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Abstract 
"Inclusion" in the broad sense of access to, and participation in, public 
policy and services has been lacking in the majority of developing countries --
whether authoritarian or democratic -- due to highly skewed political, social 
and economic power structures. To understand why this tends to be the case, 
the dissertation provides a political economy model for understanding civil 
society, arguing that the evolution of civil society and its potential as a vehicle 
for inclusion are conditioned by the economic imperatives in place and the 
state prerogatives. More specifically, 1 question the extent to which the 
neoliberal model allows civil society to fulfill this role, byexamining the 
impact of Social Funds (SFs), a key social policy institution created and 
promoted solely under the neoliberal model, on civil society in Egypt and 
Bolivia. 
1 argue that neoliberalism severely limits the possibility of: citizenship 
construction, achieving development synergy between the state and civil 
society, or strengthening the latter. These limitations are structural, inherent to 
the neoliberal development model and the changes it has brought about 
economically and politically. The research shows how these changes have 
manifestations within the state, the economy and civil society and more 
specifically social policy. Just as important, there are limitations intrinsically 
grounded in the structures found in many developing countries, pre-neoliberal 
changés. Such structures, 1 argue, do not allow new institutions like SFs to 
push forward such an ideal three-way relationship among the economy, state 
and civil society. Rather than strengthening civil society and creating 
development synergy, SFs are shown to be just an attempt to give neoliberal 
policies a human face and subdue any potential for structural changes. 
More generally, by contrasting the dynamics of civil society under 
neoliberalism in a developing country with a democratic regime (Bolivia) with 
those of a soft authoritarian regime (Egypt). 1 argue that a dichotomous 
framework, which sees democracy as antithetically opposed to 
authoritarianism is not necessarily appropriate to the analysis of developing 
countries. The cases illustrate that the state and civil society, under two-
different regime types, continue to share a number of similarities. 
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Abstract 
"L'inclusion" au sens large de l'accès aux services et de la participation 
aux prises de décision politiques fait défaut dans la majorité des pays en voie 
de développement -qu'ils soient gérés par des régimes autoritaires ou 
démocratiques- et ce à cause de structures de pouvoir politique, social et 
économique extrêmement biaisées. Pour comprendre pourquoi c'est le cas, 
cette dissertation, argumentant que l'évolution de la société civile et de ses 
potentiels en tant que véhicule pour l'inclusion est conditionnée par les 
impératifs économiques en place ainsi que par les prérogatives de l'Etat. Plus 
précisément, nous demandons à quel point le modèle néo libéral pemiet à la 
société civile de remplir ce rôle, en examinant l'impact des Fonds Sociaux 
(FS), une institution sociale et politique clé créée et développée uniquement à 
l'ère du modèle néolibéral, sur la société civile en Egypte et en Bolivie. 
Nous avançons que le néo libéralisme limite les possibilités de 
construction de la citoyenneté, d'une réalisation d'une synergie du 
développement entre l'Etat et la société civile, ou d'un renforcement de cette 
dernière. Ces limitations sont structurelles, inhérentes au modèle de 
développement néolibéral et aux changements dans le cadre de l'Etat, de 
l'économie et de la société civile et plus spécialement des politiques sociales. 
Tout aussi important, il y a des limitations inhérentes aux structures pré-
néo libérales de nombre de pays en voie de développement. Ce type de 
structures, à notre sens, ne permet pas à de nouvelles institutions comme les 
FS de favoriser une relation à trois idéale entre l'économie, l'Etat et la société 
civile. Plutôt, les FS s'avèrent être uniquement une tentative de donner aux 
politiques néo libérales un visage humain et de bloquer tout potentiel de 
changement structurel. 
Plus généralement, en comparant les dynamiques de la société civile 
sous le néo libéralisme dans un pays en voie de développement au régime 
démocratique (Bolivie) avec celles d'un régime autoritaire soft (Egypte), nous 
avançons qu'un cadre binaire, qui verrait la démocratie comme diamétralement 
opposée à l'autoritarisme n'est pas forcément adéquat pour analyser les pays en 
voie de développement. Les cas étudiés montrent en effet que, dans ces deux 
régimes de type différents, l'Etat et la société civile partagent un certain 
nombre de similitudes. 
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Chapter One 
A Political Economy Approach to Civil Society: Prospects for Inclusion 
under Neoliberalism 
Introduction 
By the end of the 1990's, the increased negative manifestations of the 
neoliberal agenda, coupled with the transition from authoritarian regimes 
towards democratically elected ones, resulted in a growing recognition by 
scholars as weIl as policy makers that issues of equity and inclusion were 
seminal for continued economic growth and political stability. In Latin 
America, the transition to electoral systems has brought with it the awareness 
that, even with democratic institutions, there could be a persistence of 
inequality and its implications for the distribution of power within those 
democracies. 1 In the Middle East, there has also been continued and 
controversial debates about the dialectical relationship between economic 
liberalization (which is being reluctantly adopted) and political opening 
(which is lagging behind), and what ramifications can these two processes 
have in terms of equity.2 Independently of its potential link to 
1 There has been numerous articles, books and edited volumes discussing these issues. For 
sorne outstanding additions see the volumes byTokman, V., Ed. (1998). Poverty and 
Ineguality in Latin America: Issues and New Challenges. Indiana, University of Notre Dame. 
;Acui'la, C. and W. Smith (1994). The Political Economy of Structural 
AdjustmentThe Logic of Support and Opposition to Neoliberal Reform. Latin American 
Political Economy in the Age ofNeoliberal Reform. E. Gamarra. New Brunswick, 
Transaction. 
,Lustig, N. (1995). Coping With Austerity. Washington D.C., Brooking Institute. 
,Castaneda, J. (1996). Democracy and Inequality in Latin America: A Tension of the 
Times. Structuring Democratic Govemance: South America in the 1990s. A. Lowenthal. 
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University. 
,Chalmers, D., C. Vilas, et al., Eds. (1997). The New Politics oflneguality in Latin 
America: Rethinking Participation and Representation. Oxford, Oxford University. 
; ECLAC reports 1992-1997; Przeworski & Marvall 19930xhom, P. and P. St arr, 
Eds. (1998). Democracy or the Market? Economie Change and Democratie Consolidation in 
Latin America. Boulder, Lynne Rienner. 
2 See Harik, 1. and D. Sullivan, Eds. (1992). Privatization and Liberalization in the Middle 
East. Bloomington, Indiana University Press. 
;Riehards, A. and J. Waterbury (1990). A Political Economy of the Middle East: 
State, Class and Economic Development. Boulder, Westview Press. 
,Murphy, E. and R. Barkey, Eds. (1993). Economic and politicalliberalization in the 
Middle East. . London, British Academie Press. 
, Brynen, R., B. Korany, et al., Eds. (1995). Political Liberalization and 
Democratization in the Arab World: Theoretical Perspectives. Boulder, Lynne Rienner. 
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democratization, in both Latin America and the Middle East, there has been 
growing concem regarding the unequal distribution of economic and political 
pain/gain associated with neoliberal policies and their effect on the inclusion 
of disadvantaged members of the population into the development processes. 
ln this dissertation, 1 argue that civil society plays an important role in 
confronting these challenges, as it is an arena in which different groups are 
able to define their interests and organize their pursuits. By allowing different 
groups (with sometimes conflicting, interests) to engage constructively with 
each other, a vibrant civil society allows for a process of balancing and 
aggregating different interests, constraining the ability if any one group to 
dominate others. The kind of inclusion and social compromise that result . 
from this process are what developing countries have been lacking, both under 
authoritarian systems and in newly democratized ones. To understand why 
this tends to be the case, the dissertation provides a political economy model 
for understanding civil society, arguing that the evolution of civil society and 
its potential for inclusion are conditioned by the economic imperatives in 
place and the state prerogatives. More specifically, 1 question the extent to 
which the neoliberal model allows civil society to fulfill this role as a vehicle 
for inclusion by examining the impact of Social Funds (SFs), as a key social 
policy institution created and promoted solely under the neoliberal model, on 
civil society in Egypt and Bolivia. In particular, 1 seek to understand whether 
or not SFs have an effect on the distribution of power and strengthening of 
actors within civil society, and the establishment of a harmonious relationship 
between civil society and the state that is conducive to positive developmental 
outcomes. In doing so, the economic and the state prerogatives under this 
model become c1ear, reflecting why they tend to encourage marginalization 
and social exclusion and curtail civil society's ability as an antidote. 
More generally, by contrasting the dynamics of civil society under 
neoliberalism in a developing country with a democratic regime (Bolivia) with 
those of a soft authoritarian regime (Egypt), 1 hope to provide insights into the 
role and the CUITent evolution of civil society in the developing world. 1 argue 
such insights have been largely ignored in the literature due to a dichotomous 
framework, which sees democracy as antithetically opposed to 
authoritarianism. This dichotomy is not necessarily appropriate to the analysis 
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of developing countries, since as the cases illustrate the state and civil society, 
under two-different regime types, continue to share a number of similarities. 
As a starting point, this chapter examines the relationship between the 
economy, civil society and the state, and how this relationship affects the 
prospects for inclusion of the marginalized. The first section presents the 
concept of civil society as part of a three-sphere model that also includes the 
state and the economy. In analyzing how the three-spheres are interconnected, 
the section explains why such a model is more suitable to the study of civil 
society in developing countries than the prevalent liberal model. After 
presenting civil society as a sphere that mediates the power configurations 
resulting from economic and state structures, the second section of the chapter 
discusses why and how civil society can act as a vehicle for inclusion, both 
under democracy and during its absence. The third section then analyzes the 
impact of the neoliberal model on civil society and its relationship with the 
state, based on the interconnectedness proposed by the three-sphere model. In 
particular, the section provides an analysis ofhow neoliberalism circumscribes . 
the potential of civil society as a vehicle for inclusion. Finally, in the last 
section of the chapter, 1 discuss the choice of cases (Egypt and Bolivia) and 
the research methodology. 
Civil Society: The Three-Sphere Model 
The concept of civil society is not foreign to political debates. From 
Hegel and Paine to Marx and Gramsci the concept has been a central theme in 
both social science and political life, albeit one with multiple definitions and 
connotations3• In this dissertation 1 borrow Taylor' s definition of civil society 
as; "a web of autonomous associations, independent of the state, which bound 
citizens together in matters of common concem, and by their mere existence 
or action could have an effect on public policy"(Taylor 1995: 204). Unlike the 
3 See Gellner, E. (1994). Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its RivaIs. London, Penguin 
Books. 
,Oxhom, P. (1995). From Controlled Inclusion to Reactionary Exclusion: The 
Struggle for Civil Society in Latin America. Civil Society: Theory, History and Comparison. 
J. Hall. Cambridge, Polit y Press. 
,Keane, J. (1998). Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions. California, Stanford 
University Press. 
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liberal Hegelian perspective of civil society based on the public/private 
dichotomy, 1 adopt a three-part conceptual model -employed by Gramsci, as 
weil as Parsons- that sees the state, the economy -meaning production, 
accumulation and consumption patterns- and civil society as constituting three 
separate but interrelated spheres4• This idea stands in sharp contrast to the 
predominant liberal Hegelian model that sees civil society as a space of 
individuals engaged in voluntary action, separate from state institutions and 
objectives. 1 argue that the three-sphere model is far better able to address the 
capacity of state/civil society partnership due to a more pragmatic and 
constructive understanding of state-civil society relations. 1 will first explain 
the shortcoming of the Iiberal view in the context of developing countries, and 
then introduce the three-sphere model as a more appropriate framework for 
understanding the realities of these countries. 
The Hegelian dichotomy has had a long philosophical genealogy and 
its application to the analysis of civil society gained particular prominence 
during the struggle against the non-democratic regimes of Eastern Europe and 
Latin America (Linz and Stepan 1996). During this 'third wave' of 
democratization liberal theorists came to see civil society as the main 
promoter for democracy and the primary safeguard against state tutelage (Hall 
1995; Keane 1998). Simultaneously, subsequent neoliberal discourse pushing 
for "diminished" state roles and apparatus also promoted civil society as a 
potential candidate for many of the chores previously belonging to the state 
(such as social services and economic support) and further validated a Iiberal 
model that understood state/civil society relations as strictly dichotomous. 
Many observers have already highlighted the biases of this liberal 
model, which derives almost exclusively from the experience of Western 
democracies and presumes a necessarily positive correlation between the 
market economy and civil society.5 However, just as important, the liberal 
4 Introduced first by Gramsci and used by Talcott Parsons', this paradigm was adopted by 
Habermas in Theory of Communicative Action, as weil as Cohen and Arato's, Civil Society 
and Political Theory. A through critique ofthis approach could be found in Keane 1998 and 
Reis 1996. 
5 Hann, C. and E. Dunn, Eds. (1996). Civil Society: Challenging Western Models. New York, 
Routledge. 
, Oxhorn, P. (2003). Conceptua1izing Civil Society from the Bottom Up: A Political 
Economy Perspective. Structural Change, Political Institutions, and Civil Society in Latin 
America, Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies,University ofCalifomia, San Diego. 
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model also promotes two key assumptions that are detrimental for the 
understanding of civil society in developing countries: 1) an apolitical nature 
of civil society that downplays the often skewed distribution of political and 
economic power in those countries; 2) a strict rivalry between civil society and 
the state. Taking each assumption in turn, 1 demonstrate their difficulties 
when applied to the case of developing countries and further de scribe how the 
three-sphere model is better able to account for the· complicated linkages in 
such countries between state, economy and civil society. 
With regard to the tirst assumption, existing inequalities create vertical 
and hierarchical dynamics of interaction within developing societies, as weil 
as sustain cultures that support such dynamics. As O'Donnell points out, huge 
social gaps induced by deep inequality foster manifold patterns of 
authoritarian relations in various encounters between the privileged and the 
rest of the society (O'Donnell 1999). As a result of the se unbalanced power 
structures, clientalism and patronage become 'natural' modes of interaction 
between different groups within civil society, as weil as between civil society 
and the state (Friedman 2002). The manifestations of entrenched clientalism 
in developing countries, thus, weaken civil society and associational culture, 
both of which frequently end up reflecting dimensions of dominatio~ and 
inequitable power relations, rather than acting in opposition to them. The shift 
to market economies during the past decade has further exacerbated these 
existing inequalities, serving to disorganize civil society and marginalize a 
number of its actors (Oxhorn 1998). Additionally, as Fox argues, the poor are 
"usually the most vulnerable to state-sanctioned coercion" and "their survival 
needs make them especially vulnerable to clientalistic incentives" (Fox 1997: 
393). The predominance of clientalism in developing countries, therefore, 
suggests that any emerging civil society will already share with, and link to, 
the state through a number of pre-determined affiliations and processes. 
As for the second assumption, the state/civil society dichotomy of the 
liberal model also suggests a zero-sum relation between the state and civil 
society, in which state intervention automatically leads to the' erosion of 
informaI networks and social capital, thus displacing and curtailing the 
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emergence, or strengthening, of civil society. According to this argument, the 
legal-bureaucratic nature of the state, even the welfare state and its distributive 
mechanisms, have a weakening effect on the social fabric and solidarity of 
communities. Such a view overlooks, tirst, the role of the state as a major 
actor in combating structural inequalities (Walzer 1992), as weil as in 
facilitating the evolution of a civil society that is both accessible to the 
disadvantaged and independent of state institutions. Second, the perception 
that the state diminishes community solidarity also neglects the inability of 
civil society to create no more than "pockets" of tolerance, inclusion or 
participation of the marginalized. It is the state, through its relationship to 
civil society, which is able to extend such pockets to the national level, 
broadening civil society's gains into more enduring structural transformations. 
As Friedman (2002) puts it: "it is the state that makes possible the citizenship 
that Marshall's defense of the welfare state was concemed to enrich and 
endow with substance because, in its democratic form, it ensures the right to 
speak, to act in pursuit of public goals, and to decide"(Friedman 2002:25). 
The nature of state institutions and policies often create incentives, 
opportunities and sanctions for distinct kinds of social mobilization and 
organization (Skocpol 1985; Oxhom 1995; Skocpol 1996; Tarrow 1996). 
Certain states provide frameworks for the iniquitous division of resources, 
determine or inhibit the power of potential interest groups and, on occasion, 
use coercive power (whether inhibitive legislation or physical repression) 
against civil society actors. Thus, as Friedman (2002) remarks, the suggestion 
that civil society is a better guarantor of liberty and equity away from the state 
may be more a symptom of the incapacity of many Southem states than a 
pointer to a real potential of civil society (Friedman 2002). That is, civil 
society can play a role on these two fronts -equity and liberty- but not in 
isolation from the state and the economic structure in place. 
In contrast to the liberal model's characterization of state/civil society 
relations as necessarily involving separation or rivalry and dismissing the 
impact of the economic sphere, in the three-sphere mode l, civil society serves 
as an arena where different groups manifest and use political and economic 
power to perpetuate or balance out pre-existing power dynamics within and/or 
between the economy and the state. Interactions between the three spheres are 
11 
dynamic and dialectical, in that any change in one of the three spheres 
necessarily has an effect on the other two. In this way, the focus of civil 
society analysis is able to shift from one that describes functional differences 
between civil society, the state and the economy, to one that illustrates how 
linkages between the spheres affect the form and role of civil society, thereby 
defining the parameters of what civil society can and cannot do within a given 
context. As 1 will show throughout this chapter, the relationship between the 
three spheres can either strengthen or inhibit civil society's ability to allow the 
disadvantaged to push forward their interests and demands. The three-sphere 
mode l, then, promotes the understanding of civil society as an arena for social 
organization that, under certain conditions, is able to facilitate inclusion. 
The three-sphere model 1 employ in this thesis builds on the idea that 
state and civil society are already interconnected actors, with amorphous 
boundaries and mutual influences (Migdal 1994).6 Evans (1996) caUs the 
most positive version of this symbiotic interchange "development synergy" 
(Evans 1996). "Development synergy" is a state/civil society relationship in 
which "civil engagement strengthens state institutions and effective state 
institutions create an environment in which civil engagement is more likely to 
thrive" (Evans 1996: 1 034). According to Evans, such a cooperative and 
complimentary relationship is also most conducive to development outputs, be 
they tangible (such as better distribution of resources) or intangible (such as 
strengthened social capital or social support networks) because it allows civil 
society and the state to complement each other. Within the liberal mode 1, in 
which the state erodes, weakens or drains resources from civil society 
institutions, it is difficult to imagine such constructive state/civil society 
interactions. Conversely, a three-sphere model that supposes 
interconnectedness rather than separation, aUows for the potential of 
state/society synergy and, thùs, is best able to address the sorts of questions 1 
6 For a detailed understanding of the different approaches on state-society relations see; 
Skocpol, T., P. Evans, et al., Eds. (1985). Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. 
, Mitchell, T. (1991). "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and their 
Critics." American Political Science Review 85(March): 77-96. 
,Migdal, J., A. Kohli, et al., Eds. (1994). State Power and Social Forces: Domination 
and Transformation in the Third Wor1d. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
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pose throughout my analyses of SFs in Bolivia and Egypt. Most notably: 
under what conditions might a relationship exist whereby civil society is both 
accessible to the marginalized while in close collaboration with the state? 
Does the evolving structure of civil society in developing countries under the 
current political economy model allow this to happen? What role does the 
state and its institutions play in this process? 
The three-sphere mode l, also understands the economy to be a sphere 
that creates certain distinctions within society, su ch as those based on the 
distribution of wealth, means of production, and division of power. Within 
this model, economic structure not only forms the basis for sorne organizations 
within civil society (such as labor and business) but also influences how the 
distribution of resources might facilitate or impede the organization of 
different groups. For example, the constituents of the informaI economy 
might find it harder to organize than more established unionized labor. By 
questioning the presumed correlation between the transition to free-market and 
civil society, the three-sphere model asks: which civil society actors are 
strengthened under this transition, which are not, and why? However, unlike 
the traditional Marxist framework, the three-sphere model acknowledges the 
non-economic axes of congruence and divergence that can affect the 
organization of civil society, such as gender and ethnicity. 
As figurel-l shows; the political economy model resulting from 
interaction and power configurations within the economy and the state 
spheres, impacts civil society. This impact in tum, can either strengthen or 
inhibit civil society's ability to allow the disadvantaged -by the political 
economy model- to push forward their interests and demands. From this 
understanding stems the importancé of civil society as the arena for social 
organization that can lead to inclusion, both under a democracy and in a non-
democratic system. 
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Figure 1-1 
State 
Political Economy Model 
(Social Policy manifestations) 
Impact 
nlmpact 
Inclusion 
Of the 
Disadvantaged 
Understanding Inclusion: The Interaction between the Three-Spheres 
As 1 have described, the three-sphere model allows me to address the 
relationship between state, economy, and civil society, as interconnected, 
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interdependent and ideally synergetic (Le. enhancing the mutual development 
of ail three spheres). In this section, 1 tum my attention more specifically to 
the role of civil society in such a model, and examine its potential as a vehicle 
for the inclusion of marginalized populations. In doing so, 1 establish a 
foundation against which later to examine those factors that, in practice, 
determine whether or not civil society actually succeeds transferring power to 
disadvantaged groups by providing them with the opportunity to organize to 
define and defend their interests in larger political processes (Oxhom 2003). 
Based on this understanding of civil society, 1 choose to focus on it, since it is 
the sphere that, in its most ideal form should play a critical part in combating 
unbalanced power relations resulting trom the political or economic 
organization of society. One useful way to de scribe this process of extending 
benefits is and combating unbalanced power relations is through the concept 
of "inclusion." Thus, this section focuses on the idea of "inclusion" and its 
relationship to civil society. What is inclusion? How does it happen? What 
role can civil society play in promoting and sustaining the inclusion of 
marginalized communities? What sorts of factors affect civil society's role? 
Finally, what might be an appropriate hypothesis about the correlation 
between regime type and inclusion (Le. possible variation in state-civil society 
relations even within democracies)? 
It is difficult to establish a measurable definition of what constitutes 
"inclusion." For sorne policy makers and scholars, the term refers to extended 
rights of citizenship. Others use the word to discuss issues of social 
democratization, equality or equity. Yet, the essence of "inclusion" remains 
the same: that is, the presence of mechanisms for ensuring that marginalized 
groups have more equitable access to different public arenas (such as public 
services and decision-making bodies) and for guaranteeing them a say in 
shaping public policy. It is "inclusion" in this broad sense of access to, and 
participation in, the public policy and services that the majority of developing 
countries -- whether authoritarian or democratic -- are lacking due to highly 
skewed political, social and economic power structures. Moreover, 1 talk 
about "inclusion" in this sense of the word when assessing the successes and 
failures of SFs in Bolivia and Egypt. 
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For the purposes of this dissertation, my definition of "inclusion" 
makes the primary presumption that inclusion is a function of structural 
dynamics; it is not the exclusive outcome of a democratic state, a more 
equitable economic structure, or a strong civil society. Rather, inclusion is the 
outcome of a myriad of political and economic dynamics, ail of which serve to 
influence whether or not different groups participate in, and shape, public 
outcomes. As Byrne (1999) argues: 
social exclusion is inherently dynamic: exclusion happens in 
time, in a time of history, and 'determines' the lives of the 
individuals and collectivities who are excluded and those 
individuals and collectivities who are noL.the term is c1early 
systemic, that is to say it is about the character of the social 
system and about the dynamic development of social structures 
(Byme 1999). 
Although a democratic system might increase the potential for inclusion, there 
is no natural correlation between the two. For example, within the new 
democracies of Latin America, regime structures allow for political choice of 
institutions and persons, but do not enhance equity and, therefore, are not truly 
inclusive according to my definition. Conversely, while the Soviet Union and 
Cuba might have been inclusive in the sense of enhancing economic equity, 
these regimes still did not allow for either political access or political change. 
This presumption about inclusion, then, further employs the three-sphere 
model's diagrammatic understanding of the interconnected relationship 
between state, economy and civil society. This multi-dimensional focus 
enables me to emphasize the unique role that civil society plays in generating 
inclusion, both in democratic (Bolivia) and in non-democratic states (Egypt), 
and to explore how the state and economy affect this role. 
ln line with this understanding of inclusion, civil society is uniquely 
poised to initiate political and economic inclusion for a number of reasons. As 
others have pointed out, "extending the benefits of collective organization can 
significantly equalize material welfare and political power" (Cohen and 
Rogers 1993: 238). On the political front, civil society relies on more than 
simply the electoral process (whereby votes can be bought, both directly and 
indirectly), or a particular oppositional activity (such as a strike). Instead, 
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civil society allows disadvantaged groups to take advantage of a number of 
different paths through which to push forward their interests and achieve their 
goals - paths that different groups are then able to modify to fit their own 
particular economic and political circumstances. On an economic front, a 
strong civil society also creates the expectation of a kind of "inclusion" that 1 
described at the beginning ofthis section. First, as Marxists and non-Marxists 
alike have observed, capitalism tends to impel states to favor the interests of 
the capitalist classes at the expense of other subordinate and less powerful 
classes (Habermas 1976; Przeworski 1985; Boron 1995). Authoritarianism 
exacerbates this tendency and increases what Cardoso (1975) has called the 
"elective affinities" between the state and entrepreneurial interests with the 
latter powerfully shaping public policy making through the informai and 
clandestine articulation between the two (Cardoso 1975; Reis 1996) This 
inequality translates into domination of, and radical deprivation among, 
groups lacking strong representation and organization. Civil society may 
control this "capitalist bias" if the market, in Walzer' s (1992) words "is set 
firmly within civil society, politically constrained, open to communal as weil 
as private initiatives, limits might be fixed on its unequal outcomes" (Walzer 
1992: 100). Civil society does this by allowing the disadvantaged to push 
forward their economic interests within public policy -at a lower transaction 
cost- and to create entities that tabs onto public resources allowing for more 
equal distribution. After ail, as Huber, points out the "degree of 
responsiveness to local needs depends very heavily on the organizational 
capacity of the local population"(Huber 2002: 467), which implies the positive 
correlation between organizational capacity and economic equity. 
Hence, civil society can play this role as a vehicle for inclusion 
through a number of interrelated and mutually reinforcing ways. First, 
through having the flexibility and adaptability to initiate, legitimize and sum-
up new forms of collective action (Tarrow 1994). For example, Las Madres 
dei Plaza de Mayo started marches for the disappeared under the Argentine 
military regime of 1978 which, in tum, gave other groups in Argentina 
impetus to march on behalf of their own respective causes. Similarly, during 
the same period, soup kitchens in other Latin American countries started 
initially as a form of social welfare, but ended up as forums for political 
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action. In these instances, where the electoral process was corrupted or not 
present, or where more traditional opposition activity was ineffective, civil 
society groups were able to push forward their interests and promote inclusion 
by hitherto unconventional means, as weil as setting precedent and example 
for other potential opposition. It is also the site -civil society- where different 
collective movements and entities can exchange experiences and re-enforce 
each other's demands. 
Likewise, strong civil society organizations serve as a vehicle for 
inclusion through their ability to shift political discourse toward their own 
particular interests and subsequently influence the development of public 
policy (Dryzek 2000). For example, the political debates taking place in the 
Eastern bloc during the 1980s were a major factor serving to ignite a transition 
to democracy at the end of the decade. In this case, civil society allowed its 
actors to reinterpret and transform social and political debates, as weil as 
conceptions of power and legitimacy (Ghannouchi 1993; Keane 1998). In the 
absence of political representation, civil society was the primary sphere where 
these groups were able to question legitimacy and collectively identify both a 
basis of resistance and a political alternative to the existing power structure. 
This new discourse, in turn, became an important factor in the conception of 
new political institutions. Rence, "the political role of civil society .. .is not 
directly related to the control or conquest of power but the generation of 
influence through ... unconstrained discussion in the cultural public sphere" 
(Cohen and Arato 1994: ix). 
Finally, by doing the above, civil society is a potential site of political 
instability for the state, as it provides its actors with a space to organize and 
prote st. That an active civil society is a source of resistance to the state, 
forces the state to consider a multiplicity of groups' interests and not to show 
excessive favor to one group at the expense of others. For example, in 1994-5 
the Bolivian state was forced into initiating a process of decentralization and 
administrative reform under the threat of civil society protests that had earlier 
brought La paz to a hait -in 1992- coupled with a concerted discourse about 
the importance of decentralization as part of respect for the country's 
multiculturalist nature. 
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In summary, civil society's ability to legitimize forms of resistance or 
protest, push discourse into the realm of public policy, and pressure states with 
the threat of collective action or resistance, gives civil society its political 
force and strategic influence. Hence, it should logically follow that the more 
civil society is able to nurture these roles, the more likely it is capable of 
balancing different interests and working for the inclusion of different groups, 
especially those with marginal political power. Civil society, "with the 
capacity to generate political alternatives and to monitor government and state, 
can help start transitions, help resist reversais, help push transitions to their 
completion, and help consolidate and deepen democracy" (Linz and Stepan 
1996: 18). As citizens define their interests, deliberate on their choices and 
push their agendas, they should begin - ideally, once again - to shape 
struggles within a political society that might otherwise exclude them. 
However, does civil society in practice actually function in such a fluid and 
constructive manner? More precisely, to what extent does civil society really 
make a difference in (and to) the context of extreme inequality? 
ln reality, vulnerabilities such as the lack of autonomous organizational 
capacity on part of civil society, state repression, clientalism, and lack of 
equitable distribution of resources to its entities have hampered civil society's 
ability to promote inclusion. These impediments do not necessarily disappear 
simply with the.evolution to a democratic regime. Examples such as those of 
the new democracies of Latin America demonstrate that, neither 
democratization nor the expansion of civil society associations necessarily 
contribute to the development of more inclusive mechanisms for the 
disadvantaged. Where, "social reform agendas that could have established the 
basis for broader popular participation and greater social equity have been 
abandoned" by Latin American states (Gwynne and Kay 2000: 151). In these 
countries, the democratic transition in many cases corresponded to a decline in 
the activities and impact of civil society on the lives of the marginalized 
(Oxhom 1994; Oxhorn 1995). What factors in the developing world, then, 
impede or assist civil society's prospect as a vehicle for inclusion? This 
dissertation will discuss the se questions at length in its case studies of civil 
society in Bolivia and Egypt. As a precursor to these cases, however, 1 would 
like to touch upon two particularly important factors influencing the success of 
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civil society in achieving the inclusion of the marginalized and disadvantaged: 
democratic transformation and the evolution of an equitable economic model. 
Of course, 1 do not wish to argue that democracy makes no difference 
to the inclusion of the marginalized. Clearly, democracy frees civil society 
from the threat of repression and coercion associated with authoritarian states. 
It further encourages "giving free rein to the expression of pent-up demands of 
downtrodden or even marginalized sectors of society, and then finding and 
implementing solutions or giving satisfaction to at least part of those demands 
soon, ifnot immediately"(Castaneda 1996: 48). Moreover, the "uncertainty of 
democracy,,7 as Przeworski caUs it, gives political players the incentive to 
compromise and include groups that they might not otherwise consider. My 
argument is that it is important to create a broader gauge of democratic 
transformation than sim ply the presence of an electoral process. As Dryzek 
(2000) describes: 
The essence of democracy itself is now widely taken to be 
deliberation, as opposed to voting, interest aggregation, 
constitutional rights, or ev en self-government" and 
democratization "is largely (but not exclusively) a matter of the 
-
progressive recognition and inclusion of different groups in the 
politicallife of society. (Dryzek 2000: 1) 
ln this definition, the role played by civil society is a crucial indicator of 
democratization, as opposed to simply an outcome of a democratic regirne. 
Others further point out the limitations of narrow definitions of democracy, 
coining the term "social democratization" to address specifically issues such 
as the inclusion of marginalized groups and their ability to channel their 
demands and reduce inequalities through modes of social organization and 
participation (Garreton 1996). That is why democracy remains a necessary, 
but not sufficient, condition for the prospects of inclusion; it gives civil society 
the potential to organize autonomously, but with the high levels of inequality 
and subsequent clientalism, civil society might not be able to take advantage 
of su ch opportunity. 
7 Alteration of power and elections, making different actors uncertain of the political 
outcome. 
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That is why an equitable economic model remains an essential 
element, not only for inclusion per se, but also for the ability of civil society to 
promote this inclusion. Even under a democracy, "widespread categorical 
inequality threatens democratic institutions twice: by giving members of 
powerful categories incentives and means to exclude others from full benefits, 
and by providing visible markers for inclusion and exclusion"(Tilly 1998: 
245). In addition to the physicallimitations inequality and economic hardship 
create for prospects of collective action, such as lack of time and capacity to 
organize, there tend to be other less material and long-term impacts of 
economic hardships. It was shown that traditional ties and networks and other 
forms of social capital are disrupted because of economic hardship, migration, 
and the emergence of fault lines, leading to erosion of social capital (Ferre ira 
and Prennushi 1999), which is a critical aspect for organization of civil 
society. Moreover, with the perpetuation of inequality, the sense of 
collectivity and solidarity tend to be overridden by individualist survival 
strategies. And the desire for structural change is replaced by a more 
individualistic des ire for economic self-improvement that can support a 
cosmic consumption pattern (Oxhorn and Starr 1998). As many observers 
agree, these individualistic overtones can be a principal threat to civil society 
itself because of the unrestrained pursuit by individuals of their own self-
interests (Waltzer 1999; Khilnani 2001; Oxhorn 2003; Oxhorn 2003). 
Subsequently, rights for disadvantaged groups that are frequently the results of 
collective struggles for citizenship rights-as opposed to clientalistic benefits-
and inclusion are jeopardized. 
Throughout this dissertation, 1 develop these ideas further, arguing that 
there are different shades of democracy, as weIl as different types of 
authoritarianism, and describing why regime-type alone is not enough to 
predict the ability of civil society to ensure inclusion. As one scholar writes, 
the nature of democratization in developing countries, and the concept of 
democracy in general, "has carried too many unexamined assumptions, 
reflecting in so doing the conditions prevailing during the emergence and 
institutionalization of democracy in the highly developed world" (O'Donnell 
1999: 304). In my comparison of a "soft" authoritarian state (Egypt) and a 
"newly democratized" one (Bolivia), 1 hope to help fill this gap in the 
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literature8 and contribute to the fine-tuning of models correlating regime-type, 
civil society, and economic structures as related to inclusion. By drawing 
attention to critical factors other than regime-type -- such as the economic 
conditions- and by emphasizing such factors' impact on inclusion, 1 
demonstrate the importance of models that attend to the particular economic 
and political conditions of developing countries. In the next section of this 
chapter, 1 address the one of the most important of these conditions: the 
propagation of the neoliberal model across the developing world. 
The ChangiIig of Civil Society Under Neoliberalism 
The 1982 Mexican crisis marked an important turning point in the 
history of international development. When the Mexican government 
announced a hait to its debt payments, the ensuing crisis resulted in, among 
other things, "a dramatic change in the priorities of the international lending 
agencies -from a professed con cern for poverty alleviation and meeting the 
poor's basic needs to securing the capacity and willingness of debtor countries 
to service their debts" (Veltmeyer and Petras 1997: 16). The economic 
policies of developing countries reflected these drastic changes when, under 
pressure of economic crisis and subsequent demands by international lending 
agencies, governments were forced to adopt a package of reforms based on the 
neoliberal model. The new model focused on five main areas, as outlined in 
the so-called Washington consensus: (1) fiscal management; (2) a declining 
state role as economic actor (i.e. privatization of state firms and prioritization 
of the private sector as the main economic agent); (3) flexible labor markets; 
(4) free trade; and (5) financial liberalization (Williamson 1993). Not only 
was this a marked shift in the economies of many developing countries, but it 
also resulted in changes oftheir political organization as neoliberalism brought 
with it normative and functionalist theories about the relationship between 
8 The literature is abundant but for interesting analysis and review of the major arguments see 
O'DonneIl, G. (1993). "On the State, Demoeratization and Sorne Coneeptual Problems: A 
Latin Ameriean View with Glanees at Sorne Posteommunist Countries." World Development 
21(8): 1359-1375. 
, Linz, J. and A. Ste pan (1996). "Toward Consolidated Demoeracies." Journal of 
Demoeraey 7(2): 14-33. 
, Collier, D. and S. Levitsky (1997). "Demoeraey with Adjectives: Coneeptual 
Innovation in Comparative Researeh." W orld Polities 49(3): 430-451. 
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politics and the state; advocating the advantages of a Iimited role of the state, 
as 1 will show later. These assumptions, in turn, had important implications 
for the formulation and implementation of development policy. Neoliberal 
reforms, then, transfigured not only the economies of many developing 
countries in Latin American and the Middle East, but also their political 
structure (a structure that, in most cases, was one in which state centralized 
bodies incorporated and administered both markets and civil society 
organizations ). 
Based on the three-part conceptualization of civil society, the economy 
and state presented above, these changes associated with neoliberalism have 
an impact on civil society, in two ways; (1) directly, through the changes in 
the economic sphere and the consequent reflections this has on civil society. 
As one observer noted, "when people change the way they use 
resources ... they change their relations with each other ... [and] ... structural 
adjustment in the economies of developing countries certainly involved 
profound change in the use, production and distribution of resources" 
(Leftwich 1994: 367), (2) Indirectly, through the changes that this model 
inflicts on the state, which resonate in civil society. The adoption of 
neoliberalism "implies not only economic restructuring but also political and 
ideological retrenchment in the relations between state and civil society" 
(Soederberg 2001: 107). 
The first set of changes that directly affected civil society under 
neoliberalism include changes in: the production regime, that is patterns of 
production, consumption and accumulation; the socio-cultural discourse; and 
axes and patterns of conflict, interest intermediation and organization for 
collective movements. There is a "recent fragmentation of national labor 
movements, the decline in the relative size of the 'core' working class due to 
deindustrialization and the growing prominence of services, challenges to 
work ethics ... -to mention only the more pertinent developments" associated 
with neoliberalism (Keane 1998). First, restructuring un der neoliberalism has 
changed the relative weight of different classes and sectors, thus leading to a 
change in power relations that is necessarily reflected on civil society. The 
changes in production pattern have meant a decline in the importance of 
organized labor vis-a-vis the capitalist class. This has meant the exclusion of 
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organized labor, an important civil society actor, strengthened under previous 
development models of the 1960s. In export-oriented economies production 
are geared towards international markets and the consumption of groups and 
classes well-connected to the circuits of international capital. "In this model 
there is little interest in the purchasing power capacity and consumption of the 
working classes, or in the economic activities of the large numbers of 
inde pendent micro, small and medium size enterprises .... "(Veltmeyer and 
Petras 1997: 26). As a result large sectors of these classes have been totally 
oppressed or marginalized by the process of neoliberal structural adjustment. 
The private sector came to be se en as the main agent of growth, and the state 
withdrew from production processes, selling on the way most of its productive 
assets and worsening wealth distribution. Thus, the state became more 
dependent than ever on the private sector as a locus for growth. 
Consequently, between 1970 and the 1990s, unions lost much oftheir political 
power, large firms buiIt up their administrative hierarchies while cutting back 
lower-Ievel jobs, and venture capitalists gained power in corporate governance 
and governments became more sympathetic with capital (Tilly 1998). This 
decline in the importance of the working-class as a necessary ally for stability 
and legitimation of the state has been retlected in new wage and employment 
bargaining systems, that give more power to employers and less to workers 
and trade unions -if they existed in the first place(Gwynne and Kay 2000; 
Huber 2002). The concomitant increasing imbalarice between the state and the 
private sector, and between capital and labor, resuIting from economic 
liberalization and privatization has also endangered the commitment to equity-
oriented policies among the state elite and paths to inclusion of different 
classes and sectors. 
Second, with the neoliberal prerogatives of decline in public sector 
employment, there was a rise of informaI economy, a sector that is much more 
'unorganized, diffuse and fragmented, than the workers in the formaI sector of 
the economy. Due to the diversified nature of this sector, in terms of 
occupations and sporadic geographical distribution, it is harder for them to 
organize. This makes them prey to marginalization and domination, and their 
relative importance for any political alliance much lower. This change in the 
relative power of the different actors is also echoed in the potentials for 
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collective action by workers -which is a major faction of civil society. 
Finally, these effects of economic change are further exacerbated by 
the neoliberal socio-cultural discourse emphasizing the importance of material 
achievement and understanding it as an outcome of individual effort and 
success independent from any structural conditions. Unlike previous capitalist 
development eras, there is no alternative discourse questioning or challenging 
this individualist push, such as the Marxist, neo-Marxist, anarchist, or even 
social democratic discourses that were present during the 1950s, 60s and early 
70s. Neoliberalism exists at a historical juncture where there is no other 
alternative model. Modernizing in order to find a place within the ever more 
competitive world markets became the justification for adoption of the 
neoliberal model with the 'lack of alternatives' rhetoric (Fukuyama 1992). 
These prerogatives are being promoted as the only possible mode of conduct 
for the economy and the state and outcome of accumulated human experience 
in political and economic organization. This position was further strengthened 
by the perceived failure of the previous political economy paradigm of inward 
orientation (Gwynne and Kay 2000). This transformation came in the 1980s 
with the exhaustion of sate socialist models and related policies, creating an 
ideological hegemony of the neoliberal model with its neoclassical, liberal 
direction. This 'perception' of the inevitability ofneoliberalism coupled with 
what Francis Fukuyama called the 'end of history', referring to the hegemony 
of the current model and the lack of alternatives is what makes it a reality; i.e. 
it is a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
The second set of neoliberal changes has been affecting civil society 
via the state. In normative terms, neoliberalism is a shift in state prerogatives 
and structure into what has been called by sorne the 'national competition 
state'. That is "a state in which aIl policy formulation (e.g. social and welfare 
benefits) are subordinated to the goal of attracting and retaining the most 
capital investment possible"(Soederberg 2001: 107). In this model, the state is 
viewed either as 'constraining' or 'enabling' and society is reduced to the 
characteristics of people as conSumers (Mohan and Stokke 2000). In this 
neoliberal discourse on the state, two points are emphasized: the importance of 
the state as an agent of growth and not equity or distribution; and, following 
from this, the significance of its relations with business, as opposed to other 
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classes or social groups (Williamson 1993; Friedman 2002). The state as an 
"active' actor is inherently defied under the neoliberal model both financially 
and ideologically. Financially, with privatization of state owned as sets, and 
the withdrawal of the state from production processes, state revenue has been 
decreasing, with no alternative sources of revenue. Governments have not 
been able to raise the revenue necessary for the pursuit of effective antipoverty 
policies, or any broad coverage, quality social policy (Huber 2002). Secondly, 
the state lacks a vision of its goals and he kind of relationship, alliances and 
coalitions it wants or need to build with the different actors, including civil 
society actors apart from business interests. There is no '''positive consensus' 
regarding the principles that should guide more fundamental restructuring ... a 
basic sense ofthe kind of society that is sought, a 'vision' ofthe ultimate goals 
of reform. The market-oriented agenda by itself does not provide an adequate 
vision"(Nelson 1995: 51). 
Concomitantly, neoliberals stress the imperative of the 'insulation' of 
the state from 'particularistic' demands, in order to free itself from pressures 
from below. The idea ofa 'captured' state is by no means new to the political 
discourse on the state, from the far left to the right, but it has taken on different 
interpretations. Marx referred to the "completely autonomous position" the 
French state was able to attain under Louis Bonaparte. Astate that arose out 
of the balance of class forces in society, and so was captivated by none, still 
acted to promote capitalism in general. The idea also was resurrected in the 
literature on the developmental state and selective 'insulation' towards 
populi st demands but not informative business groups.9 This approach stands 
in sharp contra st to the idea of 'development synergy,' which proposes a 
collaborative relationship between the state and civil society. The modus 
operandi of the neoliberal technocratic approach is of the insulation of 
decision-making, where policy-making becomes the realm of technocrats and 
experts, distancing it even further trom actors of civil society, as 
representatives of 'particularistic' interests. It is an approach that by definition 
creates or nurtures antagonist relations between civil society and the state and 
further excludes the less-powerful trom possibility of directing public policy 
9 See Evans embedded autonomy. 
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to their advantage. According to Cohen and Arato, "an antagonistic relation of 
civil society, or its actors, to the economy or the state arises ... when the 
institutions of economic and political society serve to insulate decision making 
and decision makers from the influence of social organizations, initiatives, and 
forms of public discussion"(Cohen and Arato 1994: x). The state was not 
required to formulate an obligation or responsibility towards consultation on 
policy-making and/or inclusion of different groups' views. This, neoliberal 
position on the state seems to be at odds with potential strengthening of civil 
society or establishment of cooperative relations between the state and civil 
society. 
Does this mean that neoliberalism cannot evolve into the sort of 
inclusive model that opens up paths toward new pluralistic political structures 
(Oxhom 1996)? Will the state-civil society relationship under neoliberalism 
bec orne one of domination, asymmetric and co-optation, or will it be balanced 
and harmonious? Will it create positive spaces for the unprivileged to define, 
express and achieve their interests? Or will it continue a systematic process of 
marginalization, limiting the emergence of a strong civil society and 
hampering its facilitation of popular inclusion. JO As Ferreira and Prennushi 
(1999) note: "crises may be times of opportunity to implement policies that 
lead to positive and persistent distribution or social benefits, as they create a 
sense of urgency and a focus on the plight of the poorest, and as social unrest 
may threaten the social fabric" (Ferreira and Prennushi 1999: 18). At the 
moment, it seems that the neoliberal model is undergoing a crisis, one that 
stems from a production regime that marginalizes large sectors of society, and 
worsens unresolved distributional conflicts. Running parallel to these 
conflicts are the increasing demands for political inclusion and raised 
expectations regarding citizenship rights and access to decision-making arenas 
promised by the democratization process. This thesis addresses these tensions 
inherent to neoliberal reform through the lens of one particular institution: the 
Social Fund (SF). 
10 Following Oxhom, this term will be used through out the paper to refer to the inclusion of 
popular -Iower socio-economic classes (including the proletariat, the lumpen-proletariat and 
the lower middle classes). Oxhom, P. (1995). Organizing Civil Society: The Popular Sectors 
and the Struggle for Democracy in Chile. Pennsylvania, Penn State University. 
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SFs are both products of, and vehicles for, neoliberal refonn in Egypt 
and Bolivia, and created, in part, to bolster civil so~iety initiatives. In 
particular, "when institutions bring people together in similarly structured 
situations, individuals are Iikely to feel that their private grievances are 
collectively shared and collectively soluble"(Eckstein 2001: 331), thus 
encouraging collective mobilization and organization. Thus, SFs success or 
failure at bolstering civil society and facilitating inclusion of disadvantaged 
populations is, therefore, a microcosm of the successes and failures of 
neoliberalism itself. The next section describes the benetits and 
methodologies of using SFs in Bolivia and Egypt as cases studies for 
examining the prospects for inclusion under neoliberalism in developing 
countries. 
The Cases 
1 chose Bolivia and Egypt as case studies because of a number of 
similarities and differences that were relevant to the theoretical questions of 
this research. The two case studies demonstrate interesting variations in the 
dependent and intervening variables of civil society and political economy 
model, while the common features of the independent variable, SFs, make the 
comparison feasible. The tirst and most important of these differences is 
regime-type. Many institutionalists have stressed the importance of context in 
explaining the workings and meanings of institutions. Institutions themselves 
may provide a context for political action, yet contextual factors affect the 
functioning and salience of institutions (Immergut 1998: 35). Thus, variation 
in context can lead to variation in institutional dynamics and, consequently, 
outcomes. In this research, the main difference in context is the political 
regime type as the intervening variable that might (or might not) affect the 
functioning and outcome of the two SFs; that is, whether or not a regime-type 
an 'electoral democracy' or an authoritarianone11 has an impact. "Although 
11 The term 'electoral democracy' is used for more precision and to avoid subjective value-
judgements regarding what democracy is and is not. In this respect a minimalistlfunctional 
definition of democracy is adopted where the term delineates "a set of institutions that permits 
the entire adult population to act as citizens by choosing their leading decision makers in a 
competitive, fair, and regularly scheduled elections which are held in the context of the rule of 
law, guarantees for political freedom, and Iimited military prerogative"(Karl 1990:2) Karl, T. 
L. (1990). "The Dilemma of Democratization." Comparative P olitics 23(October): 1-21. 
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the full range of institutional spaces is strongly affected by the type of political 
regime, there are important variations across institutional domains" in the 
sense that not ail institutions are influenced by the regime type to the same 
degree (Je lin 1996: 102). Having cases with different regime types will clarify 
to what degree are SFs, in their relationship to civil society, vulnerable to the 
kind of regime in place. Such findings will further add to our understanding 
of the controversial relationship between civil society and democracy. Ooes 
democracy facilitate inclusion? Ooes it facilitate strengthening of civil 
society? Or is civil society solely dependent on institutional dynamics devoid 
of regime-type? Is civil society able to be the main vehicle for inclusion in 
unequal societies? Or is exclusion ontological to neoliberalism and not altered 
by democracy or the lack thereof? 
These questions are especially important to the current study of 
comparative politics in developing countries, due to the lack of understanding 
of the unraveling citizenship construction in these countries. Contrary to the 
development path followed by Western democracy, the construction of 
citizenship rights in developing countries does not seem to be following the 
classic T.H. Marshall linear process of acquisition of civil rights, followed by 
the political and, finally, the social. A study of citizenship in Latin America 
confirms that, "in Latin America states that gained legitimacy and social 
consensus on the basis of their active role in the provision of services, issues 
of political democracy and civil rights were pushed into the background" 
(Je lin 1996: 108). Moreover, "a wide range of political systems, including 
many which hold regular elections, oblige po or people to sacrifice their 
political rights in order to gain access to distributive programs. Such 
conditionality blocks the exercise of citizenship rights" (Fox 1997: 393). 
Thus, it is not clear, in the case of developing countries, what is the correlation 
between political rights and their extension through democracy, and social 
rights. In addition, social rights are not only important for our understanding 
of citizenship in those countries, but also are critical to our understanding of 
the democratic future. As O'Oonnell puts it, in order for "political equality" 
underlying democracy to be effective and not purely formai, there has to be 
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measures for equality on other levels outside the political realm. This 
realization, which in the case of developed countries propelled (1) the 
expansion and complex institutionality of the welfare state and (2) the need for 
more specific measures for the-Iess vulnerable or less-able to organize groups 
(O'DonneIl 1999), seems to be missing in developing countries. Thus, it is 
important to look at social policy initiatives in a developing democracy and a 
non-democracy in order to closely and realistically examine if, after aIl, 
democracy makes a difference or not? 
Bolivia makes for an interesting case since it comprises a case where 
democratic transition took place during severe and prolonged economic crisis, 
coupled with a dramatic shift towards market economy. Equally interesting is 
Egypt, has not witnessed a shift to democracy and where economic reforms 
have been much slower. Yet, the two countries share a number of common 
features. The timing of initial insertion into the world economy was the same 
for both regions, along with the sequence of their adoption of development 
models; trom import substitution to neoliberal policies. PoliticaIly, they both 
suffered extended periods of authoritarianism. 
Although Bolivia is a democracy, while Egypt is not, they still share a 
number of political features. Both countries show very high levels of 
clientalism and state-corporatism. Egypt has been ruled by the same party 
since the re-establishment of a multiparty system in 1977 and, along with a 
modern history of military rule, patron-client relations have become the norm 
within the Egyptian political arena. Bolivia has witnessed change in ruling 
parties since the shift to democracy in 1982. Yet, it "is an extreme example of 
patrimonial politics, in which the behavior of political parties and other actors 
is driven by access to patronage and other rents" (Gamara and Malloy 1995: 
421). Each of the two countries has an established history of centralization of 
power (although with varying degrees of success) and a tradition of a 
politicized state where there is no distinction between the ruling-party, the 
bureaucracy and the state. 
Yet there are a number of areas in which Egyptian experience, 
contradicts that of Bolivia, and in general the expectations of Latin American 
observers, three of which are of relevance to this research. First unlike 
Bolivia, in Egypt, a "flexible network of corporatist groups has helped to 
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buttress authoritarian mie" while the attempt "to squeeze interest 
representation into a tighter corporatist straightjacket has provoked political 
disorder and ... a more powerful opposition" (Bianchi 1989). Second, Egypt's 
previous experience with populist authoritarianism during Nasser's era has 
served more as a long-term deterrent against bureaucratie authoritarianism, 
rather than as a prelude to it as in the case of Bolivia. Finally, unlike Bolivia, 
Egypt is characterized by prolonged political stability both in regime-Ievel and 
frequency of massive protests and rebellion. 
The two countries also differ in state capability and societal make up. 
Although both cases could be seen as 'weak' states (according to the criteria 
developed by (Migdal 1988) and (Evans 1997), their weakness have different 
manifestations. One of the manifestations relevant to this research is the 
composition of the bureaucracy. While the Bolivian bureaucracy is almost 
non-existent, with neither espirit de corps nor defined interests, the Egyptian 
bureaucracy is overly and overtly strong. In the Bolivian case, the Fund, and 
the state in general, cannot easily pursue designed strategies because of lack of 
capability of the state apparatus. The bureaucracy is not established enough, 
in terms of its penetration of society, its personnel, nor the ability to pursue 
policy goals. In Egypt, the outcome is the same with regards to the state not 
being able to pursue its plans, but for a different reason. The Egyptian 
bureaucracy is too entrenched with vested interests of its own, interests which, 
at many times, are contrary to change and reform. Because of the Egyptian 
bureaucracy's high capabilities, it is able to dilute or ev en bloc many reforms, 
as the experience with Social Fund for Development (SFD) projects show. 
This same feature of the state gives decentralization higher potential in Bolivia 
than it does in Egypt. Yet, at the same time, it provides the Egyptian case with 
a stronger base for strengthening state institutions' -- including SFs -- than is 
the case in Bolivia. This variation in capabilities leads to interesting questions 
as to whether less penetrating states are 'better' for local democratization and 
inclusion? Or is an 'established' bureaucracy a prerequisite for development 
synergy? The answers to these questions are the pillars upon which state-civil 
society relations are built, thus they will tell us a lot about the potential of this 
relationship, as weil as the prerequisites (if any) for stronger civil societies to 
evolve in developing states context. 
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In the two cases, civil society is also weak, but again on different 
dimensions and for different reasons. In terms of ethnic composition, Egypt is 
a very homogenous society, while in Bolivia, ethnicity the main dividing line 
on issues of equality and inclusion. These demographic factors help to 
characterize civil society, its actors and the axis of mobilization - ethnicity, 
social justice, citizenship -- they work on. It also has implications on the kind 
of compromises the state will choose to make in order to improve its relations 
with civil society, as weIl as the mechanisms for co-option of dissenting 
groups. For example, in Bolivia, astate focus on, or concession to, indigenous 
groups improves the state-civil society rapport, while in Egypt, the state will 
need to define which actors are of significance to it. Demographically, Bolivia 
is much smaller than Egypt, 8 and 70 million, respectively. Hence, issues of 
poverty, growth and distribution have very different dimensions and scale in 
the two cases. 
The economic base of Bolivia is much less diversified and productive 
than that of Egypt so, for SFs, this means that one can expect very different 
political and even economic impacts due to the different magnitude of issues a 
Fund must address. More broadly, both countries have been adopting 
neoliberal economic policies and promoting more or less the same economic 
rhetoric regarding the role of the state, market forces and other economic 
actors. Both are still grappling with the after effects of structural adjustment 
programs (SAPs), including worsening levels of distribution, a declining 
standard of living among much of the population, a decreasing pace of growth, 
changing political coalitions, and heightening corruption with the domination 
of certain groups' interests over others. Specifically, both countries are giving 
an increased role to the private sector and are seeking to establish a private-
public div ide in terms of development chores. Thus, they both are supposedly 
seeking 'development synergy' with non-state partners. 
Finally, the Bolivian and Egyptian Social Funds were chosen because 
they are the oldest and most established in Latin America and the Middle East, 
respectively (the ESF since 1987 and SFD since 1991). The Egyptian Social 
Fund is also the largest in the world (De Haan, Holland et al. 2002). They are 
both working closely with civil society organizations and adopting the same 
approach of participatory development, although the nature of their projects 
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differs, as will be shown in the following chapters. In addition, the two funds 
were initiated at the peak of economic cri sis in each of the two countries. 
They both came as initiatives spearheaded by the executive and backed by the 
international support of the W orld Bank. 
The similarities and contrasts of the two cases promise richness and 
rigor for the research findings and conclusions. The choice of cross-regional 
case studies will give comparative breath to the findings, in two different 
political, economic and social contexts, and allow for theory-building. 
Realizing commonalities and differences between the cases, this dissertation 
s~ikes a balance between reaching theory-building generalizations and 
drawing case-specifie particularities that will help to better understanding of 
the two cases and the two regions. 
Methodology12 
Using institutions (SFs) as the independent variable, my research 
explores empirically how Funds affect power dynamics within civil society 
and between civil society and the state under two different regime types 
(democratic and authoritarian). The study examines the effect of Social Funds 
on local community organizations, in Bolivia and Egypt, and their linkages 
with the state. Hence, the dependent variable is civil society. Due to the 
complexity of the dependent variable, and in an attempt to operationalize and 
allow measurement for valid reliable findings, the following set of indicators 
were developed based on the factors identified earlier as determining a 
positive impact of social policy institutions on civil society: 
I-Participation: My research investigates stakeholder participation within SFs 
institutional structure and their projects. Who participates, how, and at what 
stages of the project-cyde (decision-making, implementation, etc)? Do these 
participation mechanisms allow for, or require, horizontal cooperation 
amongst stakeholders or only vertical relations? 
12 For more details on the methodology see Appendix 1. 
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2-Accountability: Are SFs accountable J3 to their govemments, the donors or 
the communities with which they work? What happens wh en there is a 
conflict of interest between the different stakeholders? What are channels 
reflect accountability? Is accountability supported by sufficient transparency 
and access to information for all relevant actors? 
3-Embeddedness14: 1 examine the lev el and type of communication between 
local actors and SFs employees on site and in the central office, especially the 
existence of sustainable community-govemment communication channels. 
How are they institutionalized, formally or informally? What are the channels 
for institutionalization? Are they known to, and used by, the beneficiaries/the 
community? 
4-Intervenening Variable/ 5: 1 use two determinants -which are closely 
related or by-products of regime-type: (a) Provision and enforcement of 
universal rules that allow for the organization of the less privileged; (b) Public 
provision of intangibles such as dissemination of knowledge and media 
publicity. 
Conclusion 
It is clear that civil society's ability to champion democracy and 
inclusion of the marginalized is determined to a great extent by structural 
conditions put forward by the economic and political model in place. In 
contrast to the liberal view, this ability is not unconditionally or essentially 
inherent to civil society per se. This is especially true in the context of 
developing countries, where high levels of inequality, concomitant clientalism, 
and the absence of accumulated systematic organization and mobilization 
experience further limit the ability of civil society to construct inclusive 
13 Accountability is understood here, as the ability of constituents to discern responsive from 
unresponsive officiaIs and sanction them accordingly. 
14 This indicator is adopted from Peter Evans work on development synergy. Evans, P. (1996). 
"Deve\opment Strategies Across the Public-Private Divide." WorId Development 32(6): 1033-
1037. 
15 This indicator is meant to assess, in order to control for, the intervening variables that might 
have an effect on the dependent variable but not as a result of the independent variable in 
question. 
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citizenship rights. Moreover, 1 argued that in such context, the transition to 
democratic regimes does not necessarily increase civil society's propensity to 
extend citizenship and inclusion. So far, this limited ability have been further 
constrained under neoliberal reforms. However, social funds seem to be a 
relatively recent neoliberal institution trying to establish collaborative relations 
between the state and sorne factions of civil society, and by doing so claim to 
be strengthening civil society. 
In the following chapters 1 will situate the study of SFs within the 
three-sphere mode l, using Egypt and Bolivia as in-depth case studies. Chapter 
Two discusses the development of SFs as an outcome of neoliberal shifts in 
social policy in developing countries, and how they manifest the use of social 
policy for political purposes. Chapter Three will examine the evolution of 
state-civil society relations in Egypt and Bolivia, in order to provide an 
understanding of the contexts in which each of SFs is functioning. Chapters 
Four and Five, will then present the findings on the Egyptian and Bolivian 
cases, respectively, and offer an account of the SF and the circumstances 
surrounding its initiation, and a description of both SF's dynamics and its 
outcomes in the communities with which it works. In the final chapter, 1 draw 
comparative lessons from the cases and general conclusions based on the 
hypothesis and research questions presented in this chapter. 
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ChapterTwo 
Social Policy Under Neoliberalism: The Rise of Social Investment Funds 
From their initial implementation in post-War Europe, the goals of 
social policy as manifested in the welfare state have been contested terrain. 16 
Social policies generally fall un der one of two main categories: universal, 
referring to programs embracing the entire citizenry without reference to 
economic need; and selective, referring to provision of services or support tied 
to lack of economic capabil ity. Each of the se two main types coincides with 
the certain ideological orientations of a country's political economy model 
(Offe 1984; Esping-Andersen 1990; Rothstein 1998; Midgley 1999). 
Universal social policy is mainly adopted by those political economy models 
"concemed with the overall dispersion of individual incomes, considering that 
excessive differences are detrimental to social cohesion" and contradictory to 
the notion of equality of citizens (Sturm 2000: 216). Under such models, 
social entitlements are part of the citizenship rights conferred by the state. 
This "maximalist conception" of social policy sees its role as providing every 
citizen with an adequate share in economic and social resources so that every 
individual is able to fully develop her or his capacity (Huber 2002). Selective 
social policy, by contrast, is found within liberal political economy models 
"not concemed with income distribution per se, but primarily with people 
whose income is below a somehow defined poverty threshold" (Sturm 2000: 
216). Such a "minimalist conception" of social policy sees its role as 
promoting political stability and curtailing potential social unrest, which may 
cause economic disruption. In other words, in this model the state is 
16 For good examples of the different arguments seeEsping-Andersen, G. (1990). The Three 
Worlds ofWelfare Capitalism. London, Polit y Press. • 
Titmuss, R. (1974). Social Policy:An Introduction. London, Allen & Unwin. 
,Offe, C., Ed. (1984). Contradictions of the Welfare State. Cambridge, MIT Press. 
,Jespersen, 1. (1996). Macroeconomic Analysis of the Welfare State: A Post-
Keynesian View. Comparative Welfare Systems: The Scandinavian Model in a Period of 
Change. B. Greve. London, McMillan Press. 
, Rothstein, B. (1998). Just Institutions Matter: The Moral and Political Logic of the 
Universal Welfare State. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
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responsible for providing the minimum needs for living rather than 
guaranteeing equitable distribution of resources. 
These different conceptions of social policy further retlect different 
conceptions of citizenship and the role of the state versus the individual. As 
Huber puts it, "the different govemments' approaches to social policy reform 
correspond closely to their vision of an appropriate model of the relationship 
between state and market, and state and civil society"(Huber 2002: 463). 
Under the first model, supremacy is given to the citizen as deserving in her/his 
own right, with astate responsibility towards aU, while under the second, 
economic considerations reign supreme, with citizenship rights being a means 
to other ends (political stability or economic performance), and the state's role 
confined only to helping the needy. Prerogatives of lasses-faire and minimal 
state social responsibility underline the latter model. Thus, it was no 
coincidence that the welfare state expanded the most under social democratic 
European govemments seeking to mie through the supremacy of citizenship 
rights, white Iiberal democratic Anglo-Saxon govemments preferred the 
minimalist approach emphasizing the supremacy of economic efficiency. The 
economic model under the social democratic model stressed equitable 
distribution of output, through progressive taxation systems and labor codes. 
Interest intermediation between state and civil society balanced the interests of 
business with that of labor, Iinking them closely to the state, as relatively equal 
partners in societal corporatism. While under the Iiberal democratic model, 
business interests and minimal taxation along with minimal state intervention 
in distribution of resources are the imperatives. 
This variance in traditional forms of social policy, as weIl as in 
contemporary approaches to reform, "make it clear that social policy designs 
are a profoundly political question, shaped by power and interests, not a 
technical question of finding the most efficient design to achieve generally 
shared goals"(Huber 2002: 462). Thus, we should expect that the imperatives 
of the neoliberal model would be retlected in the design and direction of social 
policy as weIl. Based on the three-spheres' model and the notion of civil 
society as a vehicle for inclusion which 1 introduced in Chapter One, this 
chapter will examine one particular social policy institution - Social Funds 
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(SFs) -- as a product of the neoliberal model's unique refraction of civil 
society. 
Research into social policy initiatives like Social Funds is of critical 
importance since social policy reform is underway in almost ail developing 
countries, propelled by the pressure of a burdensome 'social debt' and the 
danger of political instability. The Middle East and Latin America, in 
particular, are two such regions feeling the urgency of the se new reforms. 
Govemments of both regions are confronting political and social instability 
and discontent brought on by decades of deficient and stalled social policy 
initiatives (Estes 2000). However, in spite of the urgency of social reforms, it 
is not necessarily c1ear which reforms are appropriate to specific national 
political economy contexts in the developing world (Grindle 2000). 
Especially, that the liberal nature of the economy that these developing 
countries are establishing prevents social policies from achieving the degree of 
comprehensive rationality and effective implementation that there social 
policy reform is c1aiming to seek. Because such social policy needs to be 
"immune from the corrosive impact of economic change, fiscal crises, and 
business cycle fluctuations" inherent to the liberal/ neoclassical model (Offe 
1996: 151). What is the relationship between specific reforms and prerequisite 
state capabilities and economic prerogatives? What practical role can civil 
society play? And what are the implications of the reforms being designed or 
implemented on the development of citizenship rights in those countries? As 
will become apparent in my case studies, too often states fail to address the se 
questions effectively prior to the implementation of social reforms. 
This is especially important since those changes and reforms, no matter 
what their shape, will have far-reaching, and often unpredictable, effects on 
both citizens and states; changes which are at the heart of issues of 
govemance, citizenship and democracy, but which we have yet to adequately 
understand. As TuIchin puts it, the changes in social policy "will significantly 
alter the relationship between the state and its citizens; yet, there has been Iittle 
serious consideration of the political, social, and economic consequences of 
these trends" (TuIchin 2000). In particular, it is not cIear what impact will 
those reforms have on civil society. How will they empower or disempower 
certain sectors of society and why? And how do these reforms affect the 
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c1aimed desires of developing countries to democratize and increase equality? 
By answering these questions, the study of social policy institutions not only 
helps us understand the relationship between state and citizen, but also gives 
us insights into an issue of major theoretical and practical importance: the 
impact of social reform on processes of democratization, construction of 
citizenship, inclusion and equity(Fox 1997; Tulchin 2000). 
The following sections analyze the shifts in social policy prerogatives 
un der neoliberalism and de scribe how the evolution of SFs is a reflection of 
these shifts. The chapter then proceeds to an analysis of SFs as potential 
mechanisms for strengthening civil society and its relationship with the state. 
Social Policy and the Neoliberal Changes 
Social policy in the pre-neoliberal era highlights the various problems 
of the state, economic model and civil society during that period. Plagued by 
corruption, rent-seeking and leakage of resources to the less-needy, social 
policy institutions in most of the developing world were more ofa burden than 
a benefit to these societies. Part of what Chalmers calls a 'politicized state,' 17 
the social sector had no professional bureaucracy in the Weberian sense. 
Rather it was dominated by the vested interests of political actors, specifically 
populi st politicians and self-serving bureaucracies. Flowing trom the 
centralized state structures of the se countries, as weil as trom their clientalistic 
pattern of interest intermediation, patterns of distribution relied upon massive 
welfare bureaucracies to manage social demands and were channeled in a 
highly centralized fashion through political organizations (such as the ruling 
party and labor unions), thus creating a system of patronage and c1ientalism 
(Nelson 2000). Not only did this politicized, centralized pattern of service 
provision consolidate existing c1ientalism, inequality, and open doors for rent-
seeking, but it also shut out citizens' feedback, leading to degradation of 
services and misplacement of resources. As one scholar puts it, ministries 
administered public goods in a highly centralized structure that rarely 
17 That is astate where there is no distinction between the "executive" as ah established esprit 
de corps and the ruIing-eIite. In such astate, there are Iittie established ruIes, and the 
'govemment' is equivaient to the 'state' Chaimers, D. (\ 978). The Politicized State in Latin 
America. Authoritarianism and Comoratism in Latin America. J. Malloy. Pittsburgh, 
University of Pittsburgh Press. 
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consulted beneficiaries or bodies responsible for pro gram implementation at 
the local level (Tulchin 2000). In many instances, citizens received two 
schools when they only needed one, or were given a school when they needed 
medical facilities instead. And, quite often, they got nothing at aIl. 
For the most part, the system favored the most poiitically vocal, i.e. 
urban classes and unionized sectors. In Latin America and, to a lesser extent, 
in the Middle East, oIder welfare institutions incorporated the urban middle 
classes, leaving out peasants and the urban poor (Diaz 1997). Moreover, the 
system gave priority to the bureaucracy that was supposed to deliver the se 
social services, rather than the services themselves. So by the early 1990s, 
many ministries of health and education had made no substantial investments 
in expanded or improved facilities in over a decade, and were spending almost 
aIl of their budgets on personnel (Grindle 2000). The lack of economic rigor, 
politicized distribution practices and subsequent leakage of resources were 
matched by systemic corruption, whereby citizens had to 'pay' for supposedly 
free services and contractors had to 'pay' in order to get service provision 
bids. PoliticaIly, this meant that, "by the 1980s, ascendant technocrats who 
viewed the old-fashioned brokers as both expensive and poiitically ineffective 
moved social policy away from reliance on traditional patronage and 
generalized subsidies towards measures ostensibly more targeted directly to 
the poor"(Fox 1997: 400). At the same time, it became apparent that with the 
neoliberal economic restructuring of the 80s and the 90s there had been a 
significant increase in the rates of open and underemployment, a reduction in 
the capacity of the formaI sector to absorb surplus labor, and a growth in 
potentially destabilizing levels of inequality. 
There was, therefore, a dire need for new social policy institutions that 
would act as safety nets dealing with large segments of the population totally 
deprived of basic human needs. Those 'nets' are broadly defined as 
"instruments aimed at mitigating possible adverse effects of reform measures 
on the poor .. .including temporary arrangements, as weIl as existing social 
protection measures reformed and adapted this purpose" (Gupta and Chu 
1998: 7). Concomitantly, the neoliberal model has given certain direction and 
content to social policy programs. The aim of both governments as weIl as 
international financial institutions was to devise social safety nets that 
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promoted the twin objectives of reducing povertY and increasing economic 
growth (Inter-American Development Bank 2000). It was argued by 
advocates of the neoliberal model that: 
safety nets can help ensure that crises do not haIt development 
- that essential household investments in health and education, 
which are crucial for both current welfare and future growth, 
are maintained, and that the poor do not divest from physical 
capital upon which their productivity depends to finance 
consumption (Ferreira and Prennushi 1999: 10). 
Proponents of neoliberalism understood an effective safety net institution as a 
long-term investment, one that would supposedly deal with the destabilizing 
negative political and economic effects of neoliberalism on society, while at 
the same time over-come the problems of the traditional social policy 
institutions in developing countries. The change in social policy under the 
neoliberal model, were reflected in the shift in discourse and practice, away 
from social rights to social protection. 18 That is, citizens were viewed in an 
instrumental way, whereby granting them social protection is the means to 
further productivity, rather than guaranteeing them social services as part of 
their rights as citizens -as an ends in and by itself. This logic, as we will see 
later has significant ramifications on the scope and magnitude of social 
services as weil as the conception of ideal goveming citizenship and power 
schemes. With underlying princip les of minimizing the role of the state, an 
increased emphasis on retum on investments (i.e. economic efficiency) and an 
increased role for civil society in service delivery. The key element here is that 
civil society is pushed away from its traditional role as an arena for demand 
and pressure i.e. citizens struggle for rights, to a replacement for the state in 
providing social services. 
18 The shift could be easily detected in the literature, produced by the different donor agencies, 
as weil as govemments' policy papers, for example see; Inter-American Development Bank, 
Ed. (2000). Social Protection For Eguity and Growth. Washington D.C., Johns Hopkins 
University. 
, Jorgensen, S. and 1. Van Domelen (2001). Helping the Poor Manage Risk Better: 
The Role of Social Funds. Shielding the Poor: Social Protection in the Developing World. N. 
Lustig. Washington D.C., Brookings Institutions Press. 
, The World Bank (2001). Social Protection Sector Strategy: From Safety Net to 
Springboard. Washington D.C., The World Bank. 
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ln particular, three major changes in the formation of social safety nets 
during the neoliberal era are of interest to the issue of social policy's impact 
on civil society. These changes emerged mainly as a reaction to the problems 
sketched above. First, there was a general conflation of the idea of "citizen" 
with that of "customer" which entailed a movement away from state 
commitment to universal coverage in order to enhance economic efficiency. 
Next, neoliberal reforms emphasized a decentralization of services in terms of 
management and delivery in order to combat clientalism and rent-seeking and 
improve targeting of resources. FinaUy, at a later stage, there was an attempt 
to give prominence to the idea of different services' beneficiaries' 
participation, in order to improve quality of services. Policymakers and 
technocrats emphasized that aU three shifts were to be integrated in the 
neoliberal social safety nets in order to. overcome the problems of existing 
social policy institutions. 1 will address each ofthese three changes in tum. 
Under what Pestoff caUs, "customerization", citizens become 
'customers' to whom public services are offered selectively, and where 
'customer satisfaction' replaces more political notions of social rights and 
political accountability (Pestoff 1998). Customers have the right to 'exit' if 
not satisfied, rather than engaging into political struggles for their 'rights', 
which is the case under the different ideological underpinning of 'social 
citizenship'. By "exiting" state service institutions, the citizen/consumer is 
"free" to satisfY his or her needs elsewhere and, in so doing, promotes the 
growth of a privatized service industry that subsequently steps in to meet 
"consumer" demand. Indeed, "the state has tried to reduce its long-term 
commitment to social provision and to create more market-driven forms of 
social support"(Gwynne and Kay 2000: 150), and so guarantee economic 
efficiency and market restructuring. Starting in ChiIe under Pinochet, and 
later spreading throughout the developing world, states started privatizing 
pension funds and delegating provision of heaIth services to the private sector, 
whether in conjunction with the state or not. The rationale behind su ch 
restructuring was the assumption that market dynamics which dictate optimal 
investments and economic efficiency, will not aUow the use of resources for 
personal or political gains(Soederberg 2001). The beneficiary as 'customer,' 
then, is less likely to become a potential 'political client' and competition 
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among service providers would increase their efficiency and the quality of 
service. 
Another anticipated result of the "customerization" of citizens was the 
ability of the state to strengthen its role as service provider to the neediest 
sections of society. This reflects the frequent critique of universalistic 
programs that they waste scarce resources on middle- and upper-income 
earners who least need them (Esping-Andersen 1990; Midgley 1999; Huber 
2002). As the state's role in social service provision shrinks, wealthier 
citizens limit their demands on the state social services apparatus and, in turn, 
allow it, at least in theory, to improve the quality of its services provided to the 
poor. However, it is not clear to what extent has this shift towards citizens as 
customer has aggravated inequality in developing societies, reinforcing the 
idea of 'quality for money'. And to what extent has the combined effect of 
increased poverty and privatization of services -experienced under 
neoliberalism- led to exclusion of larger sectors from the benefits of social 
services. 
The second major shift under neoliberalism has been the move towards 
decentralization and demand-driven services as hallmarks of "good 
governance," "local democratization" and a strong civil society. In this 
argument, decentralization leads to a dispersion of resources and power, which 
should potentially strengthen civil society by curtailing authoritarian patterns 
of interest intermediation (namely clientalism) and by opening up spaces for 
organizing at the local level. Advocates of the neoliberal model argue that 
'participatory democracy' is the type of democracy at which decentralization 
aims, since "it implies that the decision-making process results from 
negotiations directly established by the various sociopolitical actors to 
influence the agenda"(Garcia-Guadilla 2002: 90). This argument is based on 
the assumption that decentralization will lead to closer relationships between 
the state and its citiiens, especially the less powerful, thereby ensuring better 
distribution of services and resources. Thus, "as long as the decentralization 
of responsibilities is accompanied by an adequate redistribution of resources 
from the central govemment, the outcome may weIl be better delivery of 
social services and more citizen input"(Huber 2002: 466). Decentralization is 
viewed as a mechanism for inclusiveness of the state both in terms of interest 
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accommodation and servIce delivery, with civil society actors as a major 
partner in the process. This means, hypothetically at least, that civil society 
actors have more potential to thrive. 
In arguments by proponents of decentralization, there seems to be an 
overwhelming tendency to equate it with local democracy, which is not 
necessarily the case. As Oxhom asserts, "the level of subnational 
democratization seems to vary independent of the level of decision-making 
authority invested by the central govemment in lower levels of govemment" 
(Oxhom 2004: 6). This has been the case in Chile under Pinochet, for 
example, where a process of decentraIization was started by the military 
regime. When trying to understand the context in which one might equate 
decentralization with local democratization, observers have distinguished 
decentralization from deconcentration, which refers to the transferring of 
duties, without the concomitant transferring ofpolitical power. Conversely, 
"( d)ecentraIization presupposes the transfer of powers, including 
political power, from the centralizing level of the national state to other 
institutions or levels that, besides having administrative independence, 
have had legitimacy bestowed on them politically through democratic 
elections"(Garcia-Guadilla 2002: 94). 
By this definition, the realities of decentralization in the many countries that 
have attempted it (such as Chile and Bolivia) are more akin to deconcentration 
-- the shifting of functions down to the local level without many of the 
accompanying powers of decision-making. Sorne have argued that such a 
transfer of duties without power is unable to lead to increased democracy or a 
strengthened civil society (Gwynne and Kay 2000). 
Lately, though, other scholars have challenged this position. In an 
extensive study on decentralization in developing countries, Oxhom asserts 
that "even the Iimited spaces for autonomy associated with deconcentration 
can lead to demands for greater levels of autonomy as actors emerge within 
society to take advantage of those spaces"(Oxhom 2004: 1 0). He further 
argues that: 
actors may emerge because of frustrated expectations that the 
decentralization process itself generates, either because it 
falsely raised expectations for greater local control and/or 
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because the central state is either incapable of and/or unwilling 
to address real problems in those areas for which it still retains 
significant authority (Oxhorn 2004: 10). 
So it is not c1ear wh ether decentralization, in whatever form, leads to more 
democracy, participation, and inclusion or whether, alternately, it simply 
serves to recreate the same old authoritarian patterns of interest intermediation 
and exclusion. 
Overlapping with the above two shifts and stemming from them, the 
third shift in social policy under neoliberalism, has been the increased 
emphasis on the participation of different programs' beneficiaries individually 
and the grassroots' organizations representing them in social safety nets. The 
two positive aspects of participation, in theory at least, are that, first, it ensures 
better "targeting" or resources which ideally eliminates waste and corruption 
because limited resources are directed at those with real need and, second, that 
it allows for civil society incorporation in policy making -through grassroots 
organizations and NGOs representing their constituencies- thus increasing the 
space and prospects for strengthening civil society. Thus, 'participation' is 
both a customer's right and a necessity for ensuring the alleged positive gains 
of decentralization. According to a number of studies, participation has been 
expected to contribute to: (a) ensuring that the highest priority problems are 
addressed; (b) effective sub-project execution (including subproject 
formulation, submission, implementation); (c) community capacity 
building/skills development and social capital enhancement; and (d) 
sustainability of benefits (Conning and Kevane 2002; The World Bank 2002). 
This conceptualization of participation as a means for inclusion and 
empowerment is based on a harmony model of power, whereby increasing the 
power of the marginalized does not necessitate altering existing structures or 
taking away from the power of the advantaged. In this model, participation is 
a means for activating the marginalized within existing structures in order to 
increase efficiency and output of social policy institutions and investments. 
Diametrically opposed to this position is the Marxists and post-Marxist stand 
on empowerment and inclusion through participation. In those models, power 
is conceptualized as a dialectic, whereby inclusion and empowerment of the 
marginalized requires structural transformation of economic and political 
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relations, with projection on the social scale (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). And 
unless such structural transformation happens, which is by definition a zero-
sum game between the powerful and the marginalized, no real power is 
transferred to the less powerful sectors. In turn, participation is understood as 
mainly community mobilization of diversified collective interests in the face 
of hegemonic interests and power. Agian, it is not c1ear how inclusion and 
participation as emphasized by the neoliberal harmonious model of power, can 
or will -even unintentionally- lead to the structural changes and their positive 
impact assumed by the Marxist critique. Or even more basically, which 
premise or model of power is more applicable to the realities of exclusion in 
developing countries. 
It is c1ear that while the first shift - towards selective social policy and 
'customerization' of citizens -- might be deleterious to civil society, the two 
other shifts - toward decentralization and participation -- might provide civil 
society with chances for expansion and empowerment. Thus, the question 
remains as to what extent have social safety institutions in reality achieved the 
positive potentials of such shifts and minimized the negatives? 
Changes in Social Policy and the Evolution of Social Funds 
As case studies of the implications/impact of social policy reform 
initiatives and social safety nets under neoliberalism, SFs stand out for a 
number of reasons. First, SFs emerged specifically from the neoliberal 
transformations of the 1980s and 1990s, created and backed by the one of the 
main advocates of neoliberalism, the World Bank. Supporting more than 70 
funds worldwide, the Bank earmarked half of its social protection loans to 
Social Funds in the fiscal year 1999, versus labor market projects, pensions, 
and social insurance (The World Bank 2001). Not only are SFs important in 
their own right in terms of the amount of resources allocated to them,' they are 
also important as an illustration of the dominant Bank':promoted development 
mode\. Second, Funds work with civil society organizations, mainly NGOs, to 
implement their projects, shedding light on the partnership between the state 
and civil society actors under neoliberalism, and elucidating the dynamics of 
civil society-state relations under that mode\. Third, SFs provide a new 
paradigm for access to social benefits based on the three shifts in social policy 
46 
sketched above (customer-based, decentralization and participation), one that 
seems to be moving away from traditional clientalistic patronage relations and 
more towards targeting the 'poor'. 
SFs started as a form of social safety net in Bolivia in 1986 with a five 
year mandate to help those highly affected by structural adjustment measures, 
especially those who were unemployed as a result of privatization of the 
public sector as weil as those who had not been able to deal with the changing 
market dynamics and needed re-training in order to be productive. 
Hypothetically, SFs should make: 
progress toward three separate goals: poverty and 
unemployment alleviation, defusing social and political 
opposition to structural adjustment measures, and spurring a 
process of institutional reform involving a strengthening of 
civil society and leading ultimately to more meaningful 
democratization (Vivian 1994: 24). 
Those funds, which began as temporary poverty alleviation measures, ended 
up as structured institutions with a larger and much longer mandate than 
originally intended. The logic behind this shift was that the main beneficiaries 
of funds are those who have been left out of main stream development 
processes and were therefore hard to target in five- or even ten-year plans. 
The primary objective of social funds has also changed over the years. Both 
technocrats and scholars now divide the evolution of social fund objectives 
into three generations. The first generation of social funds had as their 
primary objective the provision of employment and income support to people 
impoverished by economic cri sis. These funds functioned mainly as a 
complement to the Bank's structural adjustment programs. The second 
generation of social funds, emerging in the late 1980's and early 1990's, 
aimed more at longer-term poverty reduction through the development of 
social and economic infrastructure (Morley and Lustig 1998). Finally, starting 
in the mid-1990s, the third generation of funds came to emphasize the 
participation of beneficiaries in order to develop their organizational and 
productive capacity, and strengthen social capital. 
Currently, the projects of the different funds usually coyer one or more 
of five areas: improvement of infrastructure in poor communities; job 
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creation; broad-based community-development and capacity building; 
improvement in delivery of social services; and support for govemmental 
decentralization (Jorgensen and Van Domelen 2001). The SF sets the priority 
areas and sectors it wants to fund, based on poverty-maps of the country and 
different needs' assessment exercises, and then solicits projects in those 
areas/sectors. Designers of SFs argue that in this way, funds can be a useful 
vehic1e for the redistribution of resources, since they employ sophisticated 
targeting mechanisms (such as poverty maps) that traditional public entities do 
not use (Jack 2001). In terms of operations, sorne funds work directly with 
community groups, while others work more c10sely with intermediaries like 
local govemments (Jorgensen and Van Domelen 2001). But in aIl cases, the 
Funds do not directly implement projects; rather they sub-contract different 
ministries, NGOs and private sector companies and banks for the design and 
implementation process. They respond to applications for projects made by 
these different entities, and they only supervise and follow-up on the 
implementation process. In this way, Funds "represent the first family of 
development programs with a c1ear role for community-based organizations in 
the design and implementation ofprojects" (Bigio 1998: 5). 
In theory, SFs require that local communities do the project 
prioritization and selection. The reason for this 'demand driven' approach is to 
"encourage communities to organize and decide which among their many 
unsatisfied needs have the highest priority" (Goodman and Morley 1998: 3 7). 
In order to facilitate this operational approach, SFs function through regional 
offices that have different degrees of decision-making authority and autonomy 
-depending on the management of each Fund. The Funds are autonomous 
from line ministries, and fall directly under the authority of the Presidency or 
the Prime Minister's office, which is supposedly a major asset allowing them 
to escape the inflexibility and time-consuming procedures of national 
bureaucracies, as weIl as evade the corruption and rent-seeking of traditional 
social policy institutions. The funds are mostly funded through World Bank 
loans, and grants from different bilateral donor institutions. 
In terms of welfare programs, SFs represent selective social policies 
which try to re-integrate their beneficiaries into the market economy. Not 
only are they meant to target certain sectors of the population, they do so 
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through instruments directed at the economic productivity of those sectors, 
based on the neoliberal emphasis on the primacy of economic 
return/productivity as a guiding principle for social policy. The neoliberal 
emphasis on decentralization and participation of service-users are also at the 
core of this institution, as is clear in their operation. The Funds are the first 
generation of institutions that are meant to respond directly to community 
organizations and NGOs, providing them with a new space for serting agendas 
and presenting their demands, as well as increasing their weight as 
acknowledged political actors within the public sphere. In addition, the 
structures of SFs imply a decentralization of decision-making within the 
organization, and complete autonomy from national bureaucracies. As Covey 
writes, "as intermediary financing institutions with decentralized delivery 
systems, social funds are more flexible than most regular, bureaucratie 
structures and can fund projects more rapidly ... that actively solicit the 
participation of local interest groups" (Covey 1998: 167). According to 
studies, 
social funds have also become more decentralized in their 
operations, facilitating a greater geographical dispersion in the 
use of their resources [and] improved efforts have been made at 
both promotion (ensuring people have heard of the social fund) 
and outreach (facilitating applications from poorer 
communities) (White 2002: 607). 
Through this mode of operation, SFs claim to be particularly important 
to civil society because their structures and procedures permit the 
incorporation of the views of a range of societal groups in the formulation of 
policies (policy pluralism), and the equitable delivery of public services. They 
also redefine the role for the state in a number of ways, including; less direct 
service provision, creation and maintenance of a level playing field for 
economic activity, and empowerment of non-state actors (Brinkerhoff 2000). 
Yet, it remains to be se en whether SFs can live up to such expectations, 
especially given the process of market-driven 'customarization' that is equally 
at the heart ofthis institutional set up. 
Despite this evident importance of establishing linkages between the 
conceptualization and implementation of SFs, on the one hand, and their 
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relationship to civil society and the state, on the other, none of the existing 
literature tackles these issues. The existing Iiterature, ranging fonn technical 
reports by the donor agencies (mainly the World Bank), to research centers 
and academic institutions, mainly focuses on one ofthree broad themes: 
(1) An emphasis on technical issues such as targeting, sustainability, 
cost-effectiveness in poverty alleviation, and institutional design 
(G1aessner, Lee et al. 1994; Kanaan 1997; Bigio 1998; Gupta and 
Chu 1998; The World Bank 2002; Van Domelen 2002; White 
2002). 
(2) A discussion of how Funds can only be temporary complements to 
much needed economic and political refonn (Bresser- Pereira and 
Nakano 1998; AI-Sayyid 2002) 
(3) A description of how, if weil administered, Funds can create 
political support for the govemment (Graham 1997; Morley and 
Lustig 1998). 
And even though SFs have come under criticism over the past few years, this 
criticism has tended to focus on technical issues regarding the functioning of 
the Funds and their possible improvement, rarely questioning the logic behind 
their existence or the impact they have on larger issues of citizenship and 
inclusion (Comia 2001; The World Bank 2002; Van Domelen 2002; White 
2002). The question still remains as to what kind of effect the emphasis on 
participation in SFs has on the power structure within local civil society. The 
answer to this question will help us understand whether inclusion necessitates 
structural transfonnations of power relations or whether participation, as 
described above, is sufficient for strengthening civil society and empowering 
the marginalized. More generally, this research is an opportunity to question 
the underlying neoliberal logic of empowennent via economic (market) 
arrangements that engage civil society organizations. 
Civil Society and Social Funds 
As mentioned earlier, civil society, has become a buzz-word, and not 
undeservedly, for quite a while now. It has been linked to different 
institutions, processes and concepts, and SFs have been no exception. In 
discussing SFs, observers frequently mention civil society, either as one of the 
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motives for establishing SFs or as one of its intended outcomes. Sorne 
observers argue that SFs open the way for a stronger civil society, local 
democratization and inclusion of the marginalized through both their projects 
and their mode of operations. Other scholars refute those allegations, claiming 
that SFs are doing the exact opposite, further weakening civil society, 
consolidating clientalistic relations and perpetuating exclusion. The two case 
studies selected for studyexamine the basis for such arguments empirically. 
Before delving into the case studies though, 1 will compile and analyze the 
different and often-contradictory arguments made for and against the positive 
impact SFs can have on civil society. 
The tirst argument made in favor of SFs' positive impact on civil 
society is based on the claim that SFs provide communities and civil society 
actors with much needed tinancial resources and organizational experience. 
"Given that these funds don't, of themselves, implement any social program, 
but rather work as development banks allocating resources or making loans, 
the mediation by NGOs between the State and target groups can result in an 
interesting process of social and politicallearning"(Levy 1997: 671). SFs are 
one of the few institutions that engage civil society in a dual way, by funding 
projects undertaken by civil society actors and by strengthening the capacity 
of those actors for collective action by providing them with necessary skills to 
this end. For civil society, especially at the local community level, this can be 
a major source of economic empowerment. As the three-sphere model 
explains, this is a major determinant in the strength of civil society. In the 
context of developing countries where the state seldom supports civil society 
organizations tinancially, and where there is no broad-based societal 
contribution to these organizations (as there is in the developed worId), SFs 
representa unique funding opportunity for civil society. 
SFs can also allow communities the possibility of "learning-by-doing," 
giving them direct experience in running projects. This generates a sense of 
"ownership" and enhances the communities' sense of identity and internai 
incentives for collaborative action (Jack 2001). It is claimed that participation 
in the project cycle can provide local leaders with organizational experience 
that can be dep10yed or capitalized on for different purposes, increasing the 
potentia1 for mobilization within civil society. SFs a1so have specitied funds 
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for continuously assessing and strengthening of community organizations 
(Schmidt and Marc 1995). Many SFs train NGOs and local govemmental 
bodies in participatory approaches to development projects, democratic local 
govemance, gender mainstreaming, as weIl as in book-keeping and financial 
management. As one of the evaluation studies on SFs found, 
many community committees visited during the field work said 
that they had benefited from the training provided by social 
funds, and sorne indicated their intention to apply skills leamed 
in financial management, chairing and managing project 
committees, and taking and distributing minutes from 
committee meetings to other local development 
programs(Parker and Serrano 2000: 28). 
Yet, so far it is not clear whether the funding provided and the 
experience gained by civil society organizations have a sustained impact on 
civil society organizations, in terms of increased autonomy, horizontal 
communication, and their capacity for mobilization and collective action. For 
one, sorne have argued that the resources SFs make accessible might become a 
source of conflict and a means to further encourage excessively materialistic, 
individualistic tendencies among civil society actors. One scholar suggests 
that "through the competition for scarce material resources," the se funds 
"fragment the sense of community and solidarity at the local level" 
(Soederberg 2001: 118). Another potential problem is that SFs might end up 
distributing resources, ev en within the circle of civil society, in a way that 
does not advance inclusion of the marginalized. For example, resources might 
cluster around pro-status quo organizations that do represent the interests of 
less-disadvantaged groups. These critics point out that the fact an application 
has to be made to local govemment or social fund offices means that the 
initiative is most likely to be taken by a relatively educated pers on who has 
sufficient socio-economic standing within the community to take the lead 
(Carvalho, Perkins et al. 2002). It is difficult for the less-advantaged to 
acquire the capacity to create community initiatives (such as communication 
skills, spare time and/or money). As for the organizational ski Ils and 
experiences that SFs help civil society actors acquire, these skills might or 
might not be relevant or adaptable for purposes of collective action. For 
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example, if capacity-building skills are very technical and "project-oriented" 
(such as those focusing on book-keeping, project proposaI writing, or out-of-
context gender-mainstreaming) then they do not necessarily have more 
generally positive effects on civil society as a who le. As one observer notes, 
"whilst the social fund may impart sorne skills to the community by 
training ... these effects are concentrated amongst a few people and do not 
generally provide a firm base for further independent community-initiatives" 
(White 2002: 610). In addition, the selection of those who gets training is 
another factor that tends to shape SFs' expected outcome, as is the quality and 
efficacy of the training. Therefore, it is important to examine the content of 
SFs skills provision programs and to try to understand the extent to which 
local elites or elite organizations have captured SF programs. 
The second set of arguments relating SFs to civil society is based on 
the ide a of synergy. On the positive side, sorne scholars agree, that one of the 
main successes of SFs has been their ability to work with a wide variety of 
agencies and to establish networks among private contractors, line ministries, 
local authorities, NGOs, and the communities themselves(Tendler 2000; 
Jorgensen and Van Domelen 2001). This is arguably the first step in 
transcending the long-Iost trust between the state and civil society which is 
endemic to most developing countries. In this view, SFs help generate a trust 
in the public sector that hopefully extends beyond the scope and life-span of 
the funds' projects and direct objectives. They can also serve as models for 
participatory approaches, demonstrating to governments the feasibility and 
utility of these approaches (Schmidt and Marc 1995), which is what many 
scholars, donor agencies and governments have been advocating during the 
past decade. It is argued that: 
due to their demand-driven, participatory approach, social fund 
interventions may increase both household and community social 
capital by increasing community cohesion, furthering community 
propensity to act jointly for the benefit of members of the 
community, and build trust and empowerment (Jorgensen and 
Van Domelen 2001: 105). 
This kind of synergy, many c\aim, can be the model for a larger reform of the 
state in which civil society is a major player and inclusion is a top priority. 
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According to a World Bank Strategy paper, "social Investment Funds can play 
a catalytic role in the ongoing regional process of modemization of the state," 
enhancing its relationship with other actors (The World Bank 1998: iii). They 
can provide impetus -- as weil as guiding princip les -- for the broader process 
of reform based on citizens' participation, transparency and local 
democratization «Jelin 1996; Brinkerhoff 2000; Grindle 2000). It is argued 
that this has been the case in Bolivia where an "emergency social fund 
improved the relationship between the central govemment and NGOs" and in 
Egypt, where "the social fund has been successful in promoting partnerships 
between central govemment, NGOs, and the private sector, despite strong 
initial resistance"(Carvalho, Perkins et al. 2002: 619). 
However, there is no c1ear evidence that, since the spread of SFs more 
than a decade ago, there has been a growing state-civil society synergy in 
countries where those funds operate. That is not to say that this synergy might 
not be produced by SFs; rather it is to say that there has been no rigorous 
questioning ofwhat the evidence or indicators of such synergy are or could be, 
and whether they are correlated to SFs or not. 
These concems are given further weight by counterarguments 
contesting not only the ability of SFs to create such development synergy, but 
even questioning the importance of this kind of synergy for civil society. 
According to these views, it is unlikely that SFs strengthen either civil society 
or grassroots' actors for a number of reasons. First, a strong civil society 
needs a capable state and, as 1 discussed earlier, weak states have been a 
continuing problem in most of the developing world. Thus, the question 
becomes: "are social funds helping build and strengthen the institutional 
capacity for designing, implementing, and delivering social services, or are 
they displacing and weakening existing institutions such as sector ministries 
and departments" (Stiglitz 1998: 20). In this sense, SFs can be seen as a 
parallel service provider diverting attention from needed state reforms. These 
negative effects on long-term reform are summed up in the following passage: 
There is evidence of negative effects of social funds on other 
(mainstream) elements of national and local policies and public 
sector. Setting up a parallel system, particularly wh en 
conditions for fund staff are much better than in mainstream 
54 
public institutions, may harm the morale and efficiency in 
fields outside the social fund. Establishing funds may displace 
other sources of funding. It may sidetrack from tackling tough 
issues regarding transparent and accountable government 
structures: donors may be paying less attention to those than 
they might, and social funds may detlect the attention of the 
users of public services (De Haan, Holland et al. 2002: 650). 
Second, sorne argue that the state is at best indifferent about seeking 
partnerships with civil society. Instead, it might be more inclined to use civil 
society organizations, through SFs, as service deliverers rather than engage 
them as equal partners. As one scholar noted, "cases of 'authoritarian 
technocracy' for the poor ('we know what is good for you and will make sure 
that you comply') are innumerable"(Jelin 1997: 94). Moreover, scholars have 
examined how the state's authoritarian tactics have weakened or 
'extinguished' civil society by absorbing it into the bureaucratic structure of 
state apparatus, which sorne argue is the idea behind SFs. From a neo-
Gramscian perspective, SFs might even be seen as an attempt by the state -
representing the interests of 'dominant' classes -- to maintain and reproduce 
its hegemony through civil society. These funds "rather than being designed 
as a social safety net, [are] intended to act as a disciplinary mechanism to 
instill values and goals similar to these of the ruling classes in civil society" 
(Soederberg 2001: 116). According to this argument, SFs can instill the shift 
to "customarization" discussed earlier into the collective consciousness, where 
citizens are persuaded not to engage in collective struggles to establish their 
rights through a citizenship project, but rather only to seek employment 
opportunities or access to the limited social provisions to which they are 
entitled. In similar vein, it is argued that civil society organizations play a role 
in implementing state programs, but not in reversing state agendas to the 
benefit of the unprivileged. SFs are thus seen as being used to sell reform 
packages to people in developing countries and/or let states and international 
institutions off the hook regarding potential demands for social rights. For 
example, one observer notes that, "IMF and World Bank representatives 
invariably make use of safety nets in international fora, citing them as an 
indication that - although the social dimensions of adjustment had been 
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previously neglected - the problem is now Jeally _ being addressed"(Vivian 
1994: 24). As Mohan puts it, "instead of romanticizing the role of local civil 
society ... we need to examine the political use of 'the local' by various actors. 
In this politics of the local, state institutions, international don or agencies ... are 
sorne key actors" (Mo han and Stokke 2000: 254). 
Finally, there is the argument that synergy, ev en if it happens, might 
not be beneficial to civil society. According to this argument, SFs might 
further weaken local democratization by helping to perpetuate dependency on 
the center or on se/ected local actors and weakening or giving insufficient 
voice to elected institutions on the local level (Parker and Serrano 2000). 
Similarly, there is an argument that a multiplicity of stakeholders can create a 
conflict of interest, or a domination of interests that are not pro-
democratization. For example, with partnerships between local government, 
local private firms and communities, there is a high probability for conflicts 
between the efficiency goals of firms and the need for time-consuming and 
complex processes to promote community ownership and autonomous 
decision-making (De Haan, Holland et al. 2002). Moreover, in entering state 
institutions, civil society groups may have to develop a more hierarchical 
internaI structure in order to produce a stable leadership to deal with 
government officiais (Dryzek 2000). Such a structure "may make the 
government more informed about, and more responsive to, the interests of 
group 'oligarchs' but not members" (Cohen and Rogers 1993: 245). Civil 
society organizations are quiet different from one another and they vary in the 
degree of grassroots' participation, level of representation and in the extent of 
their democratic or authoritarian practices. Not only might this synergy or 
partnership limit the possibility for civil society to become a vehicle for 
inclusion of the marginalized but, even worse, it can inhibit their inclusion and 
representation within civil society itself. We need to examine such 
partnerships work in practice and address the question of the extent to which 
civil society groups (and which actors within them) are involved. 
Finally, when discussing the impact of SFs on civil society, many 
claim that SFs might have been limited in their influence because of their 
small scale and lack of resources compared to the magnitude of the problems 
they must address (Jack 2001; Lustig 2001). As Jorgenson points out. 
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On average in the Latin American region, less than V.S.$ 10 is 
spent per year per poor pers on through social funds. In the 
Middle East and North Africa, in spite ofthe presence of one of 
the world's largest social funds in Egypt ... Social fund spending 
is a relatively small share of total effort on safety net programs 
(Jorgensen and Van Domelen 2001: 94). 
This means that if one could increase resources to those institutions, there 
could be substantial benefits on issues such as the empowerment of civil 
society and grassroots' actors. At the same time, there are valid arguments to 
the contrary, regarding the historical challenge of creating civil society in 
developing countries, suggesting that ev en if the resources were increased to 
SFs, the problems are much more structural than what SFs can tackle. 
Thus, in contrast to the arguments made earlier in favor of SFs, there 
seems to be a need to examine the negative claims. It is important to know 
how the structural organization of each SF facilitates certain kinds of 
participation by civil society organizations. For example, do they have access 
to decision-making or are they just being used by different actors for different 
reasons? And what is the effect of the participatory, demand-Ied approach of 
SF in terms of accountability: is there an established and effective mechanism 
of monitoring and evaluation in which SFs are accountable to civil society 
organization or the communities with which they work? In general whether 
SFs are helping civil society organizations to play a role in the inclusion ofthe 
marginalized or not or are these organizations -and in tum civil society as a 
who le- limited to the technical questions of implementation. 
Conclusion 
As much as there is difference in theorization about civil society, there 
is about social policy and Social Funds. As this chapter have shown social 
policy under the neoliberal model, and SFs as its prototype, is characterized by 
three main shifts; customerization, decentralization, and civil society 
participation. However, there is no consensus about the viability nor the 
desirability of the se changes for purposes of inclusion, social democratization 
and civil society. Especially that civil society as shown in Chapter one and in 
a number of counter arguments in this chapter is conditioned by structural 
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economic and political parameters, reflecting existing power relations in a 
society. Ifthis latter position is true, then these shifts in social policy will not 
achieve there claimed advantages of eroding clientalism, improving social 
policy and strengthening civil society, because they do not tackle the power 
structure. Rather they might ev en worsen conditions on ail these fronts. 
Hence, there is a need to examine the claimed positive impact of these three 
changes, in general, and SFs, in particular on civil society as a means for 
inclusion. Specifically, whether participatory approaches adopted by SFs will 
necessarily lead to local democratization and inclusion of the marginalized, 
through empowering civil society, or not? And even if they do, will they be 
limited to the communities in which they work, or transcend to the national 
level as sorne would like to believe? And, if that is the case, what are the 
channels through which this 'elevation' process is taking place? 
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Cbapter Tbree 
Two Civil Societies- Similar Histories But Different Outcomes 
Introduction 
ln this chapter, my analysis of Egypt and Bolivia focuses specifically 
on the intertwined political and economic factors that have shaped state-civil 
society relations, in order to be able to situate the two SFs within there 
respective contexts. 1 begin by describing the historical background to the 
current composition and characterization of civil society in Egypt, pinpointing 
the major landmarks defining its relationship to the state during Egypt's 
modem history. 1 look at how Egypt's shift to neoliberal policies affected the 
development of state-civil society relations, with emphasis on the NGO sector, 
which represents the largest kind of civil society organizations in Egypt. The 
second section of the chapter explains how the semi-corporatist political 
structure and economic rentieTÏsm of the state impacted the functioning of 
civil society in Egypt. 1 assess the functioning of present-day Egyptian civil 
society based on the four elements 1 discuss in Chapter One: civil society's 
potential for generating alternative political discourse, legitimating and 
mobilizing collective action, establishing deliberative forums and networks, 
and acting as a potential deterrent to state abuse of power. 1 then move to the 
Bolivian case in the third section, providing an analysis of the development of 
civil society in Bolivia from the perspective of the three-sphere model and its 
underlining logic of interconnectedness between the economy, "political 
change and civil society formation. In particular, 1 will highlight sorne major 
turning-points in the life of modem Bolivian civil society which include recent 
innovative legal reforms. Again, 1 will then assess the Bolivian civil society in 
terms of the above-mentioned functions. Although there are a lot of 
similarities in the evolution of state-civil society in the two cases, as 1 will 
show in the concluding section, the kind of soft-authoritarianism 
characterizing the Egyptian regime is an important determinant of state-civil 
society relations, and one feature that distinguishes Egypt from my case study 
ofBolivian democracy. 
Egyptian Civil Society: Background 
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One scholar dates the ri se of civil society in Egypt to Mohammed Ali's 
modernization project ofthe early 19th century citing the policies and practices 
that resulted in, among other things, the integration of Egypt into the 
international economy, the increase in Egyptian social differentiation, and the 
spread of mass education (AI-Sayyid 1995). However, four main historical 
landmarks have influenced the evolution of Egyptian civil society in its 
present form: the pre-1952 semi-liberal experiment, the populist 
authoritarianism of Nasser, Sadat's open-do or policy of infitah and, finaIly, 
the Mubarak era of neoliberal change. Based on the three-spheres mode l, 1 
argue that despite the very different economic and political models of these 
four periods, they are characterized by a weak civil society due to the Egyptian 
state's continued efforts to limit or control civil society through repression and 
legislative manipulation, as weIl as the rentier economy on which the state is 
based. These periods were notable for their systemic exclusion of large 
sectors of the population, politicaIly, economically or both, something which 
has been exacerbated by more recent neoliberal reforms. This section briefly 
explains the relevance ofthese four eras to the evolution of civil society. 
Egypt's experiment with semi-Iiberal rule of lasted from 1923-1952, 
during which time Egypt was a constitutional monarchy. During this period, 
Egypt had a constitution, a muItiparty system, a parliamentary government, 
regular elections for the legislative bodies, and a range of diversified and 
vibrant newspapers and publications. Alternation of power among parties and 
prime ministers was frequent. Political divisions based on party affiliation 
characterized the political activity on university campuses, the tone of 
different publications and media channel s, and the political discourse and 
collective action within the public sphere. During this period, Egypt had a 
political society, but not a strong civil society. Political affiliation was the 
main axis of mobilization, and although party affiliation was related to 
economic activity (i.e. different parties' constituencies represented certain 
socio-economic classes), there were no major interest group organizations per 
se. Though El Mikawy argues that Egypt's political parties represented a wide 
spectrum of classes and interests between 1923 and 1952 (EI-Mikawy 1999), 
the actual breadth of such interest representation is debatable. Nevertheless, it 
is the case that the rising yet sm ail national bourgeoisie, the landed 
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aristocracy, as weil as labor and student activists, were ail associated with 
party platforrns, not civil society organizations. That is, they were part of, and 
organized through, political parties and not autonomous trade unions or 
student organizations representing their interests as sectors. Consequently, it 
seems that an over active political society ultimately overwhelmed and 
blocked the insurgence of a strong civil society. In addition, the economic 
sphere was neither highly developed nor differentiated enough to support the 
emergence of such a civil society. Egypt's economy was mainly agricultural, 
with most of the arable land owned by just 0.5% of the population. There was 
little industry and a primarily foreign-owned service sector. In other words, 
there was no established national bourgeoisie and the size of the labor market 
was too limited to allow for the necessary differentiation within civil society. 
This was not compensated for with the presence of other axes of 
differentiation or mobilization within civil society, such as identity politics or 
civil rights issues, as in the case of Bolivia, which 1 will discuss later in the 
chapter. 
This short-lived liberal experiment -with a multi-party system and 
regular elections- ended in 1952 under Nasser's era of pragmatic revolution 
and later populist authoritarianism. Following a peaceful coup d'etat, Abd E1-
Nasser's regime banned political parties, reduced the margin of freedom of 
expression and organization, and established a system of state centralization 
and corporatism. During that period, political activity and mobilization were 
channeled toward and, to a great extent, absorbed into the state political 
organizations, Hay'aat Al-Tahrir (Liberation Agency), followed by Al-Ithad 
El-Qawmi (fhe National Union) and finally Al-Itihaad Al-Ishtraqi (Socialist 
Union). These corporatist institutions were the regime's mechanism for 
'controlled inclusion' of the masses. They sought to -and were successful at-
including labor, students and the intelligentsia, organizing their political 
activities through those central state institutions around the 'national project 
for modernization and independence' rather than separate sectorial interests or 
different and diversified social, political or economic agendas. The 'national 
project' was based politically on an Arab nationalist ideology calling for 
Egypt's independence from 'imperial Western powers' and its role in uniting 
the Arab countries against these powers. Economically, Nasser's project 
61 
adopted an ISI model, establishing state-owned heavy industries, nationalizing 
private-owned industries and embarking on a re-distribution project of 
privately-owned land. The establishment of a universal social policy that 
guaranteed free education, health care and food subsidies for ail Egyptians was 
a goal and official discourse that complemented this economic mode!. 
According to EI-Mikawy, "the Nasserist project sought to appease the lower 
classes by offering subsidized food items, free education, free health care, and 
guaranteed employment upon graduation" (EI-Mikawy 1999: 24). The project 
and the state political institutions mentioned above, built their credibility on a 
mixture of a nationalist ideology and the economic measures for re-
distribution ofwealth and allowing for social mobility ofthe popular sectors. 
Like the Iiberal experiment of the previous era, Nasser's era also 
proscribed the rise of a national bourgeoisie, building instead a new class of 
rent-seeking state managers, and absorbing the intelligentsia and activists 
through its political organizations and in rally for its 'national modemization 
project' . Under this national populist political economy model, in which the 
state either absorbed or suppressed possible dissenting groups and the masses 
became the beneficiaries of massive state subsidies, there was no potential, not 
even in terms of rhetoric, for the flourishing of civil society. Although a 
number of civil society organizations were formed, as complementary to 
Nasser's developmental model, mainly labor unions and farmers cooperatives, 
these bodies were created by the state and co-opted in the process, either 
through the use of political propaganda and ideology, or in response to the 
clientalistic benefits the system provided. Over and above, "the one-party 
structure did not allow disagreement on policy ... [it] served to reinforce the 
populist ISI model of economic and social development which meant to 
improve the lot of the middle and lower classes and saw no way to do that 
other than by using state power" (EI-Mikawy 1999: 23). Autonomy from the 
state, in terms of interest definition; group organization or resource 
mobilization, was not possible or even considered desirable by a lot of sectors. 
In addition, to building this credibility and using co-optation strategies 
through introducing new economic and social benefits to different politically 
active sectors (such as labor), the state also used systematic coercive practices 
towards dissent. A police state was characteristic ofthis era in which political 
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opponents were subject to systematic torture and ev en capital punishment. Ali 
publications and media channels had a censor from the military establishment. 
Extensive detention campaigns left almost ail dissent in prison, from the 
Communists to the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, under such coercive regime 
state control of collective activities was inescapable. Hence, the seeds for civil 
society were in the hands ofthe state, which did not allow it to bud. 
After the death of Nasser, and Sadat's succession from Vice-President 
in 1971 and his consolidation of power after the 1973 Mid East war, there was 
evidence of a political opening that might have had positive consequences for 
the development of civil society. Of course, the centralized concentration of 
power in the state (and, specifically, the Presidency) continued under Sadat 
and was reflected in the 1971 constitution and its 1980 amendments, which 
legislated unlimited terms for the Presidency. Still, in an attempt to curtail the 
Nasserites influence, and build new credibility for the regime through political 
liberalism rather than socio-economic equity or Arab nationalism as Nasser 
did, Sadat sought to impart a margin of freedom. By 1978, Sadat had allowed 
six political parties to be established, and permitted newspapers to reflect 
dissent about the state's direction. Most observers agree that Sadat's political 
opening was not only for the purpose of building legitimacy and support to 
counterbalance Nasser's 'national project,' but also due to his careful 
consideration of certain international factors. Sadat wanted to appeal to his 
new Western allies as a "modernizing, democratic" leader and to affirm his 
shift away from the Eastern bloc (Waterbury 1983; Kassem 1999). However, 
the regime was not willing to introduce completely free elections, allow for 
alternation of power, an open public sphere or significant restraint of coercion 
that a liberalized political transformation required. 
Economically, Sadat reverted from Nasser's policy of limiting private 
ownership of industries and agricultural land and adopting the imperatives of 
ISI, rather the new regime started seeking foreign investments, refrained from 
making new state-investments in industrial establishments, abolished the ban 
on consumer imports and attempted to curtail subsidies. The regime put in 
place the backbone of a liberal economy through the open-door policy of 
infitah. However, the Egyptian state un der Sadat did not manage to make the 
transition towards a liberalized economy in the Western sense. Rather it 
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ended up 'opening' the door only to a kind of crony capitalism, in which a 
coalition of interest-seeking state managers- whose ranks had swollen during 
the Nasser era -- and non-productive speculative capitalists continued to live 
off the state(Sadowski 1991). There was no increase in industrialization nor 
economic output, rather Sadat was bailed out from an unfolding economic 
crisis through American foreign assistance in response to Egypt signing Peace 
Accords with Israel. This new source of rents along with the re-opening ofthe 
Suez Canal, and the influx of expatriate Egyptian labor remittances from the 
Gulf countries, allowed the regime continued patemalistic relationship with 
society in which the state acted as 'provider' through the framework of 
clientalism and not citizenship. Thus, neither the limited political opening that 
Sadat introduced, nor the liberalized economic model he was seeking to 
establish, sough the seeds for a strong civil society to emerge. 
In fact, Sadat's regime adopted a mixture of 'controlled inclusion' of 
selected potential actors of civil society, namely the business elite who were 
the main beneficiaries of the new economic policies, and 'systemic exclusion' 
of the popular sectors -including labor and state employees. As Owen 
concludes, the winners under the infitah model, "were offered limited 
participation in a system of elections and interest representation designed to 
exclude the lower classes from the political process while at the same time 
paving the way for a graduai whittling away at the policies of 
universalism"(Owen 1995: 184). The regime did not allow for labor unions, 
business organizations or professional associations to organize and flourish, 
inhibiting the budding of civil society. 
Mubarak came to power in 1981 at a moment of turmoil and crisis. 
Sadat had been assassinated by Islamist militants19, while most of the 
country's intellectuals, multiple generations of political activists, and ex-
public officiais remained in prison. The message was clear: the regime's 
power and control, ev en with maximum levels of coercion, remained limited. 
Thus, Mubarak, resorting to peaceful coexistence with dissenters, released 
most political prison ers and stretched the margin on freedom of expression. 
19 Sadat had opened up space for the strengthening of Islamists through student activism, in 
order to combat the influence ofNasserite nationalists and socialists from the previous era. 
However, with the mushrooming ofpolitical Islamists groups who opposed Sadat's 
relationship with the US and the Peace Accords of 1978, they ended up assassinating him. 
64 
Economically, conditions were conducive to political liberalization as weIl. 
The fall of oil prices, increasing population growth, and a lack of productive 
economic strucuture, meant that Egypt was unable to meet the growing needs 
and expectations of the Egyptian public that Nasser's commitment to state 
subsidization nourished. Moreover, unlike both Nasser and Sadat regimes, 
Mubarak's did not have -during its early years- a different economic project 
not even in terms of discourse and rhetoric. That is, while Nasser advocated 
national ISI imperatives, and Sadat pushed for economic 1 iberalization, 
Mubarak was tied up in the halted mixed-economy that both regimes have left . 
behind. The regime tried to compensate for economic decline by opening up 
politically, a classic 'survival mechanism' as Brumberg would calI it 
(Brumberg 1995). As a result, the period from 1982 to 1990 witnessed 
increased tolerance on part of the regime for political expression and dissent. 
Civil society organizations such as professional associations and labor unions 
enjoyed a considerable level of autonomy and sorne space for collective action 
among their rank and file. 
This short-lived political opening, the reason for optimism about the 
potential for democratization and civil society insurgence in Egypt, ended in 
the early 1990s with the regime' s shift to political "de-liberalization" as part of 
its clampdown on militant Islamists and in order to push forward its neoliberal 
economic reforms without any political upheaval that such reforms might lead 
to. Not only did the regime resort to repression against militant Islamist 
groups, but it also issued a number of laws curtailing the space of civil society 
actors. In 1993, the govemment created law 100, which curtailed the 
autonomy of professional associations and syndicates in order to control the 
rising influence of Islamists within these organizations. The govemment 
pushed the People's Council to adopt the law in less than 48 hours(AI-Sayyid 
1995). No public debate was involved, nor were there any consultations with 
stakeholders within the public sphere. The law required a minimum quorum 
of voters (in board elections of these associations) - a figure which was set at 
a level the govemment believed to be unattainable -- for the electoral results to 
be he Id le gal (Clark 2000). Moreover, the govemment invoked a number of 
excuses to postpone elections within certain associations and syndicates that 
government-appointed professionals have sin ce been running for years. In 
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1994, the state also enacted a decree by which heads of Egyptian universities 
and village chiefs ('omdas) were appointed by government, rather than 
elected, as had been the case since the 1970s. In 1995, the state also tried to 
curtail the freedom ofthe press by issuing Law 93, which stiffened the penalty 
for "publication crimes" -which are very loosely defined to include 
unsubstantiated allegations against public officiais and 'defaming of Egypt'20_ 
to imprisonment, though after continued public protest, the President had to 
interfere and withdraw the law (Clark 2000; Kienle 2000). 
As for civil organizations -which are mainly NGOs and community 
development associations (CDAs), or al monzamaat al a 'hUa in Arabie, they 
are governed by Law 32 of 1964 (amended by Law 84 of 2002), un der the 
supervision of the Ministry oflnsurance and Social Affairs. Article 42 ofthis 
law gives the Minister of ~nsurance and Social Affairs the right to dissolve any 
civil organization according to her/his discretion and without the need to go to 
court (United Nations Development Programme 2003). The Law also gives 
the executive authority the right not to register an organization if it objects to 
the organization's main purpose or its founders. To prote st against an 
executive decision of this nature, an organization must bring its appeal to 
court, in long and cumbersome process. According to Article 23, the same 
authority has the right to question any organization and revoke any of its 
actions. Not surprisingly, the Law does not give civil society organizations 
reciprocal rights or established mechanisms through which to guarantee 
accountability and transparency from the state in return. In addition, the 
whole country, including civil society organizations, continue to live under the 
restrictions of the 'Emergency Law.' Since 1967, Egypt has spent aIl but five 
months under a declared "state of emergency" "by which the regime has 
rationalized the outiawing of demonstrations, the use of indefinite detentions 
without trial, and the endowment of presidential decrees with the power of 
law" (Brownlee 2002: 6). According to the Law, the security forces have the 
right to detain anyone on suspicion of being a "danger to public security." 
The Law also gives the state the right to suspend or ban publications of any 
20 'Defaming of Egypt' and 'tarnishing Egypt's reputation' are two terms which have not been 
defined and are open to multiple interpretations, and thus, have been used in court by the state 
against sorne political activists and even media professionals and led to the imprisonment of 
sorne. 
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society and to restrict public meetings of more than ten persons without prior 
security permission (AI-Sayyid 1995). 
Hence, the prospects for political reform, which was nominal to start 
with, started to deteriorate sharply during the 1990s. Mubarak "began to 
'deliberalize', -- renewing controls on opposition parties, elections, Islamist 
activity, civil society organizations, and the press"(Brownlee 2002: 7). The 
state crackdown on Islamists ended up extending to civil society as a who le. 
As Farsoun puts it, "Egyptian civil associations are not operating un der 
enabling laws of a "law-state" but rather are subject to an electoral regime 
embedded in an authoritarian state bureaucracy that controls these associations 
in an arbitrary, rigid, and corrupt manner"(Farsoun and Zacharia 1995: 269). 
Thus, the margin of freedom that Mubarak's regime allowed easily slipped 
away before any embryonic strong civil society could emerge, because such 
political 'openings' were simply 'survival mechanisms' initiated solely at the 
discretion of the regime and without any substantial institutional basis. 
"Mubarak's tirst years in power thus never represented a genuine move 
toward liberal democracy but only a tactical and precarious tolerance" 
(Brownlee 2002: 8). 
Economically, following four wars and the collapse of the ISI model, 
Egypt found itself by the mid-1970s with serious budget deticits and a massive 
external debt. However, as a rentier state with its geopolitical endowment as a 
major regional power, and with the help of different kinds of rents - labor 
rem ittance s, oil exports, foreign aid, and later on the Suez canal receipts --
Egypt was able to finance this deficit and ward off structural adjustment 
programs (SAP) until the end of 1980s. Nevertheless, by the early 1990s, 
sources of rent were disappearing with the decline in oil prices, the return of 
vast numbers of Egyptian migrants from the Gulf, and international and 
regional political environments were changing following the Mexican 
economic cri sis. These internai and external factors set the stage for different 
donors and international tinancial institutions (IFI) to begin advocating for the 
implementation of SAP. When thousands of workers from the Gulf returned 
home and began to put pressure on the already deteriorating economy 
following the end of the 1991 Gulf War, donors promised increased aid in 
return for Egypt's commitment to economic reform. At the same time, in spite 
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of the po or state of the economy, it was also a golden moment for Egypt to 
capitalize on its support for coalition-forces in Iraq. By the early 1990s, Egypt 
started implementing the main economic premises of neoliberalism, including 
privatization, market-driven regulation, and withdrawal of the state from sorne 
public provisions. 
For civil society, the shift to neoliberalism has featured two opposing 
trends: the potential strengthening of sorne factions of civil society, namely the 
NGO sector and the business groups; while at the same time the continued 
weakening of grassroots organizations and an increased difficulty of 
organization and mobilization due to political and le gal restrictions, which 
were further tightened with the economic shift to neoliberalism. On the one 
hand, the deterioration of living conditions, coupled with the state's shrinking 
role in providing social services, has meant an increased opportunity for civil 
society organizations to step in and fill the breach. For example, state health 
expenditures decreased from 2.3% of GOP to 1.21 % in 1981 and only 0.6% in 
1993/94 (Clark 2000: 162). As "the majority of Egyptians cannot afford 
services offered in private practices or companies, the bulk of this load has 
fallen on the shoulders of the NGO sector"(Clark 2000: 162). Since NGOs 
were starting to shoulder sorne former responsibilities of the state, one might 
expect that NGOs would now have an increased influence on poliey-shaping 
and public debate. However, NGOs were limited to a role of service delivery, 
but with no right to organize its constituency or ev en shape the policies 
goveming the services they are supposed to deliver. For example, the state 
called upon NGOs to provide inexpensive health services and allows them to 
establish clinies, but they were not consulted on the state health policies or 
expenditures nor are they allowed to organize public protests in response to 
unwanted reform within this sector. 
The state's stand towards business groups --the other faction of civil 
society strengthened under neoliberalism - was a little different. This faction 
perceived by the state as the only locomotive for economie growth under 
neoliberalism, started to increasingly play a consultative role vis-à-vis the 
state, forming joint bodies to consider policy decisions affecting their interests. 
As one scholar explains it, "the opening of new fields of economic activity to 
private actors increased their freedom of action in these areas ... [T]hey could 
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gain the ear of the regime and occasionally succeed in affecting its 
policies"(Kienle 2000: 3). However, this did not mean an opening for civil 
society as a who le, but rather a selective strengthening of certain interest 
groups on part of the state. Moreover, this move defied the idea of civil 
society as an arena where different interest groups and sectors should ideally 
have equal opportunities advocating their diverse and often competing 
agendas. 
More generally, economic liberalization along with the lack ofpolitical 
liberalization continued to stifle the emergence of a number of civil society 
actors, such as tenant groups and organized labor. Tenant groups which 
formed cooperatives in the 1960s, after the re-distribution of agricultural land 
to them, were pushed to the margin in terms of political weight or even 
catering for the practical needs of tenant farmers following the new 
agricultural holding law of 1997. Sorne land was returned to its previous 
owners (who were part of a landed aristocracy), rents were liberalized and the 
prices of farming inputs, which used to be managed by the cooperatives of 
tenants, rose. The implementation of the neoliberal model also continued to 
marginalize the popular classes, including formaI and informallabor, a process 
that started in the mid-1970s with the shift to open-door policy infitah and the 
consequent desire to weaken the losers of this process, mainly the popular 
sectors. Labor, for instance, lost much of its leverage with the privatization of 
large state-run factories. AIso, the privatization of these entities and 
subsequent reduction in its employment, along with the state's reversai of its 
earlier commitment to the universal employment of university graduates, have 
led to the burgeoning of the informai economy, a sector which is not typically 
organized or represented within civil society. As AI-Sayyid points out, "the 
urban poor and the peasants, who do not possess organizations acting on their 
behalf ... find no place for themselves in an emerging civil society"(Al-Sayyid 
1995: 140). In addition, neoliberal changes meant that the state had to cut 
back its universal social policy that it was committed to for decades. Fearing 
instability akin to the 1977 "bread riots,,21 that such changes might cause, the 
21 These were the most significant and comprehensive act of prote st in Egypt's modern 
history, when the largest number of masses took to the street in prote st of the state's 
cancellation of food subsidies and forced the state to back offfrom its proposed plan. 
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state also has increased restrictions on political life and civil society. The 
"economic evolution atIected the evolution of Iiberties because the regime 
lost, or was afraid to lose, control over a number of activities and actors 
previously directly dependent upon it"(Kienle 2000: 5). Instead of increasing 
consultation with the state, then, the state has tightened its constraints on civil 
society's activities due to the fear of that civil society's increased 
responsibilities will translate into corresponding, perhaps disruptive, political 
influence. 
In summary, the Egyptian state being a "weak" or "soft" state, as 
Migdal and Waterbury/Springborg respectively note, lacks certain basic 
capabilities to penetrate society?2 Understanding the state limitations, Egypt's 
rulers "have opted for strategies of corporatization that are far more tentative, 
partial, and inconsistent than the "state corporatist" systems of Latin America 
or the "societal corporatist" systems of Western Europe" (Bianchi 1989). 
Hence, the authoritarian nature of the Egyptian regime did not translate into 
features of totalitarianism nor was it able to develop a rigid and 
comprehensive system of state corporatism when it came to its relations with 
civil society. Rather within this structure, each party/group perceives that 
there are more rewards in dealing separately with the state. As Brumberg 
asserts "rulers of Iiberalized autocracies strive to pit one group against another 
in ways that maximize the rulers' room for maneuver and· restrict the 
opposition's capacity to work together"(Brumberg 2002: 61). Thus, the lack of 
civil society forums and networks presenting itself as a potential opposition, 
becomes a logical consequence of a corporatist structure that does not reward 
cooperative behavior. 
Economically, the fact that Egypt is a rentier state deriving its revenue 
from rents, mainly, oil, the Suez canal, tourism and remittances of offshore 
labor, and not directly from society, further contributes to the weakening of 
civil society. On the one hand, the fact that the state does not have to extract 
its revenue makes it easier to appropriate resources in support of corporatist 
mechanisms inhibiting the emergence of civil society. As Giacomo Luciani 
22 For a detailed account ofthose capabilities and how Egypt ranks compared to other Third 
World countries, see Migdal, 1. (1988). Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society 
Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton, Princeton University. 
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notes, "a state that economically supports society and is the main source of 
private revenues through government expenditures, while in turn is supported 
be revenues accruing from abroad, does not need to respond to 
society"(Luciani 1995: 211). Through rents the Egyptian state, is able to 
finance and sustain a ruling coalition through extensive, although low quality, 
social provisions, for the popular sectors, and profit -making mechanisms for 
non-competitive business c1ass. This secures a type of c1ientalism that 
supports political exclusion and neutralizes prospective struggles within civil 
society. Civil society actors, who do not have the political right to cali for 
accountability of the state or participation in the formulation of its policies, 
also do not have the economic motive to do so since they are financed by the 
state and do not contribute significantly to its revenue, which lessens their 
bargaining power. 
The brief history demonstrates that the Egyptian state's ability to shift 
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at its convenience between pluralism and coercion reflects an environment in 
which "[p ]residential power reigns supreme, unchecked by either counter-
balancing forces within the ruling elite or by forces arising within civil 
society" (Zaki 1999: 116). At the same time, it would be wrong to suggest 
that state coercion and co-optation are the only reasons that Egyptian civil 
society has failed to achieve autonomy or mobilize different sectors of society. 
In brief, Egypt's civil society does not have a c1ear legal foundation, an 
extensive resource base, or an open political society through which it can 
engage the state. It is evident that the weakness of Egyptian civil society is 
both an outcome of a systematic state pattern of exclusion that continued 
throughout the four eras of modem history 1 discussed above, curtailing its 
potential as a vehicle for inclusion. A common theme throughout has been the 
history of state coercion, using legislative, judicial, financial and physical 
force/incentive to Iimit the prospect of achieving strong civil society 
organizations. Moreover, large sectors of potential civil society actors who 
could organize along sectorial economic interest, such as labor, farmers and 
business, have been economically dependent on the state, whether during the 
Nasser's era (Jabor and farmers) or the Sadat and Mubarak eras (business). 
This economic clientalism -financed by rents- have served to enforce political 
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cooptation of these sectors and to deprive them of the motive to push for 
autonomous organization. 
Egyptian Civil Society Under Neoliberalism 
1 believe that only by understanding the interaction between the 
economic and the political structures of Egypt (the three spheres' model), 
could civil society be understood. In this section 1 explain how Egyptian civil 
society as part of an edifice built on semi-corporatist relations in the political 
sphere, and rentierism in the economic sphere, falls far short of the interrelated 
functions of civil society 1 outlined earlier in Chapter 1. These include the 
role civil society plays in the production of an alternative political discourse, 
the initiation of different forms of collective action, the creation of deliberative 
fora for public policy, and finally the preclusion of state hegemony through its 
role as a potential force for instability. The outcome of this combination of 
semi-coropratism and repression characterizing the political sphere in Egypt, 
and financed by the rents coming from the economic sphere, was very evident 
in how NGOs -currently the largest sector of Egyptian civil society- failed in 
performing the interrelated functions of civil society discussed earlier. 
For one, civil society in Egypt has not succeeded in generating any 
solid alternative political discourse. This is partly because the present regime 
-- unlike its predecessors -- has managed to subdue "Egypt's Islamists, leftists, 
and human rights community to the point where little domestic impetus for 
reform remains"(Brownlee 2002: Il). Moreover, most of the organizations 
constituting civil society in Egypt are also either unaware of, or unenthusiastic 
about, their role as agents for political and social change. For example, in a 
study of clinics run by the most grassroots-oriented social welfare NGOs in 
Egypt, Clark finds that these NGOs "are not actively or consciously engaged 
in establishing any form of an alternative conception of state and society at the 
grassroots or national levels"(Clark 1995: 167). A major field study on 
political participation in Egypt (Abu Saeda 1997) Iikewise concludes that 
social welfare organizations do not encourage participation since citizens 
suffice with obtaining their services without positively sharing in constructing 
the governing structures of these organizations. These structures, in turn, "are 
limited to a small number of individuals who do not encourage others to join 
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them in order to secure their control over the societies" (Abu Saeda 1997: 22). 
As AI-Sayyid puts it, "the link between democracy and living conditions is not 
c1ear in the minds of people" (AI-Sayyid, Personal Interview, Cairo 
26/2/2004) and, as a result, welfare NGOs do not seem to care as much about 
political change as, for example, their counterparts in Latin America. This has 
led AI-Sayyid and other scholars to conclude that the social-services' NGOs 
are unable to play much of a role in changing political discourse (Clark 1995). 
The implication of this conclusion is perhaps best understood by considering 
the fact that such NGOs constitute more than 80% of Egyptian civil society 
organizations (AI-Sayyid, Personal Interview, Cairo 26/2/2004). Moreover, 
lacking internai democratic or pluralistic discourse and practice themselves, 
NGOs, as civil society organizations, are extremely limited in the positive 
influence they can have on the state. 
Second, Egyptian NGOs have also failed to legitimize and mobilize 
collective action. At first glance, this may seem surprising since those civil 
society organizations which are service providers offer a range of socio-
economic services (e.g. education, providing nurseries, health clinics, or 
vocational training) and, thus, not only have extensive access to the masses, 
but also are well-integrated into the livelihoods of the Egyptian public. My 
research and field work have shown that, because of the kind of services they 
provide, these organizations actually reach the lower and 10wer-middle 
classes, ev en when leadership cadres of those NGOs are almost exclusively 
from the upper- and middle-c1ass. However, the lack of political consciousness 
1 discussed earlier, also meant that none of the NGOs 1 investigated for this 
research had engaged in or mobilized their beneficiaries for any kind of 
lobbying or advocacy activities, let alone public collective action in dissent of 
any state policy. 
As for establishing deliberative forums to enhance the inclusiveness of 
public policy, civil society in Egypt has lagged behind other countries of the 
South. As one scholar asserts, "Egyptian NGOs do not form what can be 
labeled an 'NGO movement'. There is little or no coordination between 
NGOs"(Clark 2000: 167). During my field research, 1 met with a number of 
NGOs that worked on similar projects in the same geographical vicinity, yet 
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had no means of communication, coordination or cooperation?3 There was no 
sense of solidarity or exchange of experience for the purposes of improving 
performance and over-coming structural political and economic obstacles. 
Moreover, while in other countries umbrella bodies represent NGOs in public 
policy and funding negotiations vis-à-vis govemment or donor organizations, 
such bodies are absent in Egypt. My own study on the institutional capacity of 
Egyptian NGOs in the late 1990s (Unpublished. 1997)demonstrated that this 
lack of coordination led to a redundancy of effort and a significant waste of 
resources. As importantly, it allowed the state to sustain unpopular policies 
and to blame the absence of consultation on civil society itself. Because of 
these coordination and communication problems, the "ability of Egyptian 
NGOs to influence policy in favor of the po or and to act as effective advocates 
for them at the national and local levels is still extremely limited ... "(Assaad 
and Rouchdy 1999: 89). 
Consequently, civil society's inability to shape public debate, organize 
collective action, and establish deliberative policy forums has limited its 
ability to serve as a force to counter state power, or effectively threaten state 
stability. As Brumberg (2002) argues, civil society organizations have not 
been able to pierce the armor of "liberalized autocracy" in Egypt. On the 
contrary, the sheer proliferation of small NGOs has made state attempts at co-
optation easier (Brumberg 2002). Whether because of the fear of coercion, or 
out of a rational behavior aimed at maximizing personal or organizational 
benefits, leaders of most civil society organizations are not willing to engage 
in confrontation with the state. As AI-Sayyid affirms, most civil society 
organizations and especially NGOs "view maintaining good relations with the 
govemment as the best way to ensure receiving govemment favors in terms of 
appointments in legislative or advisory bodies, obtaining facilities and benefits 
for their members, or simply escaping the wrath of officiaIs, particularly 
security forces" (Al-Sayyid 1995). As a result, the Egyptian state does not 
consider NGOs an equal partner, or a potential threat, when formulating civil 
society regulations, nor does it include civil society in policy decisions 
23 Abu Swer NGO and the Productive Family Association were doing micro-credit projects. 
While AI-:ral AI Kabir NGO and another one in Ismailia city were establishing health 
services. 
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involving sectors to which it might otherwise contribute, such as social 
welfare. In an interview with the executive director of one of the most active 
and prominent NGOs in Egypt, (who asked to remain anonymous), he 
summed up the difficulties: 
the govemment does not consider our views even in 
formulating the NGO law ... they know from previous 
experience that we won't be doing anything to oppose ... and 
ev en if sorne of us do resist and oppose, other organizations 
wou Id breach what we agree on and register un der that same 
law the next dal4 (Pers on al Interview, Cairo 24/10/03). 
So in conclusion, the Egyptian civil society is currently formed of 
NGOs -the largest sector- that are focused on delivery of social services, with 
no public advocacy mandate, and co-opted trade unions and business 
associations that are connected to the state through clientalistic relationships, 
while embryonic social movements find it difficult to rise due to politica1 
repression. Hence, unlike its peers in Latin America civil society in Egypt, 
has not been able to bring about significant changes to the mode of rule, nor to 
integrate certain sectors of societies into the public sphere. In spite of the 
margin of freedom that the different Egyptian regimes, have allowed, civil 
society has not been able to acquire much needed strength and autonomy. 
Aware of the possible threats that this margin of freedom might otherwise 
cause, the Egyptian regime has always engaged civil society in cooptation 
strategies that "further contributed towards inhibiting the development of 
formai political groupings and hence the possibility of successful challenges to 
the system"(Kassem 1999: 1). The regime successfully managed to put 
together a system whereby "a large degree ofan association's success depends 
on the members' ability to get around impediments through informai 
arrangements and networks which incorporate state officials"(Clark 2000: 
172). And the fact that the state does not have to extract its revenue form 
society, has allowed it to put forth such a system and to easily manipulate civil 
24 Here he is referring to an agreement that sorne NGOs have reached about refusing to 
register under the previous NGO law of 1998 - a law which the government had passed in 
spite ofwide opposition from the NGO community. 
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society actors -who do not have much economic leverage or bargaining 
power- into accepting it and playing by its mies. 
A Background to Civil Society: The Three-Spheres' Model in Bolivia 
Just as Egypt defies any easy classification of its political system, 
regime type in Bolivia (and, more generally, across South America) is not 
easily classified as either strictly democratic or authoritarian. Likewise, the 
Bolivian state is not easily ranked in terms of the degree of stability, or the 
presence of a clear demarcation between civil society, political society, and 
the state. However, the evolution of civil society and its relationship with the 
state is marked by four main transformations: the 1952 revolution, the 
struggle for democracy from the 1970s to the mid 1980's, the launch of the 
New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1985 and, finally, the introduction of a series 
ofnew laws and reforms in 1993/94. Using the three-sphere model to analyze 
these four landmarks, 1 will de scribe the current dimensions of civil society in 
Bolivia and the status of its relationship with the state. 
Although the political development of Bolivia has its roots in its 
colonial heritage and attempts to build a nation-state throughout the 19th 
Century, this potential was not fully realized until the 1952 revolution. Before 
that date, Bolivia was mainly dominated by a tin-mining bourgeoisie that 
formed an oligarchic state, with no civil or political rights for the indigenous 
population, which at the time constituted more than 80% of Bolivians. The 
main economic activities at the time were tin-mining and exportation, and 
agriculture. There were no significant industries or services contributing to the 
national economy, and the small-sized tin-mining oligarchy did not manage 
nor was interested in creating a viable economy that can cater to the needs of 
society at large. Moreover, the state did not even have a monopoly over the 
use of power within its territory, which was controlled by different caudillos. 
ln other words, it did not ev en constitute a state in the Weberian sense. The 
indigenous majority was economically and politically tied to the oligarchie 
elite under a patron-client system of distribution and interest intermediation. 
Rather, there were militant and clandestine groups of tin-workers and farmers 
who resorted to violence in trying to secure sorne basic living needs when the 
existing patrimonial system failed to cater to these needs. The lack of a 
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productive and diversified economic structure sustained this patrimonial 
system and made it the only viable option for the majority of Bolivians to 
secure a living. Within this context of extreme political repression, and 
economic exclusion of the majority of Bolivians, absence of minimal equity 
and the rule of law, there was no 'civil' society in the sense of interest groups, 
legal associations, and social movements autonomously organizing and 
engaging peacefully in pursuit of their demands. 
From 1952 to 1964, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement 
(Movemiento Nationalista Revolucionario MNR) led a revolution and 
undertook major steps towards establishing a modem Bolivian state, including 
the nationalization of the tin-mining industry, the declaration of universal 
suffrage, and the approval of an agrarian reform law (Malloy 1968). The 
changes amounted to a revolution since the movement was seeking to build a 
state in the Weberian sense and to include the largest sector of society -
indigenous population- by granting them economic, civil and political rights 
that they were deprived of for decades. The MNR also acted in line with the 
militant labor and farmer groups who forcefully took acquisition of privately 
owned tin-mines and land, and legalized the acquisition (Van Cott 2000). 
Those changes transformed the MNR from an elitist movement into a mass-
based party that was anchored and supported by labor and peasant 
organizations. However, those changes did not signify the rise of a strong and 
autonomous civil society. Threatened by the militancy and rising strength of 
potential civil society groups, such as labor and farmers -who were keyin 
tuming the 1952 movement into a revolution and consolidating its grip on 
power- and aware of the weakness of the rising state which was not 
institutionally consolidated nor guaranteed a sustained ruling coalition, the 
MNR embarked on 'containing' civil society before it ev en began to flourish. 
Beyond these changes, the primary political change was "the initiation 
of a hegemonic,. single-party regime that sought to simultaneously mobilize 
and control peasant and labor groups activated during the revolutionary 
upheaval" (Gamarra and Malloy 1995: 402). Like in Egypt, the Bolivian 
revolution sought to link the state with civil society through a pattern of 
'controlled inclusion,' sowing the seeds for a corporatist system that marked 
state-civil society relations for the next 50 years. In this context, the party 
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leadership attempted to co-opt groups such as the militant Bolivian Tin-
Miners' Federation (FSTMB) by creating the Central Workers Union Central 
Obrera Bo/iviana (COB), granting it "fuero sindical"-legal prerogatives-, and 
including it in co-government (Gamarra and Malloy 1995). At the same time, 
the govemment under the MNR also strengthened the national army to counter 
balance the militancy of labor organizations like FSTMB. Thus, the 
revolution employed the dual mechanism of classic state corporatism: the 
threat of coercion and granting rewards. In the case of the MNR, this meant 
the formalization of de facto peasant land reclamation and the establishment of 
extensive rights for labor. Employing this dual mechanism early on in life of 
what could have been an embryonic civil society, did not allow it to 
experiment and accumulate the necessary experience for independently 
defining its interests, and pursuing it through peaceful organization, and 
collective action. Rather, the existing groupings of farmers and labor were 
ingrained in a clientalistic structure trying to secure minimal economic gains 
and official positions. Potential actors of civil society became part of the state 
structure before they could form a civil society. Just like Nasser's regime in 
Egypt, the MNR also utilized a nationalist discourse to subordinate any rising 
civil society. Capitalizing and agitating threats on its national territory from 
neighboring Peru and Chile, the MNR rallied for national unit y and portrayed 
potential sectorial or ethnic mobilization and resultant claims as jeopardizing 
this unity in the face of external threats. 
As the party attempted to consolidate its grip on the Bolivian state, it 
began distributing positions in the cabinet and other bureaucratic posts based 
on loyalty to the party (Gamarra and Malloy 1995). Civil society groups 
sought to securejobs and governmental positions rather than place strategie 
demands on the state. From the mid-1950s- until the mid-1970s, Bolivian 
civil society seemed to be an extension of the state and, although a number of 
organizations mushroomed during this era, they lacked autonomy and a clear 
agenda of their own. Those organizations which were based on sectoral 
interests -- e.g. teachers, labor associations constituting the Central Obrera 
Boliviana (COB), and peasant groups -- were dominated by the goveming 
party and later by the military juntas (Mayorga 1999). Civil society was under 
the hegemony of a nationalist-revolutionary discourse and corporatist alliances 
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between certain factions of civil society and the state. In the face of an 
entrenched landed elite, this embedded relationship seemed to be a win/win 
situation. Peasants and mining-Iabor could promote their interest in the re-
distribution of resources, ev en if minimal, and the state could overcome 
existing centers of power within the society and the economy, and establish a 
"modem" state system. 
In addition to the practice of controlled inclusion of civil society 
groups, the MNR adopted a number of other critical economic reforms, most 
notably a statist development strategy, based on import substitution 
industrialization (lSI), central-planning, and huge state enterprises. However, 
just as the export-oriented tin-mining bourgeoisie failed to promote the 
construction of a viable economy during the first half of the twentieth century, 
so did the MNR. The state continued to depend on tin-exports and 
international financial aid to provide for its needs and meet its responsibilities 
(Cavarozzi 2001; Morales 2001). Focusing on consolidating its political 
power, rather than mobilizing sufficient resources to create a productive 
economic base, the newly-structured and relatively large state apparatus 
reproduced the patrimonial dynamics of the previous regime, adopting a 
mercantilist attitude toward the national economy to meet its political 
prerogatives. To finance its corporatist structure, the regime depended on 
rents from tin-exports, milked rather than expanded the novice state 
corporations, and indulged in accumulating foreign debt - symptoms that 
continued weil beyond the MNR era to become characteristic of the Bolivian 
state in general (Gamarra and Malloy 1995: 408). Moreover, the lack of a 
differentiated economic base gave the different actors of civil society - again, 
based mainly on economic and sectoral interests -- a pretext to accept the 
corporatist structure the state. Labor and middle c1ass professionals were 
employed and economically supported by the state, and cou Id only secure 
minimal social and economic provisions through the state. Thus, by the end of 
the 1970s, the state had become a predator, a patrimonial ruler with an ever-
growing entourage that preyed on society at large. As in the case of Egypt, 
Bolivia was plagued by both state-corporatism and a rentier system, and has 
lacked the productive economic base and political opening necessary for the 
formation of an autonomous civil society. 
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In 1964, the Barrientos' coup initiated an eighteen-year period of 
military ruie. Successive military governments, however, did not attempt to 
reverse the MNR's revolutionary reforms. The state continued to depend on 
the COBs and the peasants' organization as pillars supporting the viability of 
its governance. The relationship continued because the military regimes did 
not have an alternative sector of society that it could build a ruling coalition 
with to guarantee the sustainability of its rule. Reciprocally, those civil 
society actors, aware of the corporatist nature binding them to the state and 
guaranteeing their inclusion, also continued their support for the ruling regime. 
In fact, the Barrientos government, and those that followed, sought to 
implement much of the same development strategies initially spear-headed by 
the MNR (Gamarra 1998). Other than the increase of politieal repression and 
coercion typical of military rule, the coup was more of a shift in persons than a 
strategie change in the political and economic prerogatives of the state. Not 
only were public-sector investments financed by foreign capital from both 
official and private sources, but the growth of the domestic banking sector 
between 1964 and 1982 was also connected to the expansion of external credit 
(Morales 2001). Increasingly, lending operations were made from sources 
other than deposits, long-term loans either refinanced by the central bank or 
raised directly from abroad, to the extent that even "state banks ... formed a key 
part in the nexus of clientelism that developed during this time" (Morales 
2001: 408). 
Thus, during the MNR rule and the following military dictatorships the 
size and autonomy of civil society were clearly limited. The sector-based 
associations that existed, mainly labor, farmers and professional associations, 
were linked to the state in clientalistic relationships, while most of the 
Bolivian population was not part of these formally organized economic-based 
associations. However, not being represented by these associations, the 
indigenous majority of Bolivians, continued to organize informally in there 
geographically sporadic communities, in an effort to run their affairs in 
absence of state presence. These organizations, which were run by the local 
bodies called originaria, later provided an axis for civil society organization 
and mobilization, as 1 will discuss later in detail. Unlike, the Egyptian case, 
there was still an untapped resource for civil society's insurgence. 
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By the late 1970s, civil society in Bolivia underwent major changes in 
support of democracy; as new actors began taking front stage and traditional 
actors started shifting away from the military regime. The impetus for this 
transition was the genocide of Tolata, in which military authorities killed a 
number of peasants. The peasants' movement, one of the two major factions 
of civil society at the time, started questioning its alliance with the military 
regime. Simultaneously, independent groupings started to emerge within civil 
society rejecting the existent co-opted bodies and calling for the autonomous 
organization of communities. These groups started with the establishing of 
Comite Civico de Santa Cruz (Civic Committee), a new entity rallying for the 
political, economic and civil rights of Bolivians - not sector-based or 
representing economic interests of a particular group- and compromised of 
independent indigenous intellectuals and local community leaders in Santa 
Cruz. The Committee started to question the dominant statist-revolutionary 
discourse by transforming the precedent of collective action away from one 
based on type of production - such as peasant agriculture or tin-mining --
toward one that organized representation around issues of regional identity, 
thus marking the rise of the identity politics that has become probably the 
most important axis for mobilization of Bolivian civil society until today 
(Mayorga 1999). 
Civic Committees spread widely during the 1970s and became major 
actors within Bolivian civil society. Even today, they are still referred to by 
scholars and many Bolivian activists as an example of Bolivia's strong civil 
society heritage. The committees have persistently rejected corporatist 
proposaIs for consolidation into a single body and relentlessly called for the 
retum of democracy, a platform which has been "an important factor in the 
success of the oppositional movement as a who le" (Salter 1995: 19). 
However, it is also important to note the paradoxical nature of the committees. 
Although civic committees are, in essence, a political expression of elite 
interests in the departmental capitals and are to a great extent hierarchica} 
structures (Toranzo, Persona} interview La Paz 13/12/02) see also (Van Cott 
2000), they are also highly valued and appreciated by most Bolivians as "the 
true representatives" of their interests and the institution that best understands 
their reality (Deigo Ayo, Interview, La Paz, 14/12/02). This is also reflected 
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in their high level of legitimacy among Bolivians. For example, an opinion 
poli conducted in the early 1990s found that comités civicos ranked second to 
the Catholic Church in terms of public respect (Gamara and Malloy, 1995: 
419). This paradox alludes to a kind of hybridism in Bolivian civil society 
that is not evident in the Egyptian case. This hybridism, is indicated by the 
presence of multiple organizations within civil society, sorne of which are co-
opted by the state, while others remain largely autonomous and have a high 
mobilization capacity among their constituencies. Yet, among those 
autonomous organizations, such as the Committees, there is a great extent of 
hierarchy and lack of grass-roots participation and representation, which takes 
away from the ideal of civil society organizations as inclusionary mechanisms. 
In the 1970s, these new hybrid civil society organizations, backed by 
the emergent Katarista parties, the first formaI indigenous political party, 
joined together to create an autonomous civil society body representing 
peasants and workers.25 The Bolivian Unitary Union Peasant Workers 
Confederation -- Confederacion Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campasinos 
de Bolivia (CSUTCB) -- unified the fragmented and conflicted campesino 
(peasant) movement, replacing the govemment-controlled Central Obrera 
Boliviana in the fight for democracy (Mayorga 1999). The new movement 
against the military regime was supported by factions of the influential 
Catholic Church, which were active in the campaign for human rights and 
transition to democracy?6 As such, the state began losing credibility among 
its traditional allies (the church, COBs, and peasants), who discredited it as 
25 Another example of civil society hybridism is the Tupaj Katari movement from 1973-79. 
The dissemination of their Manifesto of Tiwanaku represents the beginning of a process in 
which indigenous intellectuals and social movement organizations proposed as the solution to 
chronic political instability and endemic poverty an alternative model of state-society relations 
based on recognition of ethnie difference. The Katarista parties, as they were known, sought 
not to join the political party system, but to replace it with a radically restructured 
multicultural, multilingual, and multinational Bolivian state that would respect lndian 
autonomy. Rather than the Bolivian tlag, these parties tlew the Aymara wiphala (indigenous 
tlag) and invoked the protection of indigenous deities and historical figures Van Cott, D. 
(2000). The Friendly Liquidation of the Past: The Politics of Diversity in Latin America. 
Pittsburg, University of Pittsburg . 
. 1 include this example to show how the Kataristas demonstrate the highly entangled 
relationship between the political society and civil society in Bolivia. Unlike Comites, the 
Kataristas seek political power, but they are also a civil society actor, representing culturally-
and ethnically- based organized interests. 
26 It is important to note that unlike in the Western liberal conceptualization of civil society, 
religious institutions in many of the developing countries are a major part of civil society, in 
the sense of being entities for articulation and defense of societal interests. 
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fascist and repressive (Gamarra 1998; Mayorga 1999; Van Cott 2000). The 
brutality of military regimes united civil society actors in the cali for 
democracy. On another front, the exhaustion of the ISI model and the state's 
incapacity to act as a full-scale provider of social welfare further weakened its 
basis of legitimacy, and gave impetus to the rising autonomous movement 
within civil society. By that time, different sectors of society, whether 
represented by formaI or informaI (not recognized by the state) civil society 
organizations, realized that neither the MNR nor the following military 
regimes cou Id deliver to their interests, in terms of economic benefits, and 
political and civic rights. The majority of the population still lived in poverty, 
was deprived of social services, and denied political representation and 
participation based on ethnicity. Successive regimes had not establish the 
economic and ethnic equity Bolivians expected following the MNR revolution 
that they supported and consolidated. 
However, while certain rising institutions -- such as those within the 
CSUTSB -- enjoyed growing autonomy and were increasingly representative, 
up until the mid-1980s, a number of other civil society groups had only limited 
capacity to influence state politics. The social and political participation from 
other sectors of society was restricted to micro-territorial levels, and 
negotiations with the state were limited to obtaining very specific benefits 
through the mediation of political parties (Blanes 1999). These fragmented 
practices were due partly to the economic structure of Bolivia, which 
depended, until weIl into the 1980s, on only a handful of export products and 
on the country's diverse ethnic and geographic make up. As a result, most 
economic groups independent of co-opted labor organizations lacked enough 
power to organize or put pressure on the govemment (Blanes 1999). At the 
same time, the dispersion of isolated communities over vast areas of land, and 
their different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, led to varied and at times 
contradictory parochial agendas that prevented them from organizing as viable 
actors within civil society. As Oxhom puts it: "there is a vast number. of 
organizations, particularly in rural areas, that historically have been 
marginalized from national political processes ... fragmentation and isolation 
combined to limit not only their actual political incorporation, but also their 
des ire for political incorporation"(Oxhom 2001: 10). It is this fragmentation 
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that leads Javier Medina, a prominent Bolivian social scientist and 
development consultant, to mistakenly assert that Bolivia does not have a 
history of civil society, but rather one of communitarian networks and action, 
(Medina, Personal Interview, La paz 291l1l02)?7 Of course, it is important to 
note that, although those actors were not vocally demanding inclusion within 
the realm of national civil society, their mere presence at the community level 
can be seen as a first step towards inclusion and an increased potential for a 
strong civil society. And although, these civil society actors were not the only 
source for bringing about a shift to democracy in 1982, they did contribute to 
the making of that transition. 
A third turning point in the evolution of Bolivian civil society was the 
shift to democracy in 1982 and the accompanying economic crisis that led to 
subsequent neoliberal reforms in 1985. As in the case of Egypt, by 1985 the 
state-centered development strategy in Bolivia had been exhausted. The 
country was riddled by hyperinflation, and faced a total collapse of the world 
tin-market, a high foreign debt burden, and no international creditworthiness 
(Gamarra 1998). Bolivia's first elected president in almost 20 years, Hernan 
Siles Zuazo, unable to handle decades of corruption and economic 
mismanagement, stepped down in 1985,a year before his term ended, under 
the heightened pressure of economic crisis. President Paz Estensorro came to 
office. As the leader of MNR during the revolution and Bolivia's first 
president after 1952, he was deemed the best man to launch 'another 
revolution': the New Economie Policy (NEP) set forth in Decree 21060 
(Torres and Perez 2000: 246). Bolivia's NEP was much more drastic than 
Egypt's structural adjustment program. The main features of the new policy 
set out a number of fiscal, monetary and economic measures aimed at 
decreasing the chronic fiscal deficit, reducing price control s, providing 
supportive measures for the growth of the private sector, reforming the tax 
code and, later on, privatizing major state enterprises (Torres and Perez 2000; 
Morales 2001). 
27 This interview affirmed my earlier assumption regarding the dominance of the Iiberal 
definitionlconceptualization and its tendency to dismiss many positive realities of developing 
countries' structures. For Medina, civil society was an individualistic "Western" notion that 
does not suit the context of Bolivia. 
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The dual political and economic shifts confronted civil society with 
both opportunities and challenges. The opportunities included an increased 
political opening and freedom of organization and expression associated with 
democracy, the space that the implementation of NEP provided for policy-
debate with the state, and the need for civil society to articulate and place 
consequent demands in the light of a changing economic structure. The 
challenge was that with transition to democracy, which was the consensual 
and strategic demand that different civil society actors were rallying for 
throughout the 1970s, there was a need to formulate and adapt new agendas; 
while at the same time undergoing a sever economic crisis that fragmented and 
put pressure on civil society actors, in terms of its capacity to think and act 
strategically and to continue building itselfwithout being fixated on short-term 
economic demands. These two significant shifts in the economic and political 
context - the NEP and the successful transition to democracy -- resulted in a 
crisis for the traditional civil society actors (labor and peasants) that 
previously had mobilized around the democratization struggle as their number 
one priority. At the same time, though, these changes also led to the 
emergence of new social actors (feminists, cultural and ecologists), thereby 
transforming the nature of civil society in newly-democratized Bolivia. 
Understanding these differing outcomes helps us to better appreciate the 
composition and dynamics of civil society groups today. 
For one, the retum of democracy in Bolivia - as in many other Latin 
American countries -- came not solely, in spite of their best efforts, through 
sustained pressure from civil society actors. Rather, the shift to democracy 
came as result of a govemability crisis, whereby the military regimes did not 
have a political nor economic project to sustain their rule. They were faced by 
a severe and pro-Ionged economic crisis they could not manage and lack of 
political prerogatives and allies necessary for goveming a political unstable 
country. Thus, democracy was brought about through coalition-building or 
politicas de accuerdos (Politics of Accords) between different players. The 
pacts were made by and consequently secured the interests of, major political 
factions, which do not necessarily coincide with and represent different civil 
society actors. The resulting pacts were concemed with instilling political 
stability rather than guaranteeing space for continued growth of civil society. 
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They compromised the spaces available to civil society to both experiment and 
further stren~hen its capabilities as an equal to the state. Indeed, pacts 
between coalition players often proved to be exclusionary and a major source 
of discontinuity in terms of policy-design, institution-building and norms-
institutionalization. Moreover, coalition-building further entrenched the 
corporatist political culture and led to certain expectations goveming state-
civil society actors. As one author notes, rules dividing lead positions within 
the bureaucracy between the different parties of the coalition "hardly made for 
an efficient system .. .it promoted patronage more than ever. . .left little room 
for non-Acuerdo actors and opened the door to a great deal of 
sectarianism"(Graham: 59). The transition to democracy in Bolivia was more 
problematie than the norm because political instability was high and, 
consequently, the pacts/compromises were made very instrumentally to restore 
sorne level of stability with no input and sufficient inclusion of civil society 
actors. 
A second effect that the changes of the 1980s had on civil society was 
that "the new economic policy ... disciplined peasants and workers' unions 
through the harsh realities of the market, while orienting their demands for 
participation towards the sphere of electoral clientelism of new and old 
political parties"(Medeiros 2001: 409). This change in context effectively 
ended both the civil society-state allegiance of the statist-revolutionary era and 
the openly antagonistic confrontational relationship of the 1970s. Rather, the 
economie hardships that the NEP evoked and the fact that a transition to 
dem~cracy was already accomplished, depriving civil society organizations of 
the basic theme for the struggle of civil society players- changed the agenda 
from structural issues such as regime-type and distribution of resources to one 
of daily subsistence concems such as prices, wages and pensions. 
Furthermore, economic concems overshadowed and demoted ethnie issues on 
civil society's agenda, thus, weakening a major axis of mobilization for civil 
society and a number of organizations working essentially on this axis. In 
other words, the ethnic based organizations, which were starting to acquire 
strength in the 1970's and to build a capacity for mobilization and collective 
action, lost a lot of their momentum with society's shift of concem towards 
surviving daily economic hardships. The problem was that these organizations 
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were not strong or consolidated enough by the 1980s to be able to adapt to 
these changes in context and develop a vision/agenda balancing the practical 
vis-à-vis the strategic needs of their constituency. In addition, the NEP 
changes led to the decline in the role of organized labor, even more intensely 
th an in the Egyptian case, where the pace of privatization was much slower. 
With the NEP in place, an estimated 40-45 percent of state miners and factory 
workers were fired between 1985 and 1987 (Van Cott 2000: 103), thus 
reducing the size of the most politicized sectors of the labor movement. 
Nevertheless, the shift to democracy and neoliberalism was not ail bad 
for civil society. In addition, to the political opening that democracy allowed, 
the shift in political and economic context gave rise to a number of new actors 
within civil society. NGOs run by ex-political activists returning from exile in 
Europe started to appear. Prior to 1980, Bolivia had about 100 NGOs. By 
1992, there were around 530 (Petras and Arrellano-Lopez 1994: 561). The 
NGOs were significantly different from grassroots organizations in terms of 
their composition and activities. As Petras explains: 
white members of grassroots organizations are not universally poor, 
as, for example, in the case of sorne successful cooperatives, their 
social class origins tend to be different from the people who work for 
NGOs, who are usually drawn primarily from the urban, white-collar 
professional class (Petras and Arrellano-Lopez 1994: 599). 
Most of these local NGOs were either 1) institutions affiliated with the Church 
and charged with carrying out social programs and/or 2) research institutes 
and 'think tanks.' In terms of activities, the purpose ofthese early local NGOs 
was to support the labor and peasant movements through education and 
communication projects. The "NGOs became refuges for intellectual sectors 
that began working in the countryside and in marginalized urban zones, 
intending to incorporate citizens from sectors traditionally ignored by the 
State"(Paz 1999: 115). They coordinated activities with the local levels of the 
COB and the workers' and peasants' groups, giving them new impetus and 
helping them --even if minimally- build their institutional capacity while acting 
as brokers between the grassroots and the international donor organizations 
and providing them with much needed funding. The neoliberal changes and 
the subsequent emphasis on the important role of the private sector in this 
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model also gave rise to business organizations such as the Bolivian 
Confederation of Private Entrepreneurs, which were established to represent 
and advocate the interests of this group. The new entities gained increased 
visibility and brought with them new forms of collective social action 
(Gamarra and Malloy 1995; Van Cott 2000). Not only did those new entities 
-NGOs and business organizations- broaden the tapestry of civil society 
actors, but it also enriched the mechanisms by which civil society engages the 
state -which is also linked to the shift to democracy- lobbying and advocacy 
started to appear as viable forms of collective action. Finally, the economic 
hardships induced by economic failure of the state and subsequent neoliberal 
changes also "gave rise to political organizations that moved away from 
traditional style parties into becoming archetypical expressions of social 
movements with unsatisfied demands" (Paz 1999: 116). 
The fourth and final tuming point in state-civil society relations came 
in 1993 with the MNRlMRTKL electoral campaign, Plan de Todos (The Plan 
for Ali), and the groundbreaking legislation enacted after their victory. At this 
point, Bolivian technocrats and the political elite became interested in 
enhancing govemability and political stability through delegating state 
responsibilities and decentralization to local authorities and civil society 
organizations. this opened up new spaces for the functioning of civil society 
and strengthening many of its indigenous organizations. The reforms 
resonated with civil society's decade-long call for multiculturalism, ethnic 
diversity and regionalization. "Indeed, by 1991, the civic committees had 
submitted over 20 proposaIs relating to administrative and political 
decentralization" (Salter 1995: 20). The three subsequent 'pillar' laws passed 
in 1994-5 were the capitalization law (establishing the mechanisms for the 
privatization of state enterprises), the law for popular participation (LPP) 
(enlarging the powers and autonomy of local municipal govemments and 
legitimizing/promoting the participation of community organizations in the 
affairs of local municipal govemments); and the educational reform law 
(establishing the basis for a bilingual and multicultural education). These 
pillar laws gave rise to the important Law of Administrative Decentralization 
(LAD), and the Law of National Dialogue (LDN). 
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Together, these laws de-concentrated the authority and funds of 
national-Ievel management of social services (health, education, and social 
assistance) and devolved administrative responsibilities for investment fund 
management to the departmental (or regional government) level (Grindle 
2000). The laws were an attempt to re-engineer the state, but at the same time 
were delegating more resources and power to local level authority in which 
civil society organizations were present and playing a major role. More than 
simply decentralizing the state, then, this reform process "represents an effort 
at social engineering designed to restructure Bolivian political institutions 
democratically from the bottom up" (Oxhorn 2001: 15). Without delving into 
the details of every legal reform influenced by the piIIar laws, it will suffice to 
sketch the major features of a few which are of relevance to the functioning of 
civil society. Those changes to the macro-context Bolivian political economy, 
as 1 will show, resulted in a change in the parameters within which different 
civil society actors were able to function. 
ln terms of the issue of decentralization, unlike in Egypt where the 
mayors and local officiaIs are appointed, the LPP "established the 
municipality as the basic unit for local government throughout the country" 
(Grindle 2000: 94). In the case of Bolivia, this meant that, "for the first time 
in the country's history, the legal standing of indigenous and community 
organizations and sponsored their incorporation into the new local 
institutions"(Grindle 2000: 94). A number of major groups were incorporated 
into the arena of civil society, organizations that had been building links with 
the masses for a long time but were not acknowledged by the state. Over 
16,000 Organizaciones Territoriales de Base (OTBs), including traditional 
organizations through which indigenous communities had organized and 
governed themselves, were legally recognized by mid-1997 (Oxhorn 2001). 
The OTBs were to establish community priorities though participatory 
planning exercises that resulted in an Annual Operational Plan Programa 
Operativa Anual (POA) for each municipality. In practice, this has led to a 
systematic local planning process in which each community first selects 
priorities, which are then discussed and ranked at the municipal level by local 
government authorities and community representatives. The OTBs were also 
to select members for a new Comites de Vigilancia in each municipality, 
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charged with representing community interests through its monitoring of 
municipal govemment activities. Vigilance committees also had the mandate 
to propose investment projects and to supervise their implementation. 
Of course, this is not to claim that these legal reforms were problem-
free or that they managed to overcome years of mutual skepticism, conflict, 
and corporatism that characterized the relations between the state and civil 
society. Indeed, the reforms had a number offlaws and generated a number of 
problems. For one, the mechanisms endorsed by those reforms were in many 
cases faulty in design or in practice. For example, the structure of vigilance 
committees only allows for representation by OTBs, to the exclusion of other 
organizations within civil society thereby neglecting participation of other 
non-regional formations of civil society. The committees, moreover, do not 
have enough financial independence to push forward their ideas and demands. 
During our interview, the Program Coordinator of Municipalization at the 
Bolivian Ministry for Human Development pointed out: 
The vigilance committee can review the budget, but it doesn't have 
the power to do anything about it ... They don't have any money, and 
the govemment had to write an edict in order to pay for a part of the 
vigilance committees' function, so those committees depended on 
money from the State (Barrios, Interview, La Paz 26111/02). 
This financial dependence jeopardizes the autonomy of these committees. 
Following from this, there are a number of operational problems confronting 
these committees. They lack, for instance, the needed organizational and 
technical capacity to function .. Another scholar who is also a top-executive in 
the Ministry ofHuman Development argued, for example, that: 
There isn't a minimum internaI organization [within the VC]; in most 
of the cases. They don't have internaI rules, conforming statutes. 
They don 't know how to separate functions. There is this sort of 
hyper-presidentiai idea, where everything focuses on the President of 
the Vigilance Committee" (Deigo Ayo, Personai Interview, La Paz 
14/12/02). 
Sorne observers c1aim, further, that such changes have actually led to an 
increase in conflict at the local level due to competition over resources, raised 
and frustrated expectations, and territorial conflicts between the newly created 
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municipalities (Ortego 2002). Due to the dialectic relationship between being 
a decision-making authority, and lacking the tinancial independence and the 
technical expertise and heirarchy in the VCs, the reforms created higher 
expectations in local communities regarding independence of decision-making 
and satisfaction of demands that could not be met in practice. As the Pro gram 
Coordinator 1 mentioned earlier put it, these reforms "create the high 
expectation that people can participate to a greater degree than they actually 
can, which produces a sense of frustration" (Barri os, Interview, La Paz 26/11/02). 
A number of Bolivian social scientists and community development workers 
told me that old local elites are still abusing their influence, economic 
resources are often misused or not applied; and local cadres lack the capacity 
to manage the proposed structures for accountability (Deigo Ayo, Personal 
Interview 14/12/2002; Carlos Torazno, Personal Interview, La paz 
13/12/02)see also. In circumstances such as the se, participation in practice is 
far more Iimited than the text of the legal reforms implies. Thus, the attempt 
to develop both the state and civil society through reforms to the system of 
social and economic participation is not working as originally expected by 
either state officiaIs or civil society actors. 
These shortcomings aside, it would be wrong to conclude that 
decentralization and participation-enhancing reforms do not (or will not in the 
future) make a difference for the development of a more equitable relationship 
between civil society and the state. As Ricardo paz puts it, "formaI inclusion 
of rights does not usually take effect immediately, it requires mobilization and 
pressure to be executed" (Paz 1999: 111). This is especially true in Bolivia, 
with its longstanding history of state-corporatism and Iimited wealth. Bolivia 
is a country with a weak state, "national political parties held together 
primarily by the distribution of patronage from the center, politically 
mobilized interests that were centralized and often stronger and more cohesive 
than the parties, and a history of economic and political instability"(Grindle 
2000: 97); hence, the outcome of reform should not be expected to yield 
immediate results. Yet, unlike the case in Egypt, civil society in Bolivia 
functions under a legal framework that, at least formally, guarantees the 
autonomy of organizations and the freedom of association and mobilization, 
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all of which are conducive to the thriving of civil society. In the words of one 
author: 
The institutional changes that have taken place in Bolivia over the 
last decade have created new social orders and institutional 
arrangements between the different forms of social and political 
actors; but they have also created new dynamics and subjects, which 
are important for the evolution of new development and 
democratization policies (Leon 2001: 24). 
While not necessarily uprooting old structures, these reforrns "have at least 
opened new channels of social expression that had until then had been silenced 
or economically insignificant" (Paz 1999: 120). As one interviewee said, 
simply, "there are more natives in power and resources are better distributed" 
(Ayo, Personal Interview, 14/12/02). In particular, 1 find that there are three 
significant ongoing and long-terrn effects that the recent reforrns have brought 
about. First, they have generated a more participatory discourse between the 
state and civil society. Second, they have given civil society actors access to 
funds and more opportunities to influence the system. Finally, they have 
brought about conditions in which other non-corporatist laws and mechanisms 
of reforrn are able to unfold. However, with the recurrent political crisis in 
Bolivia, mainly in 2003 and 200528, it is not clear to what extent do these 
reforrns address the grievances of the indigenous majority, in terrns of 
resource-distribution and political participation. 
Beyond these pertinent issues of decentralization and participation, 
another significant innovation in state-civil society relations brought about by 
recent le gal reforrns of the LDN is the introduction of municipal funds and the 
annual operational plan (POA) which allow citizens to practice and develop 
organizational skills critical to the future evolution of civil society. As 
Grindle asserts, the LPP "enhanced citizen capacity to hold public officiaIs 
accountable for their actions"(Grindle 2000: 96). This opportunity, even if 
minimally exploited, sets forth a process of heightening the expectations of 
civil society actors with regard to what they can and even should do. 
Currently, 14% of the Bolivian civil society actors are engaged in programs 
28 In the two incidences the President was forced to resign in response to massive popular 
protests. 
92 
and/or projects un der the theme of "social control," which include 
participatory planning, human rights and localleadership29 (Leon 2001). 
Additionally, the 1994-95 reforms gave impetus to a number of 
subsequent laws ushering in a more participatory relationship between the 
state and civil society: for example, the NGO law, and the changes in 
electorallaws of for electing mayors. Currently, Bolivian NGOs are govemed 
under the Civil Code by the Law of Associations and Foundations (Ley de 
Asociaciones y Fundaciones - LAF). Unlike the case of Egypt, where NGOs 
have objected to Law 84 on the basis that it curtails their autonomy, in Bolivia, 
the National Coordinator of Networks (Coordinadora Nacional de Redes -
CNR) -- which includes the principal NGOs of the country -- has expressed 
support for the CNR and actively cooperated with parliamentary commissions 
in order to reach consensus on various points. According to Arauco, the Vice-
President of National Union of Institutions for Social Action Uni6n Nacional 
de Instituciones para el Trabajo de Acci6n Social (UNIT AS), the LAF 
guarantees quality and mutual control between the NGOs and the state 
(Editorial 1999: 4). Further encouraging the institutionalization of 
participation, in July 2002 amendments were made to the electoral law 
allowing independent candidates to run in local mayoral elections. Previously, 
only party members were allowed to run, which meant that the mayors were 
mostly members of local communities with political ambitious that stationed 
them in La Paz, far from their constituencies. The new amendments will give 
local community leaders more direct access to the political system and, 
hopefully, make the mayors more attentive to their communities since the 
competition is more open (Tikkuna, personal interview, Desagudero 
1/12/2002; Fernandez, Personal interview, La Paz 30/11/02). The amendment 
came as a response to grassroots organizations pressure to give communities 
more space for self-management and better representation. 
Reforms and the Interrelated Functions of Civil Society 
29 Within this classification, 62% of the interventions are by NGOs, 10% are functional 
organizations or grassroots organizations, and 12% are individuals, academics or social 
experts, whereas 8% are communitiesLeon, R. (2001). Mapeo de actores de la sociedad civil 
promoviendo la ciudadania. La Paz, Department for International Development (DFID). 
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In sum, as a prototype of Latin American civil society, the Bolivian 
civil society features sorne aspects of strength such as diversity of actors 
(social movements, NGOs, non-state community bodies originaria, labor, 
business and peasants' organizations) and increased autonomy as a result of 
democratization and the subsequent legal reforms, as weil as weaknesses due 
to the heritage of state-coporatism and lack of economic independence of a lot 
of these actors. The military dictatorships generated spaces of resistance and 
solidarity, which led to the mobilization of a civil society that started to 
articulate its demands and set forth its own initiatives, thus increasing its 
power relative to the state. Even wh en "these spaces were not defined as 
public or political, they provided for both democratic socialization and 
instruction in patterns of behavior suitable for participation in the public 
sphere"(Jelin 1996: 1 02). They also led to a rising consciousness against 
domination and submissiveness. Yet this empowerment of civil society 
groups was counterbalanced by a persistent colonial legacy of ethnic, racial 
and cultural hierarchy (Bresser- Pereira and Nakano 1998: 44). As evident to 
any visitor to Bolivia, domination on the part of local oligarchies and 
bourgeoisies is evident in everyday relations among classes, as weil as in the 
clientalistic and populist forms of interaction between the state and society. 
Subsequent legal reforms, however, have greatly increased the potential for 
democratization at the local levei. Decentralization initiatives and 
participation, the opening up of resources and avenues of expression for civil 
society groups, and transformations within the local electoral process have ail 
provided Bolivia with a far greater opportunity for civil society to serve as a 
vehicle for inclusion than in the case of Egypfo. Hence, the Bolivian civil 
society has fared way better than its Egyptian peer in performing the 
interrelated functions discussed earlier in Chapter One. 
30. Moreover the history of reform in Bolivia -in particular that of land reform- and the role 
that civil society actors played in it, suggests strong support for the potential success ofreform 
from below For more details see Malloy, J. (1968). Revolution and Development in Bolivia. 
Constructive Change in Latin America. C. Balsier. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press: 
177-232. 
, Eckstein, S. (1982). "The Impact of Revolution on Social Welfare in Latin 
America." Theory and Society l1(January): 43-94. 
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From my discussions with different groups of Bolivians, there seemed 
to be a national discourse that civil society managed to generate and instill. 
Although there seems to be no consensus on the role that civil society is 
expected to play, there are positive indications of a common direction on 
which civil society and the state seem to be in agreement. The idea of 
citizenship construction -- with its different dimensions of poverty eradication, 
establishment of a state of law and strengthened indigenous and multi-cultural 
representation -- was a recurring theme in my discussions with state officiais, 
intellectuals and ordinary citizens on state-civil society relations. Most 
notably, there was a conceptualization of, and discourse, on "social control,", -
mechanisms through which the Church in cooperation with other civil society 
actors supervise the spending of state funds on the regional level- with its two 
sides of participation and accountability. People strongly questioned the idea 
of political parties as their sole representatives. More and more, civil society 
organizations are elaborating a national agenda of demands related to citizens' 
problems and less to the great themes of traditional polities (Ayo, Personal 
Interveiw La Paz 14/12/02; Torazno Personal Interview, La Paz 13/12/02; 
participants in focus group discussion, Desaguadero 7/12/02; participants in 
focus group discussion, San Perdo de Curahuara 15/12/02).31 ln discussing 
the role of the vigilante committees, a/caldes (mayors), and the state resources 
given to municipalities, the groups of citizens with whom 1 met in remote and 
marginalized areas like Desaguadero, San Pedro de Curauhara and AI Alto 
talked primarily about "rights" from the state, rather than "grants." Theyalso 
talked about other specific reforms that the state should adopt and their 
demands to the state for endorsing and strengthening the indigenous goveming 
bodies or originaria. As one participant in a focus group discussion put it 
"this state is running by our resources and should govern through people who 
know more about us and about our needs the originaria" (Pers on al interview, 
San Pedro 24/1112002). That is, there is idea that citizens were capable of 
organizing their own affairs and have the right to do so - notions that were 
fundamentally absent within the discourse of their Egyptian counterparts. The 
importance of this discourse in that people -at least in terms of thought and 
31 See Appendix 1 for details on interviews and focus group discussions. 
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logic- are transcending clientalistic relationships and conceptualizing 
themselves as citizens with the right to organize and choose, rather than being 
grateful to patemalistic state grants. This suggests the potential for civil 
society to further organize and mobilize different constituencies. 
On another level, civil society actors are interested in establishing 
networks and forums that consolidate their position vis-à-vis the state, and 
allow them to make better use of the opportune environment induced by 
democratization and legal reforms. Unlike Egypt, were NGO forums and civil 
society networks are uncommon, in Bolivia NGOs have organized themselves 
into national and regional networks based on shared thematic interests or 
funding sources32 • Although these networks have not been very efficient at 
coordinating and representing their members, due to the country's embedded 
tradition of centralization and lack of horizontal cooperation civil society 
actors (Blanes 1999; Leon 2001), they still present an important tirst step 
toward the establishment for civil society cooperation. They also provide a 
non-proliferated counter-part to the state, obliging it to engage in policy-
debates and consultations on issues affecting civil society actors and socio-
political reforms at large. For example, the NGO law and the LDN had to be 
negotiated with civil society umbrella organization, and their input integrated 
before being passed. This is also a factor of the relative political freedom 
Bolivia enjoys compared to Egypt. 
Following from the success of in generating this citizenship discourse 
and a level of coordinated action, civil society actors managed to increase its 
ability to organize collective action and to use this ability -and the subsequent 
threat to political stability- as bargaining power vis-à-vis the state. For 
example, civil society actors have paralleled their proposaIs for 
decentralization of govemment and multicultural socio-political reforms with 
a number of threats and actual protests, including one that brought La Paz to a 
standstill for one day in February 1992. That served to force different 
administrations to follow through on the debates about decentralization, local 
democratization and social reform. During my stay in Bolivia in 200212003 
there was not a month that passed without demonstrations or marches ranging 
32 CIPCA and UNITAS are among the most notable umbrella organizations for NGOs. 
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from a few hundreds of people to a few thousands. The number of protests 
during less than six months in Bolivia was more than the entire equivalent in 
Egypt during a decade. This is partially due to the more politically democratic 
setting of Bolivia, where coercion is used on a lesser scale than in Egypt, and 
partially because of an accumulated history of organizing and mobilizing 
collective action during the military dictatorships and the concomitant struggle 
for democracy; an experience that Egypt lacks. Moreover, the transition to 
democracy, even though it was not solely brought about by pressure from civil 
society actors, has given those actors the confidence that change is possible 
and that the pressure they create on the state can yield results, encouraging 
them to mobilize when necessary. Also the fragile political structure of the 
Bolivian state and its history of instability have further encouraged people to 
organize collective action.33 
This protest and mobilization, although having its manifestations and 
outcome within the political society (i.e. on the parties and ruling elite), it has 
its roots in civil society. Thus, the Bolivian case is a very interesting example 
ofthe symbiotic relationship between the political society and civil society. In 
this case factionalism and patronage within the political society, have inhibited 
the channeling of mobilization -within the civil society- into positive outcome. 
Conclusion 
Although the Egyptian and Bolivian civil societies share a common 
modem history of state-corporatism and lack of economic independence and 
sufficient resources, they have evolved differently, and currently they tend to 
show different levels of strength. As evident from the above assessment in 
terms of the outlined functions, the Bolivian civil society shows more potential 
for playing its role as a vehicle for inclusion than its Egyptian peer. Unlike the 
case ofBolivia, where civil society has been politicized during the struggle for 
democracy, it seems that the problem with civil society in Egypt is that civil 
society lacks political consciousness, that it is crippled in its ability to rally for 
political change. Egyptian civil society is neither autonomous nor politically 
conscious enough to push for strategic rather than parochial demands. Nor are 
33 Protests and demonstrations have led to the ousting of Bolivian Presidents and the 
govemment in 2003 and 2005. -
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there clear axes of differentiation along which interests can be organized. 
Thus, as Barkey ~sserts, Egyptian "civil society is the regime' s own 
construction, composed of layers of patronage networks"(Barkey 1995), 
limiting the emergence of any actual autonomy, that characterizes effective 
civil societies. Two main factors account for the different outcomes: (1) the 
semi-authoritarian nature of the Egyptian regime versus the military 
dictatorships of Bolivia in the 1960s and 1970s, and (2) the shift to political 
democracy and economic crisis of in 1980s. 
Egypt's authoritarianism depends on a combination of elements that 
mark its political and economic sphere, affect the evolution of its civil society 
and shape resultant institutions, all of which where absent in Bolivia under 
military dictatorships. The first of these elements is the nature of state 
coercion, which unlike the case of Bolivia under military dictatorships, is used 
selectively when needed and when cooptation does not work. The second is 
corporatism, which has resulted in the co-option potential activist groups, but 
has never been institutionalized enough to provide channels of mobilization 
that can eventually be used against the system. Third, there is a limited margin 
of freedom coupled with a psuedo-electoral system, elements which allow for 
benign expression of dissent by the media, the existence of associational 
organizations and parties all of which are subject to manipulation by the 
regime. Such limited freedoms, as shown earlier, actually serve to cushion the 
system against accumulated pressure for change. It is a political tactic by 
which different regimes, such as those of Sadat and Mubarak, take off the lid 
and allow the release of steam resulting from political repression and restraint. 
In contrast, the absence of this margin of freedom and the existence of outright 
coercion in Bolivia during the military regimes have helped civil and political 
societies to develop autonomously, in face of these regimes, and thus they 
were less subdued than in Egypt: The final element is rentierism, the act of 
using the country's geo-political position to extract revenue instead of taxing 
its citizens and financing the above-mentioned elements - coercion, 
corporatism, pseudo-democratic freedoms, and propaganda about political 
opening -- without any accountability to the people. Again, the severe 
economic crisis of the 1980s in Bolivia, and the inability of the system to 
finance its way out of it like the Egyptian system, have encouraged civil 
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society actors to organize and mobilize independently in pursuit of its 
demands under such crisis and the changing economic structure. Hence, "the 
trademark mixture of guided pluralism, controlled elections, and selective 
repression in Egypt. . .is not just a "survival strategy" adopted by authoritarian 
regimes, but rather a type of political system whose institutions, rules, and 
logic defy any linear model of democratization" (Brumberg 2002: 56). 
The second multifaceted factor that increased the potential strength of 
Bolivian civil society is the shift to democracy. This shift have allowed civil 
society to organize more freely and lowered the risks and transaction-costs of 
mobilization, which is not the case in Egypt, where civil society continues to 
function under state restraint. Following form the transition to democracy, the 
legal framework in Bolivia avails civil society actors a number of resources 
and spaces for growth that is not present in Egypt. For example, the LPP, 
LDN, LDA establishes mechanisms and provides resources for 
democratization on the local level, thus, strengthening the role of civil society 
actors who have been most active in local communities and who are best 
suited to support the state in this process. While in Egypt, the legal and 
financial frameworks continue to concentrate power in the hands of the state. 
Thus, within this edifice of authoritarianism in Egypt, it is impossible to 
establish a relationship where civil society is accessible to the marginalized, 
independent from the state, yet in close relation or collaboration with it 
without domination. 
That is not to argue that the Bolivian civil society has reached the ideal 
of being autonomous from the state yet effective in inclusion of the 
marginalized. Rather, l am arguing that it has latent strengths and potentials 
that the Egyptian civil society lacks. This difference in the CUITent relative 
strength and potential of civil society poses the question of if and how such 
difference affects the functioning and impact of SFs in the two countries? The 
following chapters will address and attempt to answer this question in detail. 
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Cbapter Four 
Egypt: Is if Sucb a Failure? 
Comparisons between the Egyptian Social Fund for Development 
(SFD) and similar funds in other countries are almost never to the SFD's 
advantage. World Bank officiais complain that the Fund - the largest in the 
world -- is too big to be efficient. Development consultants argue that it has 
been infiltrated by stereotypically Egyptian "cultural traits," such as 
tendencies toward postponement and hierarchy. The SFD employees, in turn, 
claim that any problems with the Fund are attributable to "the previous 
administration." While there is a certain degree of validity in ail of these 
perspectives, in this chapter 1 argue that the failures of the SFD largely reflect 
structural problems at the macro-economic and political levels of Egyptian 
society. In the first section of this chapter, 1 show how macro-economic 
change led to the initiation and evolution of the SFD, specifically via the 
implementation of neoliberal economic policies and the economic crisis of the 
early 1990s. 1 then analyze how the transformation of the SFD into a 
permanent institution has incorporated the three main trends characterizing 
social policy institutions under neoliberalism: market-orientation, 
decentralization, and participation. In the third section, 1 discuss the findings 
of my fieldwork and evaluate how SFD performed in terms of participation, 
accountability and embeddedness. 1 am particularly interested in the extent to 
which the SFD served to strengthen civil society. In the final section, 1 
analyze the SFD within the larger picture of the Egyptian semi-corporatist 
state, with its rentier economy, weak civil society, and authoritarian structures 
of power. 
Neoliberalism and the Rise of SFD 
As 1 explained earlier in Chapter Three, the Egyptian state started 
implementing a neoliberal structural adjustment program in 1991, under the 
pressure of a prolonged economic crisis, and in order to appease and secure 
the economic support of the U.S. and international financial institutions. At 
that time, sources of rent -- remittances, oil, and tourism - were drying up, and 
the return of thousands of workers from the Gulf following the 1991 war put 
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even more pressure on the already deteriorating Egyptian economy. 
Meanwhile, the existing social safety net was under attack from beneficiaries, 
international financial institutions and even the state. The Food Voucher 
system wasted state resources on the non-needy through inefficient targeting 
and black-marketeering. A rent-seeking bureaucracy managed the health and 
education sectors, providing poor quality services for a fee but, at the same 
time, failing to reach out to its designated beneficiaries. In order to overcome 
these existing problems of leakage, patronage and rent-seeking, as weIl as to 
the guarantee optimal use of resources to combat the negative effects of 
structural adjustment, the Egyptian state together with the World Bank 
inaugurated a "model" social safety net called the Social Fund for 
Development (SFD). Established by the Presidential Decree no. 40 in 1991, 
the SFD began as a temporary independent institution for handling the rapid 
disbursement of funds. 
In its initial phase, the Fund focused on: (1) rehabilitation training 
programs for the Gulf returnees and those who lost their jobs due to the 
privatization of state entities; (2) the financing of infrastructure projects in 
poor areas, making use of the local workers. During its first years, however, 
the Fund was neither as visible nor as successful with its targeted beneficiaries 
as its Bolivian peer (see Chapter Five). According to the Fund's first Director 
of Institutional Capacity Building Program: 
It took us a few years to arrange the house ... and for the staff to 
understand the pseudo-governmental nature of the Fund and its 
mandate of contracting outside entities to implement the projects 
(Abu Zaid, Personal Interview, Cairo 12/1/02). 
For a few years after Egypt started implementing its SAP, the country 
experienced the classic -cyclical- improvement in macro-level economic 
indicators associated with structural adjustment. The government deficit feIl, 
GDP increased and there was a flux of foreign direct investment (FDI). 
However, these improvements proved short-lived. By the end of the 1990s, 
Egypt's SAP had led to no substantial improvement in the lives of the majority 
of Egyptians; rather, it had actually worsened living standards and life-
opportunities. By 1995-96, the official rate of poverty in Egypt had reached 
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48percent of the total population (Assaad and Rouchdy 1999). Wages 
declined and unemployment rose as the state retreated from its earlier 
commitment to provide employment for ail graduates and began a sustained 
process of privatization. The state lacked a systematic strategy for 
employment, and remained without any "detailed policies and programs for 
job creation as a coherent and integrated component of macro-economic 
policies" (EI-Ehwany and El-Laithy 2001: 12). On an even more basic level, 
state policy did not attempt to explicitly address poverty issues, nor was 
government (or, indeed, any other institution) responsible for designing, 
implementing and monitoring poverty reduction programs (EI-Ehwany and EI-
Laithy 2001). Thus, there was a need for an institution that could address such 
economic challenges and their potential political ramifications, hence the SFD 
was changed from a temporary institution to a permanent one, and designated 
to be the locus for addressing the issues of poverty and unemployment. 
Later on, the Fund's mandate and programs expanded, but the main 
premise of its institutional structure - its autonomy from the national 
bureaucracy -- remained the same. In order to escape the shortcomings of the 
notorious Egyptian bureaucracy, as weil as to maintain (typically neoliberal) 
technocratie insulation, the Fund falls directly un der the jurisdiction of the 
Prime Minister, and is run by an Executive Director appointed by the 
President. Unlike their counterparts in national ministries, the Fund attracts 
professionals with high levels of education and expertise, mainly due to its 
internationally competitive salaries. SFD resources come from grants and 
loans provided by the government's General State Budget, as weil as from 
foreign governments and different bilateral, regional and international donor 
institutions i.e. its not financially dependent or under the jurisprudence of on 
any Ministry. Thus, it is both financially and administratively autonomous. 
This autonomy, arguably, allows enough flexibility for the Fund to respond to 
macro-economic changes and market dynamics and defend against the 
expected economic fluctuations associated with neoliberal policies. It allows 
the Fund to change its operations (and even its mandate) so as to more 
effectively cater to the needs of its 'clients,' unlike traditional state social 
policy arrangements i.e. the Fund can change its areas of spending in terms of 
location and type of projects to accommodate changing macro-economic 
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situation. In an interview, the Deputy-Director of the Fund, gave examples of 
how SFD was able to change its programmatic focus to suit new macro-
economic climates, such as its present emphasis on, and expansion of, the 
Small Enterprise Development Organization (SEDO) in response to the need 
for job creation through entrepreneurship (EI-Bakry, Personal Interview, Cairo 
18/1/02). The SFD was therefore devised to be a responsive institutional 
mechanism to combat structural shortcomings. 
SFD Adopting Three Policy Shifts 
In response to the economic crisis of the late 1990s, Presidential 
Decree no. 434 in 1999 adjusted the Fund's mandate, tuming it into a 
permanent institution with the objective of reducing poverty through job 
creation and investment in human development. Through the expansion of its 
programs, the Fund is now intended to be more than simply a safety net, 
tackling poverty through medium- and long-term, self-sustaining projects as 
opposed to simply providing short-term assistance to the unemployed. The 
SFD ultimately became Egypt's second largest social welfare program, 
accounting for 13percent of Egyptian govemment social welfare expenditure 
in 1999 (Don or Assistance Group 2001).34 The SFD has evolved to comprise 
of five main programs: 
1. The Small Enterprise Development Organization (SEDO): 
using banks and a limited number of NGOs to provide loans 
and technical assistance toward the establishment of small-
and medium-scale enterprises. 
2. The Public Works Program: 
public infrastructure projects 
materials and labor. 
supporting labor-intensive 
using local contractors, 
3. The Community Development Program: providing capacity-
building, social services projects and micro-credit loans to 
34 Egypt has three main safety net programs which together accounted for 4percent of the total 
govemment expenditures in 1999: The Social Fund for Development (13percent), The 
Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs (MISA) social security transfers (2percent), and the 
food subsidy program (85percent) (Donor Assistance Group (2001). Position Paper on Social 
Development in Egypt. Cairo, Donor Assistance Group in Egypt. 
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grassroots' organizations via NGOs and local govemment 
bodies. 
4. The Human Resources Development Program: using 
subcontractors to train displaced public sector employees and 
new graduates. 
5. The Institutional Development Program: strengthening the 
administrative and technical capabilities of the SFD itself, as 
weil as the intermediary organizations through which it works 
(mainly, state local authorities and NGOs). 
The idea and design of these new programs reflect the three main 
premises of neoliberal social policy that 1 discuss in Chapter Two: 
customerization or market-orientation of social policy, decentralization of 
services' management and provision, and participation of beneficiaries in the 
design and implementation of programs and services. 
Being market-oriented, the programs focused on "social investments" 
rather than "social rights": that is, projects with concrete economic retums 
(such as loans for small enterprises or vocational training) as opposed to social 
aid grants (such as literacy and health projects). It is interesting to note that 
ever since its start in 1991, the fastest growing pro gram in the SFD has been 
the Small Enterprise Development Organization (SEDO), an institution which 
provides loans of up to US $10,000. At the same time, there was systematic 
decrease in aIl programs of soft technologies, such as institutional building and 
gender-equity enhancing programs, as 1 will show later. 
Second, the SFD decentralized through 25 regional and satellite offices 
spread across Egypt. According to the Community Development Pro gram 
(CDP) Operations' Manual: 
Rather than monitoring the progress ofprojects and reporting to 
the headquarters in Cairo, the offices now have a major input in 
the type of projects that should be carried out in selected 
govemorates ... [and] coordinate between SFD core programs 
and sponsoring agencies (Social Fund for Development 1999: 
4). 
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Decentralizing the management and operations of the SFD was meant to 
provide more flexibility and responsiveness towards the Fund's beneficiaries 
thereby encouraging grassroots participation. Decentralization also seemed in 
line with the Fund's market-orientation, since decentralized management 
guaranteed better responsiveness to beneficiaries as "customers." It seemed 
the best way to mak~ timely decisions, follow up on the performance of the 
Fund's myriad of subcontractors, and maximize beneficiaries' participation. 
Thus, decentralization of operations was also a 'natural' outgrowth of the 
Fund's out-sourcing policy, whereby the Fund's various programs worked 
with counterparts from the private sector and civil society. These 
corporate/non-profit sector relationships were to give SFD a comparative 
advantage over traditional social service institutions and help the Fund 
strengthen both ofthese sectors. From 1991 to 1997, the Fund had disbursed a 
total of US$827 million with 56 percent of this figure channeled through 
NGOs and banks, 27 percent through local authorities (governorates) and 10 
percent through central government ministries and agencies (Bruinsma 2000: 
10). 
ln later stages, however, the SFD seemed to pull back from civil 
society participation. The Board of the SFD shifted funding away from the 
NGO sector and toward ministerial-Ievel budgetary support. This has meant 
that between the SFD's Phase 1 (1991 to 1996) and Phase 2 (end of 1999), the 
share of CDP funds flowing to line ministries increased from 26 percent to 53 
percent, while NGO funding decreased from 41 percent to 25 percent (2000; 
Social Fund for Development 2000). The change reflects the increased 
politicization of the SFD, which will be discussed in details later, as Fund 
resources ended up being sucked back into the national bureaucracy, an 
outcome that the creation of the Fund was meant to prevent. The shift was 
also related to other problems, such as the overabundance of funding and the 
SFD' s own limited institutional capabilities, both of which 1 will discuss in 
detail in upcoming sections. 
ln conclusion, the adoption of these neoliberal priorities --
customerization, participation, and decentralization -- along with the nature of 
the Egyptian political and economic system, have often seemed to be pulling 
the SFD in two opposing directions. On the one hand, as 1 de scribe in Chapter 
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Three, Egypt is a semi-corporatist rentier state with a weak civil society. 
There is, therefore, the strong probability that the SFD will be co-opted by the 
Egyptian state (as opposed, in the best-case scenario, to developing into a re-
distributive mechanism for strengthening civil society). As Bangura (1999) 
argues, "[in] rentier states with weak civil societies ... the state tends to act as a 
benevolent or patemalistic provider when it engages in distributive 
policies"(Bangura 1999: 3). On the other hand, the flexible nature of 
corporatism in Egypt, and the weaknesses and contradictions inherent to the 
Egyptian state itself, mean that the SFD does stand a chance of becoming a 
non-corporatist state institution, one with substantial power to strengthen civil 
society. As 1 point out in Chapter Two, participation and decentralization can 
create space for civil society and encourage collective action. The fieldwork 
for this research was conducted in 2002, after these neoliberal political and 
economic transformations were weIl underway and their ramifications clearly 
apparent. In the following section, 1 will examine the outcome of these 
transformations as manifested in the projects of the Community Development 
Program. 
The Social Fund for Development: The Community Development 
Program 
1 focus specifically on the SFD's community development program 
(CDP) since, more than any other program within SFD, its mandate 
necessitates an engagement with civil society. According to the CDP 
operations manual, this pro gram is "intended to strengthen the institutional 
capabilities of regional NGOs, and to mobilize local grassroots community 
initiatives" (Social Fund for Development 1999: 2). The CDP attempts to 
meet the needs ofthe grassroots community by using two major approaches: 
One is gradually shifting its funding to rely in crea singly on 
NGOs that are more capable of conducting community 
participation techniques. The other approach focuses on 
increasing the role of vocational training and micro-finance 
(Social Fund for Development 2000: 14). 
The CDP finances projects across the social development spectrum, including 
projects in health, education, micro-credit, the environment, and population 
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control (see figure 4.1). Just like the rest of SFD programs, this program 
implements these projects through intermediaries, including private 
organizations, local administrative bodies, govemorates and ministries; 
however, whenever feasible, NGOs receive preferential treatment (Social 
Fund for Development 1999: 14). 
Initially, 1 had also wanted to study the Institutional Development 
Program (IDP) of the SFD. The IDP's mandate is to strengthen the 
institutional capacity of the SFD and its various partners, whether line 
ministries, local authorities or NGOs. Thus, the program seemed to have the 
potential to help Egyptian civil society transcend many of its present 
shortcomings, such as those 1 discuss in Chapter Three. It was also a 
potential mechanism for establishing communication channels between 
govemmental and non-govemmental bodies, thereby helping to create 
development synergy. However, 1 discovered during my fieldwork that the 
SFD administration had placed this program on hold claiming that it lacked a 
niche. Subsequently, IDP's budget was transferred towards the development 
of a database for the Fund (Gad, Personai Interview, Cairo 1/3/02). Indeed, in 
an interview with the Vice President of the Fund, wh en asked about 
achievements of the IDP, he referred to this new database system as opposed 
to any potentiai role that IDP might have play with intermediaries (EI-Bakry, 
Pers on al Interview, Cairo 18/1/02). The Director of the IDP confirmed the 
loss of the IDP's budget to the database, observing that the program did not 
seem to be a priority for the SFD management (Gad, Personai Interview, Cairo 
1/3/02). It is interesting to note too that the program had a director but neither 
projects nor clear plans. That the SFD management placed the IDP on hold 
aiso indicates its Iack of commitment to boistering the institutionai capacity of 
its different intermediaries.35 
3S The diversion of the IOP budget was the tirst sign to me of the SFO's tendency to shy away 
from 'soft technology' (i.e. organizational capacity building) in order to focus on more 'hard' 
technological outcomes, such as the database. It also signitied a pulling away from both civil 
society in general, and NGOs in particular, since this program was supposed to be the main 
measure of SFO's support for intermediaries (especially civil society organizations). 
Moreover, the confusion of the SFO managers) regarding the objectives of the IOP, also 
foreshadowed both a lack oftransparency and a centralized decision-making process that 1 
later found within the CDP as weil. 
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In examining the work of the CDP, 1 focused on pro gram projects in 
Ismailia, a govemorate 1 00 km east of the capital, Cairo. Ismailia is 
moderately populated and includes both rural villages and several large cities 
(for details on the choice of Ismailia see Appendix 1). The moderate 
geographic and demographic size of the govemorate allowed me to study the 
CDP projects comprehensively. During my fieldwork, the CDP worked with 
six NGOs. Two had ongoing projects. The other four were in the process of 
either phasing out, or had just-ended, their projects. The most funded of ail 
six intermediaries was the Productive F amily Association (PF A), a national 
entity with branches in different govemorates, established by the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and headed by the Minister, yet the SFD and the Egyptian state 
continued to calI it an 'NGO.' The PF A used the funds in a micro-credit 
scheme designed to give loans, to families who have assets, or could be 
guaranteed by a salaried employee. Being part of the state establishment, the 
funds directed to the PF A in Ismailia exceeded the funding of ail the other 
projects combined and further underscored the shift of the Fund away from 
NGOs towards govemmental bodies. 
This funding decision, also reflects the SFD's a de facto policy within 
CDP that gives supremacy to micro-credit projects and, more broadly, to the 
use of economic retum as the most important criteria for the Fund's 
investments. As Figure 4.1 shows, during year 2001, 37 percent of the 
aggregate CDP funding went to micro-credit projects, while only 8 percent 
was dedicated to capacity-building (Carl Bro Management 2001). Again, as in 
the case of the IDP, capacity-building was forgone in order to fund more 
physical projects. In the case of the CDP in Ismailia, the two ongoing micro-
credit projects took up more than 50 percent of the funds disbursed by the 
program, while the four outgoing projects dealt with the environment and 
health. Moreover, none of the six projects included a capacity-building 
component for the NGOs or their respective communities. 
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Figure 4.1. Sectorial Distribution of Contracted Participatory 
other projects 
Sanilation 
28% 
ln following sections 1 further examine those issues in detail, 1 use the 
three indicators developed in Chapter Two: participation, accountability, and 
embeddedness. 1 then analyze the Fund's potential to strengthen civil society 
and create development synergy. 1 focus specifically on the three issue-areas 1 
outline in Chapter Two. First, do SFs impart to communities and civil society 
actors much needed financial resources and organizational experience? Next, 
are SFs ideal models for state-civil society synergy since they are state 
institutions that partner with non-state actors? Finally, do SFs' adoption of 
participatory approaches lead to changes on both community and national 
levels? 
Participation 
ln examining participation, 1 compare the CDP's emphasis on 
participation in its policy documents to its encouragement of participation, in 
practice. 1 also look at the role played by donors in the promotion and practice 
of participation, since they seem to have had a degree of leverage with the 
SFD. In spite of the rhetoric on participation adopted by the SFD, the 
Egyptian government, and the international donor community, the SFD did not 
score highly on the issue of participation. 
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To start with, aH of the six civil society organizations with which the 
program was dealing were headed and managed by professionals who were 
not representative of the communities within which they worked. In an 
interview with Mr. Sobhi Zakian, a school-owner and the director of one of 
the NGOs -- a garbage collection project -- he boasted that he does not need 
the SFD money and that the car he drives is "one-of-a-kind" in the 
govemorate (Zakian, personal interview, Ismailia 28/3/02). Another NGO 
was headed by a lead member of the ruling National Democratie Party (NDP) 
and a candidate for parliament. And a third NGO, its director and board 
members were university prof essors with whom 1 was unable to meet because 
of their busy schedules. In general, aIl the subcontracted NGOs were headed 
by highly-educated public figures who were members of the ruling NDP 
and/or the govemmentallocal council. The irony is that those NGOs claim to 
represent shanty-communities that do not even have basic garbage and sewage 
services. Moreover, none of these NGOs have had a change in leadership 
since their inception. In addition, none of them had mechanisms to ensure 
their accountability to the community. As one of the Directors told me 
We are helping those poor people and this is something they 
should appreciate not ask questions about...it all depends on 
our goodwill not accountability (Anonymous 2, personal 
interview, 28/3/02). 
This statement, which was reiterated in a number of ways by the 
different NGO directors, which poses the question of regarding what 
kind of grassroots participation would they push for voluntarily. 
On the procedural leveI, the pro gram had a standard procedure by 
which the NGOs applied for funding: a General Outline for Project ProposaIs, 
in which the CDP indicated the most important points for judging a project's 
merit. The submitted proposaI was then evaluated by the field staff within the 
regionai office, using a standard Project Appraisal Check-list. It was 
interesting to find out that the "General Outline for Project ProposaI" did not 
require proof of beneficiaries' participation in choosing the specific project, 
nor a discussion of the role of participation in its future implementation and 
management plans (although it did include specification on issues such as the 
financiai sustainability of the project and environmentai considerations) 
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(Social Fund for Development 1999). 
Similarly, the "Project Appraisal Check-list" used by the 
administration to evaluate the proposaIs assigned community participation '1' 
out of a total of 26 in the evaluation criteria. Similarly, there were no 
systematic mechanisms spelled out in any of the CDP documents for 
integrating communities' participation into the monitoring and evaluation 
stages ofprojects. According to the CDP operations' manual, 
[M]onitoring presently consists of checking on a set of actions 
within a specific timeframe. It tracks progress according to a 
previously agreed work plan and criteria. The methodology is 
based on a) data collected during field visits by representative 
of the CDP, b) technical and financial monthly reports 
submitted to the CDP [by the regional offices and 
implementation agencies] (Social Fund for Development 1999: 
11) 
Additionally, the approval of any project with a budget of more than L.E. 
50,000 (U.S. $8,000) -- which included almost aIl the SFD projects - required 
the consent of the Prime Minister. Not only did this cause delay in project 
approval, something about which different NGOs and communities often 
complained, but it also did not allow those communities or even the SFD 
regional office a chance to discuss or appeal decisions. Thus, the role of the 
regional field-offices was simply to follow up on the implementation of 
projects as approved by Headquarters which, in tum, supervised their work. 
Obviously, such procedures clearly contradicted the SFD's claims of 
decentralization. 
On the operationallevel, participation was no more of a priority than it 
was at the design level. From the project selection to its implementation, the 
communities and the local NGOs were completely absent. The Board of the 
SFD was the authority that decided on the kind of projects in which CDP and 
other programs were involved. The projects were th en implemented without 
input from their regional offices, their partner NGOs or the local communities. 
For example, during my fieldwork, there was a shift in CDP away from 
literacy projects to micro-credit. When 1 asked the CDP Manager if this 
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decision might disregard the variation in needs between the different 
govemorates, he said that it was the SFD board's decision and that he had 
nothing to do with it. Information regarding the process of project selection 
was not clear even to the staff of the NGOs acting as implementing agencies 
within the SFD. According to one director the acceptance or rejection of 
projects did not have fixed criteria, but rather it depended on what was "in 
fashion" for the SFD at the time (Zakian, pers on al interview, Ismaïlia 
28/3/02). Another NGO manager said that his community needed cleaning 
projects and health clinics much more than micro-credit, but that the SFD 
office had been declining their proposaIs, even though the proposaIs included 
evidence of community assessment. In his words, "they [the SFD] only want 
to fund micro-credit" (Anonymous, personal interview, Ismaïlia 29/3/02). 
As for the project beneficiaries, not only did they not participate in the 
choice of the projects, but they were not ev en consuited on its management 
terms. In meetings with the beneficiaries of two different micro-credit 
projects, they aIl confirmed that they did not know anything about how the 
projects were designed, selected or managed (Focus group discussions 
Ismailia 13/4/02 & 14/4/02). They had not been asked to give feedback on the 
project at any stage since the start of its implementation, nor were they aware 
of any procedure for filing complaints (Focus group discussion, Ismailia 
13/4/02). As one woman who was part of the micro-credit scheme put it: 
This is aIl 'big business' between the Mr. who manages the 
NGO and the Mr. from the SFD office who provides the 
money ... they would never include simple people like us 
(Anonymous Woman, personal interview 13/4/02) 
Not only did the different beneficiaries rightly feel excluded from the 
decision-making process but, even worse, they believed that their 
exclusion was normal since these projects were 'govemmental favors' 
for which they should only be grateful. In an interview with one of the 
participants in a micro-credit scheme against whom the SFD recently 
had got a sentence for loan default, she said that she couldn't 
complain: 
[Its] not only because [1 don't] know who to complain to ... but 
also because this project is a grant from the govemment. 1 can't 
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complaint about its terms. Would you complain if someone got 
you a present you don't like?! (Umm Sahar, Personal interview, 
Ismaïlia 9 April 2002). 
Thus, the SFD not only excluded community members from active 
participation in its projects and administered them with the same top-down 
approach its existence was supposed to overcome, but it also reinforced 
patron-client relations at the expense of notions of citizenship. Umm Sahar's 
words capture a common sense among the project beneficiaries; they referred 
to the SFD as the 'government' and constantly expressed a belief in their 
inabïlity to influence its decisions (Focus group discussion, Ismaïlia 13/4/02 & 
14/4/02). Rather than "empowering" its beneficiaries, as the SFD claimed to 
do, the most dominant feeling among the beneficiaries with whom 1 spoke was 
one ofincapacity. 
ln addition, the expansion of the CDP project implementation agenda 
led to a menu of standard packages of services, such as projects ready-for-use 
by community development associations (CDAs), NGOs, banks and 
govemorates. The standard package contained a detailed project design so 
that aIl an NGO had to do was change the coyer page to include its own name 
and the name of the community it served (Anonymous Employee, pers on al 
interview, Ismailia 30/3/02). These standard packages constrained both 
communities' freedom of choice and their participation in project selection 
and implementation. As one of the reviews of the SFD found, ready-for-use 
project packages may have led to: 
efficiency and increased volume of activities, but ... also 
reduce[ d] participation and prevent[ ed] SFD from better 
understanding and addressing dynamics of poverty in its 
various qualitative dimensions. (Mutli-Donor Review Mission 
2000: 34) 
In spite of these reservations by donor agencies, the Director of the 
CDP an Engineer by training, said that there was no intention to move away 
from standard projects, because most NGOs lacked the capacity to put 
together a project proposaI and standardized packages were the quickest and 
most effective way to get projects approved (Amin, Personal Interview, Cairo 
10/4/02). He did not find it problematic to have CDP projects pre-determined 
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by the Board of Directors of the Fund, without regard for the needs of the 
different communities, and in absence of their input into such a process. For 
the CDP and its leadership, the priority was efficiency at the expense of 
effectiveness. 
Similarly, in my interviews with the CDP field office staff, it was clear 
that there was no sense of the importance of community participation or 
training, nor was there any idea about how the field officers might encourage 
it. Although none of the field staff went so far as to dismiss the importance of 
community participation, they did point to other issues -- such as 'efficiency' 
of implementation, disbursement of furids, and number of beneficiaries -- as 
being more important priorities (Roushdy, personal interview, Ismailia 
21/3/02; Ahmed, Personal Interview, Cairo 26/02/02). Indeed, they often 
seemed to see the issue along dichotomous lines, suggesting that there was a 
trade-offbetween efficiency and participation. 
Accordingly, the CDP did not invest much in training its partner 
organizations in participatory approaches, nor was much effort put into 
developing ways to establish community-driven monitoring and evaluation 
systems to enhance accountability within the NGOs and their projects. At the 
time of my research, none of the implementing NGOs 1 interviewed had 
received training on participatory techniques of community organization. 
Moreover, it was evident that there was a general inadequacy of NGO staff 
training in participatory approaches due to the restrictions imposed by pre-
determined kinds of project packages. In summary, there were neither the 
mechanisms, nor the staff motivation, within NGOs to encourage 
beneficiaries' participation. 
As for the donor agencies that could have used their leverage with the 
SFD to push it into adopting more participatory methods, they seemed to be as 
reluctant as the SFD. In an interview with the head of Program Coordination 
Unit (pCU) responsible for managing aIl the European donors' funds to the 
SFD, building its institutional capacity, and monitoring' and evaluating its 
performance, he stated that don ors always asked SFD to work on issues of 
participation; however, because of the multiplicity of donors, the SFD 
managed to play themaIl off against one another and evade the pressure 
(RoIlos, personal interview, Cairo 26/2/02). Yet, it is interesting to note that 
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the PCU itself managed to exclude communities' input in the redesigning of 
the SFD. The director affirmed that there was neither community participation 
nor consultation during the process of changing the SFD mandate and tuming 
it into a permanent institution (Rollos, personal interview, Cairo 26/2/02). 
This process included issuing a new mission statement, deciding on the goals 
and objectives of the programs, and assessing the strength, weakness, 
potentials and threats that the SFD was facing. And although such changes 
were meant to cater to the targeted beneficiaries of the SFD, those potential 
beneficiaries were not included, an approach that is perfectly in line with the 
'technocratie mania,36 characterizing neoliberalism. As for the World Bank 
officiaIs, they emphasized that the degree of community participation was the 
responsibility of the Fund and that they had no means of putting pressure on 
the SFD because, ev en if they threatened to pull funding, the SFD knew it 
could replace the money from funding sources elsewhere (Abdel Aziz, 
personal interview, Cairo 5/5/02). 
Accountability 
Just as community participation was absent in the design and 
implementation of CDP projects, so too was accountability. In theory, there 
was a two-tier structure in which implementing agencies were accountable to 
the SFD, and the SFD, in turn, accountable to both donors and the Prime 
Minister's office. Within this structure, however, the CDP had no mechanism 
spelled out in its operations manual to ensure accountability to its 
intermediaries nor were there ways - such as channels to handle complaints --
to ensure that the implementing agencies themselves were accountable. 
Moreover, none of the evaluation documents of the SFD, such as the Multi-
Donor review report or different donor-commissioned studies, were ever 
shared with the local community (Amin, Personal Interview, Cairo 10/4/02). 
When asked what mechanisms were available for ensuring, CDP's 
accountability to the community, the CDP Director asserted that anyone could 
'write' a complaint and send it to the SFD regional office or to the 
36 Technocratie mania, refers to the neoliberal obsession with technocrats as representing the 
epitome ofknowledge, and the insulation of decision-making even from those it was meant to 
affect. 
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Headquarters in Cairo (Amin, Personal Interview, Cairo 10/4/02). However, 
none of the project beneficiaries with whom 1 spoke even knew where the 
SFD regional office was in Ismailia, let alone the location of the Cairo 
Headquarters (Focus group discussions Ismailia 13/4/02 & 14/4/02). 
Moreover, if you are poor in Egypt, you are likely not to be able to 'write' a 
letter because you are illiterate; and if you cou Id, you might be intimidated by 
the thought. 
The lack of these accountability mechanisms had important 
repercussions for the beneficiaries on the ground. For example, in a group 
discussion with women who were having problems repaying their SFD micro-
loans due to the absence oftechnical assistance by the disbursing NOO, one of 
them said: 
There is nothing we can do except to pray to Ood ... he is the 
only one who would Iisten to poor ignorant women like 
us ... no one else would (Focus group discussion Ismailia 
15/4/02). 
AlI the women in the group seemed to agree with this statement, declaring that 
there was nothing that they could personalIy do to resolve their problems 
which they saw as a result of SFD and NOO shortcomings. Once again, the 
absence of accountability measures did not only affect the functioning of the 
projects but, more importantly, it further instilled a sense ofpowerlessness that 
is contradictory to the 'development synergy' SFD claims to stand for. 
This problem was further compounded by the fact that none of the 
CDP's partner NOOs in Ismailia had any established accountability 
mechanisms vis-à-vis their constituencies, and the CDP did not require any 
evidence from them that they had. This further restricted the channels for 
beneficiaries' feedback and also discouraged democratic practices among the 
NGOs themselves. By ignoring accountability, the SFD wasted yet another 
opportunity through which it might have helped strengthen civil society. 
The flipside of not pushing for accountability from the NOO/civil 
society side was that the CDP reciprocally did not see itself as accountable to 
its partner NOOs. NOOs were only able to express their views through either 
filing a complaint - for which there was no clear procedure for review and 
response -- or going personalIy to the field officers -- in whom the NOO staff 
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did not have much faith due to their limited authority. As one of the NGO 
directors put it: 
Those 'kids' have no authority. They even get their days off approved 
from the office in Cairo ... My project has been on ho Id for the past six 
months and every time 1 tried to get information from them on what 
was going on, they told me to send a letter to the office in Cairo since 
they can't help (Zakian, personal interview, Ismailia 28/3/02). 
Although this example also shows a lack of decentralization, even the 
devolution of management might not lead to accountability if there was no 
clear procedure for the channeling of grievances or if complaints were left to 
the discretion of individual officers. Moreover, this lack of accountability 
wou Id certainly invite arbitrariness, clientalism and corruption, and discourage 
the initiation of local democratization and the establishment of equitable 
relationships between civil society organizations and those of the state. 
The SFD replaced this missing 'horizontal accountability' between it, 
their partner NGOs and the local communities, with a 'hierarchical 
accountability' to the donors and the Prime Minister's office. It was to my 
surprise that, whenever 1 asked about accountability, different managers 
within the Fund referred only to the SFD reports to donors, and could not 
figure out how or why they should be accountable to the communities with 
which they worked (EI-Bakry, Personal Interview, Cairo 18/1/02; Roushdy, 
personal interview, Ismailia 21/3/02; Amin, Personal Interview, Cairo 
10/4/02). This reflects the 'traditional' perception of civil society in 
authoritarian contexts as being a tier lower than state institutions, which was 
common among the different management levels of the SFD. As the Director 
of the CDP pointed out, he felt Egyptian NGOs have a very weak institutional 
structure so that, even if accountability measures were stipulated, they would 
not be able to use them. Moreover, he explained that the SFD was there to 
"improve" NGOs, thus NGOs were in no position to hold the SFD accountable 
(Amin, Personal Interview, Cairo 10/4/02). Obviously, such perceptions, and 
their attendant practices, are diametrically opposed to the idea of development 
synergy. 
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Embeddedness 
As for the third variable -- the embeddedness of effective 
communication channels between SFD staff and community members -- it was 
clear that these channels were mainly hierarchical ones within the SFD itself, 
and between the SFD, the NGOs, and the communities. This lack of 
embeddedness seemed to be a reflection of the dynamics presented above. On 
the first level, within the SFD itself, and within the CDP in particular, project 
decision-making was highly centralized. As explained earlier, the regional 
office did not have the authority either to set priorities, approve projects, or 
even to supervise project implementation. For example, one of the six CDP 
projects in Ismailia - the garbage collection project -- was on hold for six 
month because the NGO wanted to buy a car with different specifications than 
those decided upon by the CDP. During my fieldwork 1 found five letters 
dated over the previous six months between the CDP headquarters and the 
implementing NGO in an effort to resolve the problem. In an interview with 
the NGO director, he explained how the field staff does not have the authority 
to check the car and approve it. According to the Director: "we had letters 
back and forth between our NGO and the CDP in Cairo in order to solve the 
dispute ... and thus far the project is still on hold" (Zakian, personal interview, 
Ismailia 28/3/02). The field office staff expbïined that such approval was 
outside their jurisdiction and that their only mandate was to carry out regular 
follow up visits to projects. Even the midterm progress assessments were 
carried out by missions from the CDP headquarters in Cairo (Fieldworker, 
personal interview, Ismailia 28/3/02). 
On the second level -- communication channels in the field -- there 
was only one-way communication between the SFD regional office and the 
civil society organizations with which they worked. The regional offices only 
divulged project information at their discretion. The NGOs interviewed did 
not even know what types of projects CDP might fund. As one of the 
interviewees said: 
They were funding health projects but when we designed and 
applied for a health project we got no response. It seems that 
they are for another kind of project these days (Anonymous, 
personal interview, Ismailia 28/3/02). 
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No.ne o.f the NGO managers 1 interviewed knew the criteria for project 
selectio.n, o.r the schedule o.f the pro.ject approval cycle, no.r did they have a 
sense of ho.w long the SFD respo.nse wo.uld take o.r what to. do. in the case o.f a 
delay. Fo.r example, o.ne o.f the NGOs had presented a project proposai o.ver 
three mo.nths back and had still no.t go.tten a respo.nse. When asked if this was 
the average time fo.r pro.ject appro.val, the Directo.r said that he didn't kno.w 
and that the staff at the Ismailia o.ffice would no.t tell him when to. expect a 
response (Ano.nymo.us2, perso.nal interview, Ismailia 28/3/02). These 
co.mmunicatio.n pro.blems were co.mpounded by the fact that the SFD staff did 
no.t necessarily have the right backgro.und fo.r co.mmunity develo.pment wo.rk 
nor did they have much o.f an appreciatio.n o.f co.ncepts such as participatio.n 
and civil so.ciety engagement. This lack o.f transparency co.nfirmed and 
reinfo.rced the civil so.ciety o.rganizatio.ns' "traditio.nal distrust" o.f state 
institutio.ns. As o.ne NGOs manager put it, the SFD staff "weren't any 
different than the exhausting Ministry o.f So.cial Affairs;" both, he said, 
fo.llo.wed the same edict o.f "pass by us to.mo.rro.w'" (Ano.nymo.us, perso.nal 
interview, Ismailia 28/3/02). 
As fo.r the third level o.f co.mmunicatio.n -- between the co.mmunities 
themselves and SFD regio.nal o.ffices -- it was no.n-existent. Unlike in Bolivia 
(see Chapter Five), fo.r example, where the Fo.ndo. de Inversio.n Social (FIS) 
had high visibility within the co.mmunities in which it wo.rked, the 
beneficiaries 1 interviewed did not kno.w where the lo.cal SFD o.ffice was, no.r 
did they understand the ro.le o.f SFD within their projects (Focus group 
discussions Ismaïlia 13/4/02 & 14/4/02). Project beneficiaries presumed that 
the SFD was yet ano.ther state institutio.n riddled with ail the problems of the 
traditional Egyptian bureaucracy, including a slow-pace of o.perations and low 
effectiveness. As one focus group participant put it: 
Ali what we know about the Fund is that it is ano.ther 
go.vemment agency, co.rrupt and slo.w, and wo.uld ev en put us in 
jail if we do. no.t repay the lo.ans we to.o.k fro.m this micro.-credit 
pro.ject (Ano.nymo.us, fo.cus group discussion 15/4/02). 
This co.mment -- abo.ut slo.w-pace and lo.w effectiveness -- is especially 
interesting, because tho.se are precisely the issues that the staff o.f CDP 
claimed to. co.ncem them mo.re than "participatio.n." Thus, the SFD did no.t 
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contribute to the establishment of open and effective communication channels 
(whether formaI or informaI) between civil society organizations and the state, 
let al one between itself and the local communities which it was supposed to 
serve. 
The SFD and the Creation of Development Synergy 
With its lack of emphasis on participation, accountability and 
embeddedness, it is clear that the SFD was not able to forge development 
synergy and, indeed, that many of its practices undermined the strength of 
civil society at the community level. As importantly, three additional 
overlapping processes had important ramifications for development synergy: 
the politicization of the Fund and being part of an authoritarian system, the 
lack of a community mobilization component in the projects it funded, and 
finally -and less importantly- the overabundance of its funding resources. 
First, SFD is a highly politicized institution placed within an authoritarian 
system, meaning that its decisions and direction is dictated by the need to 
preserve the political status quo and not societal needs or' even economic 
efficiency. This detracted from its 'technical' soundness, which is the niche it 
claims, and inhibited the implementation of practices involving participation 
and accountability, which cou Id have had structural effects. According to one 
of the Senior Economist in the W orld Bank, the design of the SFD allowed it 
to be as participatory as national governments wanted it to be. In the case of 
Egypt, the state does not want the SFD to be participatory (Senior Economist, 
phone interview Washington D.C. 10/2/03). SFD operations were in line with 
other non-participatory and restrictive frameworks that inhibited the 
development of civil and political society in Egypt, such as legislative 
restrictions and the continuous threat of force (see Chapter Three). As a 
number of different donors explained to me, the implementation of reform was 
the responsibility of the SFD and the Egyptian government. Inevitably, 
however, the Egyptian state was unwilling to reform the SFD because they 
were not ready to exp and the margin of accountability and participation within 
both the Fund itself and across other government institutions as weIl (Rollos, 
personal interview, Cairo 26/2/02; Senior Economist, phone interview 
10/2/02; EI-Gammal, phone interview 12/2/03). 
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Within the CDP, the ear-marking of funds towards certain types of 
projects was also a politicized process inhibiting development synergy. There 
was no evidence that the SFD's beneficiaries demanded micro-credit more 
than, for example, institutional capacity-building or literacy projects. 
Likewise, there was no research that demonstrated any exceptional impact 
resulting from CDP-funded micro-credit projects. Rather, in the case ofCDP, 
micro-credit projects actually showed little sustainability beyond loan duration 
and did not allow the owner to achieve self-reliance or overcome poverty 
(Kheir EI-Din 1999). Additionally, as other research suggests, credit programs 
often have only temporary benefits for the poor since people living close to 
subsistence level have a very high marginal utility of CUITent consumption, and 
cannot afford to wait for a retum on potentially productive investments 
(Attanasio and Szeleky 2001). Throughout my field investigation, it was very 
common to leam that beneficiaries used the credit provided through CDP -
even when in the form of physical capital -- to finance CUITent consumption. 
Only those with initial assets were able to make use of the credit provided. 
More generally, micro-credit projects excluded by necessity those who could 
not work and those who were too poor to apply for projects and wait for their 
implementation (Kheir EI-Din 1999). When 1 asked CDP's Director why the 
program prioritized micro-credit projects, he said that this was the direction set 
forth by the Board. However, the choice of micro-credit also made peTfect 
political sense since all loans were counted towards employment generation 
data which, with the ri se of unemployment, has been the focal point of the 
state's political propaganda. Thus, micro-credit was more of a political choice 
decided by the Board (a body made up of different Ministers and political 
figures with no representation by grassroots beneficiaries) than a technical one 
aimed at fulfilling the SFD's role as a social safety net.37 
Following from this politicization and authoritarian· nature of the 
system, there was little attention paid to community mobilization. For 
example, CDP did not encourage or require any of the NGOs working in 
Ismailia to include community-training components in their projects, nor did it 
37 Even the running of operations within the institution is politicized; during one ofhis 
broadcasted visits to the Fund, President Hosni Mubarak ordered a decrease in loans' interest 
rate - a decision which should be based solely on technical issues -- after one of the SEDO 
beneficiaries complained to him. 
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offer the NOOs training in participatory development techniques. Moreover, 
the CDP did not require that the subcontracting NGOs provide integrated 
programs to help beneficiaries increase their ability for collective action, nor 
were the NGOs required to develop networks to bring those beneficiaries 
together and facilitate their organization and mobilization. Even the micro-
credit projects, which could have helped initiate such efforts through the 
adoption of a group-Iending strategy, did not do so and did not intend to 
implement such a strategy in the near future. When 1 asked the beneficiaries 
of the different projects whether they were inspired by the projects to begin 
their own group initiatives, they found the idea far-fetched since they did not 
even know one another (Focus group discussion, Ismaïlia 13/4/02). A study of 
the impact of CDP on the communities with whom they worked also 
concluded that programs did not allow beneficiaries to develop social capital 
(Kheir EI-Din 1996). In fact, one study suggests that CDP's interventions, in 
the long term, might actually have eroded existing social capital since 
beneficiaries did not have time for the kinds of social interaction that they 
used to have (Kheir EI-Din 1999). The same study found that involvement 
with the Program had no effect on the low interest beneficiaries had in public 
life, contributed little to political and civic awareness and, in general, resulted 
in a low sense of social participation among the beneficiaries (Kheir EI-Din 
1999). As 1 found out during my interviews with both the beneficiaries and 
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the employees of SFD, this outcome was because the CDP did not supplement 
its programs with either community mobilization efforts or beneficiary 
networking activities. Thus, the CDP did not allow for the growth of 
established community networks that could potentially form the basis of civil 
society organizations. 
Finally, apart from the politicization of the fund, there was also an 
over-abundance of funding that posed both political and technical problems. 
Politically, the SFD-donor relationship involves another kind of politicization, 
which is classical to Egypt as a rentier state; there are a lot of donors with 
huge sums of money who will pour it into the Egyptian 'pot' regardless of 
what is being done with it. As mentioned earlier this has to do with Egypt' s 
geopolitical importance. Thus, SFD can escape donor pressure to make its 
operations more participatory, even if donors overtly encouraged such efforts. 
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The different donor agencies to the SFD seemed to agree that they could not 
push very hard for participation or accountability measures in the current 
context since there were multiple sources of funding available to the Egyptian 
state. As one of the World Bank staffputs it: 
The donors at the end of the day have nothing much to do since 
the aid they give is politically-driven, and the Egyptian regime 
knows that. Egypt is strategically important for both the 
Americans and the Europeans so at the end of the day ev en if 
the SFD or any other organization receiving funds was not 
doing a goodjob or abiding by its mandate ... they would still be 
given aid ... the money has to be given anyway and the SFD is 
better than most of the other govemment's organizations ev en 
if its not doing a great job. (Senior Economist, phone interview 
Washington D.C. 10/2/03) 
For example, the World Bank has refused to fund the Small Enterprise 
Development Organization (SEDO), since its target beneficiaries are 
unemployed graduates and, therefore, not the traditional focus of Social 
Funds. The Bank, however, was unable to stop the Fund from expanding 
SEDO, since the Egyptian govemment was able to secure funding for the 
program from other Arab govemments. 
A former employee ofthe CDP who is presently a Task Manager at the 
World Bank, argued that over-funding also posed technical hardships, since it 
pu shed SFD to disburse its funds in huge sums to fewer NGOs which, in tum, 
led to less monitoring, evaluation and follow-up (EI-Gammal, phone 
interview, 12/2/03). Aggravating this problem was the fact that most NGOs 
did not have the experience or the management capacity to deal with large 
sums of money. This lack of experience, among other things, often resulted in 
a highly concentrated and unequal distribution of resources. The CDP, rather 
than deal with smaller grassroots' organizations that lacked reliable financial 
accounting systems, instead focused primarily on large NGOs. However, as 
noted earlier, these NGOs rarely had representatives from their various 
constituencies on their boards and lacked any mechanism for accountability 
towards those communities~ In sum, from a financing perspective, the SFD 
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did not engage smaller, more potentially representative, civil society 
organizations in any substantial way either. 
Thus, for the creation of state-civil society synergy and the elevation of 
such synergy from the community level to the national level, SFD did not 
compensate for the overall lack of public reform and political will preventing 
the establishment of synergy on a broader level. Structural issues, as weil as 
technical problems, prohibited the SFD from making any real positive 
contribution. Structurally, a weak civil society functioning within restrictive 
and centralized political and legal frameworks was not conducive to the 
establishment of such synergy by the SFD. Ultimately, technically inadequate 
capacity-building for partner organizations, lengthy and complicated project-
cycle and decision-making processes, insufficient coordination of 
communication within the CDP (and between the CDP and its regional 
offices), and, finally, ad hoc and inadequate staff training for the CDP and its 
regional offices further prohibited SFD from becoming a model of synergy. 
Conclusion: The SFD as Part ofthe Larger Context 
It is evident thatthe SFD, despite its promising design, was not able to 
transcend important structural elements and create representation, choice, 
accountability and participation. On the contrary, SFD ultimately came to 
serve multiple purposes, promoting corporatism and reinforcing controlled 
freedom, thereby becoming in itself yet another semi-corporatist mechanism 
embedded in, and financed by, a rentier state. Within the semi-corporatist 
nature of Egyptian state-civil society relations, SFD was both a good example 
of this hybrid system of co-option, as weIl as an outcome of it. It provided a 
façade of pluralism that kept potential local leaders in check, satisfied donor 
expectations, and channeled away the modest expectations and frustrations of 
those victims of repressive or iniquitous political and economic policies, thus 
curbing potential dissent. Explaining how the electoral framework in Egypt is 
nothing more than a mechanism used by the system to tighten its grip on 
political participation, Kassem makes a point that is applicable to the SFD 
initiative as weil. The SFD, like elections, is an 
opportunity to participate in the existing political system, and in 
most cases, to gain access to a share of the resources it 
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commands. In this way, disparate political activists and their 
potential supporters would be recruited into the regime's 
informai system of containment and control (Kassem 1999: 1). 
The regime tends to create and use institutions, be they as big as elections or 
as small as the offices of the SFD, for the singular goal of maintaining its 
hegemony. This is not to credit the Egyptian state with a sort of foresight or 
strategic vision that is does not have. Rather, it seems that mechanisms for 
control and hegemony are self-reproducing on different levels. In the case of 
SFD, the institution acted as the channel of co-option, linking the marginalized 
to a dysfunctional welfare system through the manipulation of civil society 
organizations. This issue of co-option has become particularly relevant in 
Egypt since the shift toward neoliberalism and the reemergence of militant 
religious insurgency of the 1980s and 1990s has led the state even further 
away from supporting venues of pluralism and association. 
Economically, SFD provided enough flexibility to absorb the outcomes 
of contradictory economic policies by using rents money to buy off potential 
dissent while, simultaneously, avoiding any accountability to the communities 
it purported to serve. On the contrary, in many cases, the SFD further 
consolidated the patron-client relationship between the state and its citizens by 
disbursing projects in discretionary ways and failing to enforce any means of 
participation and accountability. SFD functioned as a tool for the superficial 
improvement of the Egyptian govemment's record on employment while, at 
the same time, shielded it from ever having to address the root causes of the 
problem which would necessitate major macro-economic change. Most of the 
SFD resources were channeled towards its Small Enterprise pro gram (SEDO), 
with its emphasis on job creation for university graduates, as opposed to 
investment in human capital or job creation for workers. This emphasis on job 
creation, in tum, reiterated the neoliberal policy -- explained in earlier chapters 
-- ofworkfare instead ofwelfare. 
Even when the SFD directed resources to NGOs through the CDP, it 
did it in a way that preserved the existing structure in which social-welfare 
NGOs acted as "a 'cushion' between state and society, absorbing sorne of the 
impact of painful economic restructuring on the poor and middle classes" 
(Clark 2000: 175). By doing so, the SFD became another mechanism that 
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ensured civil society organizations did not contribute in any way to the ri se of 
a citizenship project or any other sort of political opening. Although ''the poor 
[were] effectively excluded from the institutions of the state at aIl levels, a 
situation that [could] only be remedied through effective organizing and 
advocacy"(Assaad and Rouchdy 1999: 89), none of the NGOs examined in 
this study were engaged in reorganization or in advocacy work. As 1 
mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, civil society can contribute to 
political opening through organizing and mobilizing its constituents, 
legitimizing certain kinds of political action, creating new discourse and 
public debate, and even posing as a threat or an equal partner to the state. 
Unfortunately, Egyptian NGOs were not involved in any .of these activities, 
nor were they even aware of the need for, as weIl as their role in, collective 
political mobilization and action. For the most part, they saw themselves as 
part of the state's service-delivery mechanism, a perception that the SFD 
helped to nourish through its financial and administrative practices. 
127 
Interviews: 
*38 Ahmed. Project Officer, Community Development Program. Personal 
Interview Cairo: 26 February 2002. 
Abdel Aziz, Ahmed. SFD Task Manager, World Bank, Personal Interview. 
Cairo: 5 May 2002. 
Abu Zaid, Amani. Ex':'Director of Institutional Capacity Building Program, 
SFD. Cairo: 12 January 2002. 
Amin, Magdi. Director of the Community Development Program, SFD. 
Personal Interview. Cairo: 10 April 2002. 
Anonymous, Manager of An NGO. Personal Interview. Ismailia: 28 March 
2002. 
Anonymous 2, Director of an NGO. Personal Interview. Ismailia: 28 March 
2002. 
Anonymous Employee, Fieldworker, SFD regional office. Personal Interview. 
Ismailia: 28 March 2002. 
El-Bakry, Mohamed. Deputy-Director, SFD. Personal Interview: Cairo: 18 
January 2002. 
EI-Gammal, Y. Task Manager, The World Bank. Phone Interview. 
Washington D.C. 12 February 2003. 
Gad, Laila. Director, Institutional Development Program, SFD. Personal 
Interview. Cairo: 1 March 2002. 
38 * denotes persons where the family names where de\eted based on there persona\ requests. 
128 
Rollos, H. Director, European Union Program Coordination Unit. Personal 
Interview. Cairo: 26 February 2002. 
Senior Economist. World Bank. Telephone Interview. Washington D.C.: 10 
February 2003. 
Zakian, Sobhi. Chairman, Environmental Services NGO. Personal Interview. 
Ismailia: 28 March 2002. 
*Umm Sahar. Beneficiary of a Micro-credit Scheme. Personal Interveiw. 
Ismailia: 9 April 2002. 
129 
Chapter Five 
Bolivia: Is it Really the Model? 
As noted in earlier chapters, the Bolivian Social Fund was portrayed in 
the literature as a benchmark for effective and efficient social safety nets as 
weil as civil society-state synergy. In this chapter 1 examine the validity of 
these daims and analyze to what extent the Bolivian SF differs from its 
Egyptian counterpart. In doing so 1 try to see how the difference (if any) 
relates to the democratization of Bolivia versus the lack thereof in Egypt, and 
to what the similarities between the two funds could be attributed. The first 
section of the chapter looks at the rise of the Emergency Social Fund (ESF) --
a model for such funds worldwide -- as a by-product of neoliberal policies in 
Bolivia. The ESF eventually evolved into the current Fund for Social 
Investment, Fondo de Inversion Production Y Social (FPS), after more wide-
ranging state and social policy reforms necessitated its transformation. Next, 1 
examine the effect of FPS on civil society as categorized by the three main 
indicators 1 developed in Chapter Two: participation, accountability and 
embeddedness. Finally, in the concluding section, 1 address the extent to 
which FPS corresponds to the existing pattern of Bolivian state-civil society 
relations. 
Neoliberal Changes and the Rise of ESF 
The first Social Investment Fund (ESF) was created in Bolivia in 1987 
at a time of shifting political and economic discourse under the New 
Economie Policy. The Fund was meant to be a temporary institution to help 
ease the negative impact of structural adjustment programs (SAP) on affected 
sectors of the population. The main objectives of the fund were "to identify 
and initiate projects and programs with the highest social return and maximum 
utilization of labor" in order to "positively contribute and improve social 
conditions in the parts of the country most affected by the economic crisis and 
unemployment"(Torres and Perez 2000: 247). The Fund's initial design 
indicated that it would be phased out in three to six years from its start, at 
which point Bolivia would have made the shift to a market-economy. It was 
mostly funded by bilateral and multilateral aid, which had resumed following 
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price stabilization hardships and a decline in commercial finance of the mid-
1980s.39 
In order to avoid being engulfed by the existing bureaucracy, a 
presidential decree established the Fund as an autonomous institution outside 
the national bureaucracy, yet under direct supervision of the presidency. This 
decree was an attempt to insulate the Fund from the prevalence of inefficiency 
and corruption characterizing existing institutions due to high levels of 
politicization within the bureaucracy (for example, governmental positions 
distributed according to party affiliation rather than credentials). Most 
governmental agencies were notorious for such problems which continued to 
influence the design of social policy and led to the allocation of resources for 
political purposes rather than addressing people's needs (Morales 2001: 55). 
Bolivia was also facing another crucial problem of governance in the 
late-1980s, namely, the question of how to control the sprawling state 
apparatus. This problem was most apparent in the burgeoning number of rival 
patron-client networks run by mid-Ievel government leaders that made the 
implementation of govemment policy difficult, as weIl as consumed what little 
surplus the state extracted from society (Gamarra and Malloy 1995). In an 
attempt to escape these chronic syndromes, the President appointed a 
renowned businessman, Fernando Romero, to head the Fund along with a 
small staff ofhigh-caliber, well-paid technocrats and professionals. Because it 
was a new institution headed by a non-political entrepreneur, it was side-
stepped the classic patronage system of distributing appointments and, later, 
resources through its projects. As Fernando Romero told me in an interview, 
"1 vowed not to have more employees than to fit one floor in a building" 
(Romero, Personal Interview La Paz 10/12/02). 
The Fund financed works projects for the purpose of generating 
temporary employment and providing services to poor communities. The 
projects ranged from building basic, stone-cobbled roads, schools and houses 
in remote communities to providing meals for school children, aIl of which 
39 Grants and highly subsidized loans from international tinancial institutions and donor 
governments reached over 6 per cent of GDP in 1997 (Morales 2001:54). (Morales, 1. A. 
(2001). Economic Vulnerability in Bolivia. Towards Democratic Viability: The Bolivian 
Experience. L. Whitehead. New York, Palgrave. 
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utilized the labor of the unemployed and the poor. The Fund adopted private 
sector management methods, relied on contractors (NGOs and small 
construction firms) to execute projects, and operated with considerable 
financial autonomy from line ministries and bureaucratie regulations. 
Emphasis was placed on rapid disbursements and quick, tangible results. In 
four years, 3,300 projects were implemented and funding approvals reached 
$1.5 million per week (Goodman and Morley 1998). The Fund was able to 
reach 1.2 million beneficiaries -- a significant achievement in a country with a 
population of around 7 million at the time (Graham 1997: 60).40 Acclaimed as 
a "model" for channeling funds through NGOs and private organizations, the 
success of the ESF led to a massive increase in the level of international aid 
directed to Bolivia in the late-1980s, from $392 million in 1988 to $738.2 
million1990 (Petras and Arrellano-Lopez 1994: 561).41 
The ESF's impact on civil society was equally significant for both 
community grassroots organizations and local NGOs. The ESF solicited 
projects on the community level, encouraging local leaders and/or indigenous 
small-scale grassroots organizations to mobilize themselves in order to 
propose and implement various projects. Even as early as 1988, a study of the 
social impact of the ESF found that "33 per cent of the beneficiaries 
interviewed said that the projects strengthened community 
organization"(Graham 1997: 63). Although the Fund was not originally 
designed to increase local participation or strengthen community mobilization, 
these were logical by-products of its demand-driven approach.42 According to 
Blanes, "one of the indirect effects of its [ESF' s] massive mode of operation 
40 The word beneficiary is used throughout the text to indicate a person who has directly used 
or indirectly benefited from the projects of the Fund (for example, someone who was 
temporarily employed in a road construction project funded by the ESF as weil as a 
community member who used the road). 
41 Consequently, the number ofNOOs created to "chase" th ose funds also increased 
42 This (increasing participation and strenglhening community organization) later became one 
of the goals and an alleged advantage of SFs, both in Bolivia and the world. "Community 
involvement and contribution has evolved into a central operating feature of most social 
investment funds. Again, Bolivia was in the vanguard in establishing this new central 
objective, and other funds were quick to follow" Goodman, M. and S. Morley (1998). Social 
Investment Funds in Latin America: Past Performance and Future Role. Washington D.C., 
InterAmerican Development Bank. 
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was that it became the tirst generator of demands for participation in the rural 
context" (Blanes 1999: 9). 
NGOs also benetited from ESF's transformation of the grassroots' 
relationship to the state. Three years after the Fund's establishment, 81 
percent of the entities working with it were NGOs (Graham 1997: 74). The 
non-parti sian business conduct of the Fund, as weil as its efficiency and 
engagement with NGOs, alleviated a lot of the long-Iost trust between NGOs 
and the state. The "autonomous status and transparent procedures ofthe social 
fund made it possible to establish credibility and working relationships with 
organizations that were ideologically opposed to adjustment policies and 
distrustful of govemment programmes" including NGOs (Carvalho, Perkins et 
al. 2002: 623). Thus, "an unanticipated side effect of the ESF was that it 
strengthened local institutional capacity, as it provided NGOs and local 
govemments with experience in project design and implementation"(Graham 
1997: 6gemphasis added). Moreover, as a state institution positively engaging 
NGOs, the ESF sowed the seeds for a non-corporatist development synergy 
between the state and civil society. One author predicted that, "[b]y 
encouraging independent interaction with the state, the fund may have made 
local organizations and groups more willing to go beyond traditional party 
politics and exercise autonomous political choice" (Graham 1997: 81). 
Based on this positive record of achievements (especially the more 
tangible ones, such as increasing numbers of beneticiaries and projects), and 
in order to coyer a wider range of projects, in 1989 the state decided to replace 
the ESF, which was a temporary institution, with three permanent Funds 
modeled after it: the Fondo de Inversion Social (FIS) to solicit and fund 
small-scale social services' community projects; the Fondo Nacional de 
Desarrollo Regional (FNDR) to fund large infrastructure projects in deprived 
municipalities; and the Fondo de Desarrollo Campesino (FDC) to assess and 
cater for the developmental needs of the countryside. These new funds 
presented the second generation or phase in the development of the initial 
ESF. The idea behind these new funds was to modemize and integrate 
emergency aid into permanent structures and modes of operation. For this, 
they developed medium- and long- term strategies, oriented tirst towards 
covering demands for social infrastructure and, second, towards strengthening 
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the institutionalization and training of local community organizations (Blanes 
1999). 
My analysis focuses on the FIS -- later merged with the FDC and 
named the Fondo de Inversion Productiva Y Social (FPS) -- since it funded 
small community-based projects and, as a result, had the kind of social 
mandate to further extend the ESF's positive impact on civil society. In 1991, 
the FIS became the operative instrument of the Estrategia Social Boliviana 
(Bolivian Social Strategy) in the administration of President Paz Zamora, 
which was a strategy intended to achieve more coherent coordination among 
line ministries, administrative decentralization and participation of local 
communities (Levy 1997). In an attempt to focus its efforts and be more 
influential, the FIS' project portfolio was narrower than the ESF's, it focused 
specifically on education, health, water supply and sewage infrastructure, and 
no longer funded directly productive projects such as those involving 
economic infrastructure. Operationally, since it was not an emergency scheme 
anymore, ''the fund shifted to a more deliberate pace as stricter criteria for 
project evaluation were adopted, project supervision was tightened, direct 
contracting without public bidding was modified, and more formai linkages 
with govemment institutions and programs were established" (Goodman and 
Morley 1998: 8). This operational shift was intended to preempt the possible 
rise of corruption in the new fund as it became a permanent structure. It was 
also an attempt to make the Fund a leaming model for other govemmental 
institutions through establishing formai linkages with them. 
The third phase of fund operations in Bolivia began in 1993 with a new 
govemment administration, which was bent on reducing the scope of the state 
and stressed its regulatory role in line with the neoliberal model. The FIS was 
part of El Plan de Todos, a set of policy proposais advocating 
"capitalization,,,43 "educational reform," and "popular participation" 
(Gamarra 1998). As 1 described in Chapter 3, sorne analysts have reached the 
conclusion that the positive experiences of the ESF and the FIS actually 
influenced the changes in the regulatory framework adopted by the state in 
43 "Capitalization" refers to the distribution of 51 per cent of the proceeds from the 
privatization of state-owned assets to ail the adult population of Bolivia in or der to combat 
the concentration ofwealth associated with privatization. 
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1994-1995, as the experiences and lessons learned from the funds were 
generalized into the national framework (Goodman and Morley 1998; Parker 
and Serrano 2000). Parker and Serrano, for example, argue: 
In Bolivia, FIS influenced the emergence of the 1994 decentralization 
law by demonstrating to the central govemment that a demand-based 
policy was 'feasible. In a country with a history of strong 
centralization and few channels of communication between central 
and local decision-makers, policymakers were very skeptical about 
the transfer of decision-making power that the new law involved. 
The social fund's experience helped allay policymakers' fears by 
showing the success of the participatory approach in delivering basic 
services (Parker and Serrano 2000 : 50). 
Although such conclusions tend to be over-simplistic (as 1 mentioned earlier, 
the reforms of 1994-95 came as part of a long process of often difficult state-
civil society engagement), it is still true that both policy-makers and civil 
society actors saw Funds as major players in the implementation and 
fortification of the changes brought about by the LPP, the LAD and, later on, 
the LDN. The FIS, in particular, was to function as an intermediary between 
the line ministries with their priorities and guidelines for reform and the 
demands of local communities, channeling resources and technical assistance 
through municipalities (Levy 1997; Goodman and Morley 1998). The FIS, 
therefore, was meant to complement other institutions, pushing for 
decentralization, partnership with civil society actors and community 
empowerment. As one study of the Funds put it: "the role of the funds in 
Bolivia has changed from channeling resources to labor-generating projects of 
interest to civic action groups to becoming a major arm of the government's 
social sector policy in support of municipal development and participatory 
democracy" (Goodman and Morley 1998: 8). To what extent have such 
intentions been born out in practice? And how have civil society actors 
themselves viewed the FIS's role in strengthening civil society? Is FIS 
simply a top-down approach adopted by the state? ln the next section, 1 will 
address the micro-Ievel dynamics of FIS in two Bolivian communities. 
The Funds Today: Strengthening Civil Society and Creating Synergy? 
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In November 2000, the FIS was merged with the FDC and was 
renamed the Fondo de Inversion Productiva y Social (FPS).44 The merger was 
meant to make the FPS the main instrument for carrying out the Bolivian 
Strategy for Poverty Reduction (EBRP) in both urban areas and the 
countryside under the executive umbrella of the Directory of Funds, 
Derectario Unico de Fondos (DUF).45 Thus, the FPS was a continuation of 
the FIS.This section starts by describing the kinds of projects that the FPS 
undertakes, and the relationship it has with them, as a background to 
understanding its impact on civil society. 1 will then discuss the FPS' work in 
the two communities 1 studied, analyzing how weil the FPS contributed to 
accountabiIity, participation and embeddedness within those communities. 
Just Iike the FIS, the FPS' poverty reduction and human development 
projects coyer the following sectors: education, health, potable water, basic 
hygiene, rural development (including the construction of roads and 
neighborhoods), electricity for rural communities, natural resources and 
environment, and institutional capacity-building (Fondo de Inversion 
Productiva y Social 2002). The FPS co-funds projects within these sectors in 
accordance with the annual operational plan (POA) of each municipality. The 
resources allocated to each municipality are determined according to the 
National Compensation Plan (PNC), which is part of the Strategy for Poverty 
Reduction. The CUITent distribution of FPS resources according to sector is 
shown in Figure 4-1. 
44 Throughout this chapter, 1 refer to the FPS and the FIS interchangeably sin ce the former is 
the continuation of the latter and when 1 was conducting my field research, it had not yet 
established an identity of its own apart from FIS. The FPS workers - who were ail former FIS 
workers -- affirmed that there was not any change in direction away from how they conducted 
business under the FIS, and the beneficiaries continued to refer to the Fund as FIS, none of 
them having yet heard of the FPS. 
45 The DUF also inc1udes the FNDR. 
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Fig.4-1: FP$ Projects by Sector 
IntltutlOnal 
capacity 
building 
2% 
Environment 
4% 
Electricity 
5% 
Basic hygiene 
18% 
Education 
22% 
Rural 
development 
44% 
(Fondo de Inversion Productiva y Social 2002: 16) 
The fact that institutional capacity building (i.e. the technical assistance and 
training provided to civil society organizations and local govemment) is 
allocated only 2% of the total FPS budget is indicative of the level of 
importance the Fund attributes to strengthening civil society and 
democratization on the local level. However, it is important to note that this 
marginal amount is similar to that found in the Egyptian SFD, where capacity 
building is also the least funded activity with only 8% of the allocated budget. 
1 will retum to the issue of investment in capacity building throughout this 
chapter. 
Operationally, the FPS has undergone a number of structural changes 
to differentiate itself from the ESF. First, as it became a permanent institution 
responsible for poverty-reduction nation-wide, the staff of the Fund increased 
from 100 to 400 and the 'one floor' premises that Romero held was replaced 
by a high-rise building in the center of La Paz. This increase in the Fund' s 
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human resources is an advantage in terms of increasing its ability to deliver, 
but also limits the agility that a sm aller size allowed. 
Next, just like the SFD, in order to improve efficiency and get doser to 
its beneficiaries, the FPS decentralized its operations into nine departmental 
offices. In each of the nine departments, there is supposed to be a projects' 
selection committee composed of: a) the departmental FPS director; b) a 
prefecture representative; c) three representatives of the municipal 
govemments (one each from municipalities with populations less than, equal 
to, and more than 20,000 inhabitants); d) two representatives of the Vigilance 
Committee (without voting power), elected by the presidents of the Vigilance 
Committee; and e) a civil society representative, delegated by the 
departmental "social control mechanism" (Mechanismo do Control Social -
also without voting power) (Itturalde, Personal Interview, La paz 11111102) 
(Fondo de Inversion Productiva y Social 2002).46 As part of the Fund's pursuit 
of state-civil society synergy, the composition of the selection committees is 
meant to strike a balance in the choice of projects and allocation of resources 
between, on the one hand, civil society actors and representatives of the 
indigenous communities and, on the other, state authorities. However, it is 
interesting to note that the representatives of the local communities (i.e. the 
presidents of VCs) and other civil society actors do not have voting power. 
This leaves the decision-making power within the hands of the govemmental 
representatives (the first three of the above), and civil society representatives 
(through the VCs and the Social Control Mechanism) consultative roIes, 
which defies the idea of civil society as equal partners to the state. 
Finally, the Fund's management, in collaboration with independent 
consultants and specialists from relevant ministries, has developed a number 
of eligibility criteria for projects under each of the above sectors in order to 
guarantee objectivity and transparency in projects' selection, as well as 
achieve an optimum outcome on the Fund's investments (Camacho, Personal 
Interview, 28111102). Again, the fact that technocrats developed these 
eligibility criteria with no input from the grassroots is a sign of the level of 
46 This is an entity established by the Ley Dialoguo National (LDN) that gives the Catholic 
Church the right to forrn committees with civil society actors to watch over the spending and 
practices of the departmental and municipal administrations. 
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community participation (or lack thereof) and the extent to which the Fund 
prioritizes local democratization and empowerment. 
What impact, however, has these changes had on civil society and FPS 
beneficiaries in the Fund's target communities, especially when many ofthese 
changes seem relevant Cat least in theory) to issues of accountability, 
embeddedness and participation? ln the following sub-sections, 1 will 
examine to what extent these changes were actually implemented and what 
their impact was on the communities with whom FPS worked. Again, 1 am 
specifically concemed with the ability of the FPS to strengthen civil society as 
a vehicle for inclusion according to the criteria developed in Chapter Two. 
Did FPS projects maximize participation by civil society organizations and 
their beneficiaries? Did it ensure accountability in its project management and 
implementation? To what degree did communication channels between FPS 
projects and beneficiaries encourage embeddedness? Has FPS had any 
positive effect at ail on state/civil society synergy in Bolivia? 
To try to answer these questions, 1 conducted fieldwork ID two 
communities that were far from the capital city of La Paz. 1 chose them 
because 1 wanted to assess the extent to which the new decentralization 
process was allowing for participation, and to what extent the workers of the 
FPS kept in contact with the different communities, especially those in more 
remote areas. There was also variation in the size of the communities 1 chose, 
since population is one of the criteria which determine legal representation in 
the LPP and LDN and affect the allocation of various development 
resources.47 ln addition, 1 wanted to test whether a community's participation 
in projects and its quality of communication with FPS workers could be 
correlated to its specifie demographic characteristics. 
The first community 1 visited was San Pedro de Curahuara, a seven-
hour drive south of La Paz, where the FPS was constructing a school. There is 
no public transportation connecting the very small community of San Pedro to 
the capital city, and the last five hours of the trip from La Paz is via rugged 
tracks through relatively uninhabited country. It is a small community of no 
more than 5,000 persons, most of whom are small-scale farmers. The 
47 In Bolivia, municipalities are divided into three categories according to their population: 
20,000 inhabitants, more than 20,000 inhabitants, and less than 20,000 inhabitants. 
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community is extremely pOOr. Houses are buiIt from mud and have no 
drinking water. Most of San Pedro's residents seek medical care either in La 
paz or in the closest town, which is five hours away. The second community 1 
visited was Desaguadero on the Peruvian border, a two hour drive from La 
Paz. Desaguadero is a town with over 20,000 residents, many of whom are 
small-scale traders in Bolivian and Peruvian goods, working from both sides 
of the border. Unlike San Pedro, the town has aIl the basic services of water, 
electricity and schools. FPS was involved in expanding and renovating a 
health center there. 
ln San Pedro de Curabuara, the school project was submitted to the 
FISIFPS in 1999, while in Desaguadero the health clinic project was submitted 
in 2000. Both projects had not yet been completed and were past their 
completion due date, which was supposed to be one year from the start of 
construction (i.e. 2000 and 2001 respectively). They were being completed 
when 1 visited in December 2002. The FPS field workers 1 interviewed 
attributed the delays to conflicts between the community committees 
responsible for supervising project implementation and the contractors who 
had been chosen through a bid competition by the municipality and the FPS 
(Femandez, Personal Interview, La Paz 30/11/02). The community members 
in San Pedro and the mayor (Alcalde) of Desaguadero, however, blamed the 
delays on FPS bureaucratie procedures, slowness in assigning the required 
funds, difficulties in resolving problems with the contractors and interruptions 
caused by the change of FPS management with the change in goveming 
parties (Focus group discussion with the project community committee, San 
Pedro de Curhauahra 2/12/0248 ; Tikkuna, Personal Interview, Desaguadero 
1/12/02). 
This discussion of the different reasons given by the community 
members and the FPS for the delay touches upon a number of issues that 1 will 
discuss in detail throughout the remainder of this chapter. For starters, it 
indicates a lack of embeddedness and clear communication between the two 
parties. Moreover, through my interviews with CUITent and previous FPS 
management, it became clear that the claim made by the communities 
48 See Appendix 1 
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regarding the effect the change of govemment had on the FPS' management is 
true (Camacho, Personal Interview, La paz 28/11102; Iturralde, Personal 
Interview, La paz 11/11/02; Inchausti, Personal Interview 19/11/02). Thus, 
just like in the Egyptian case, the politicization of the Fund is not a far-fetched 
conclusion. . It appears that Bolivia's clientelistic pact-democracy that 1 
discussed in Chapter Three has managed to infiltrate the FPS and affect its 
consistency as an institution. 
Participation 
A lot of the literature on the FPS seems to credit Fund operations with . 
an impeccable record of participation by beneficiaries and civil society actors 
(for examples seeParker and Serrano 2000; Carvalho, Perkins et al. 2002). As 
one ofthese reports states: 
In the. subsequent Bolivian Social Investment Fund, citizen 
participation was a conditionality for receiving fund support. Grant 
conditionality includes 1) the existence of a community or 
neighborhood organization, which can interact with an NGO if the 
project is proposed by an NGO; 2) The community must be aware of 
the proposed project's goals and be committed to participate in its 
implementation; 3) the community must make contributions (usually 
in-kind) to the project's financing; 4) the local authority must aIlocate 
land or grant building permits when required; and 5) the NGO (if 
present) must have an established relationship with the beneficiary 
community, or have a track record of successful citizen participation 
in other communities. The SIF staff interview community members 
and NGO representatives to ensure these conditions are 
satisfied"(Goodman and Morley 1998: 37). 
However, a closer and more objective look at the history and CUITent status of 
these projects indicates a much more mixed outcome. Here, 1 look at 
community participation and the extent of beneficiaries' ability to act as 
decision-makers in the selection and implementation of FPS projects. 1 also 
examine the degree of partnership between the FPS and the various actors of 
civil society in the communities 1 studied. 
ln order to ensure the empowered participation of the community in 
their projects, the FPS depends predominantly on two mechanisms: a set of 
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project eligibility criteria, and the establishment of corn munit y committees to 
act as the FPS community-counterpart for each of its projects. For ail sectors, 
eligibility is conditional on the project being part of the annual operation plan 
(POA) of the municipality (Fon do de Inversion Productiva y Social 2002). 
This guarantees that the project is identified as a result of a participatory 
planning process rather than as a reflection of the particular interests of a 
dominant group. The specific eligibility criteria for funding differ for each 
sector (e.g. education, health, rural development), but are classified more 
generally according to the following categories: general, technical, 
sustainability, gender equity, ethnic equity and environmental concems. The 
criteria, although set by 'specialists' with no feedback from the community, 
tend to emphasize participation, as weil as gender and ethnic concems, unlike 
Egypt's SFD(Fondo de Inversion Productiva y Social 2002). 
ln addition, for sorne sectors, such as water, health and education, the 
FPS also requires the establishment of a "pre-investment" community 
committee to join in the planning and design of the project and, later on, to 
supervise its implementation (Fondo de Inversion Productiva y Social 2002). 
These committees, which are chosen by the community members, are also 
responsible for mobilizing community resources (mainly human labor) to help 
in the building of the facilities. After completion of the construction, this 
established committee is then responsible for the management and 
maintenance of the facilities. This includes securing the required resources 
through the POA and community mobilization, as weIl as supervising the 
quality of service provision and coordinating with the responsible ministries' 
representatives at the departmental level in the case of any problems. This 
committee is also the designated body for dealing with the FPS in the case of 
any delays or necessary changes to the projects. 
Yet in spite of these mechanisms for participation, a comprehensive 
assessment of the FISIFPS found that when asked who generates ideas for the 
projects, 30.5% of respondents mentioned the Alealdia (mayor's office) tirst, 
and the junta vecinal (neighborhood committees) second with 25.80%. "The 
community" was only mentioned by 23% of the respondents as being 
responsible for the generation of projects (Aquilar y Asociados 1999: 27). 
The responses of the beneficiaries with whom 1 met also echoed these 
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findings. In the two communities, the community members with whom 1 
spoke -- including members of the project supervisory committee -- got 
projects that they did not need the most because they were not the ones who 
initiated the project ideas (Focus group discussion, San Pedro de Curhauahra 
2/12/02; Corn munit y Supervisory Committee members, personal interviews, 
Desaguadero 1/12/02). In explaining why they got the school project in San 
Pedro, one focus group participant said: " 
We already had one school. We didn't need another, but it 
seems that the school was the only thing the FIS wanted to 
fund ... [or] maybe that was the project alcalde wanted (Focus 
group discussion, San Pedro de Curhauahra 2/12/02). 
This explanation, which was reiterated in my interviews by other members of 
the community, reveais two separate issues Iimiting participation. First, the 
FISIFPS, just like its Egyptian counterpart, usually has priority sectors for 
funding which are decided upon outside the community and which limits the 
community's ability to make decisions. Second, the mechanisms that the 
Fund uses do not transcend pre-existing nodes of power in the community; nor 
do they ensure that projects reflect community needs through a participatory 
process. Instead of emerging through a systematic process of discussion and 
prioritization by the POA, in practice the demand for projects was made 
through informaI requests by the community members to the Mayor. 
Although the communities 1 visited had no objection to the FPS 
projects under construction, they also confirmed that they had played no part 
in their planning. When 1 asked about how the FPS school construction 
project came about, interviewees from the community affirmed what was 
mentioned in the focus group discussions. As one interviewee (who asked to 
remain anonymous) told me on the street in San Pedro: 
WeU, we asked the mayor for a number of things then we found out 
that the school was the project he got us ... No, we didn't have 
anything to do with its planning (Personai interview, San Pedro de 
Curhauahra 3/12/02). 
ln particular, the projects' community committees appeared to play no role. 
This is especially troubling given that one of the claimed advantages of the 
Funds is that they provide communities with the opportunity to leam how to 
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prioritize their demands and how to plan and present projects to funding 
agencies. When 1 asked the beneficiaries in both sites if they had ever done 
this, the answer was unanimously negative (Focus group discussion, San 
Pedro de Curhauahra 2/12/02; Focus group discussion, Desaguadero 1/12/02). 
When 1 asked one Mayor about how the community plans and presents the 
projects to the FPS, he said: 
We hire a consultant who knows the rules and criteria and ask him to 
write up the project proposaI for whatever facility we need (Tikkuna, 
Personal Interview, Desaguadero 1/12/02). 
The answers 1 got from the community and the committee members, as well as 
the Mayor, reflect shortcomings not only in the functioning of the FPS, but 
more generally in the acclaimed participatory process ofPOAs. Tt appears that 
both the Fund and the mechanisms behind the POA were not able to transcend 
the elitist technocratie trend of 'specialists' defining and designing community 
needs in the form of projects. Thus, there are two clear issues here: 1) even if 
the community does not object to the actual project, they might have other 
priorities, and 2) they do not get the kinds of experiences needed to actually 
strengthen civil society. 
As for encouraging the participation of both the community and NGOs 
in the implementation of projects, as 1 pointed out earlier, the eligibility 
criteria for the projects to be considered, especially those in education, basic 
hygiene and health, require the formation of community committees to 
supervise the establishment and, later on, the management of these facilities. 
These criteria also require NGOs to provide training programs for the 
communities in organizational management skills (Fon do de Inversion 
Productiva y Social 2002). However, unlike earlier phases of the Fund, wh en 
ESF micro-credit borrowers in Bolivia ''were obliged to participate in training 
in solidarity group guarantees, production, management and marketing 
. techniques, interpersonal skills and sanitation" (Goodman and Morley 1998: 
58), the current programs of the FPS do not include any such group training. 
Although an earlier assessment of the FIS concluded that "transferring and 
creating capacity for the organizations and the beneficiaries through technical 
assistance should be one of the areas the FIS focuses on," su ch technical 
assistance was not provided to the projects 1 studied (Aquilar y Asociados 
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1999: 137). In neither San Pedro nor Desaguadero was there any training 
offered to the project community committee or to the community at large. 
Thus, in the case of the health clinic and school, beneficiaries did not have the 
skills to collectively manage and maintain those facilities. In aIl my focus 
group discussions, participants noted that they would depend on the local state 
authorities to manage the facilities when they are completed (Focus group 
discussion, San Pedro de Curhauahra 2/12/02; Focus group discussion, 
Desaguadero 1/12/02). As one ofthe participants put it "we have not managed 
anything before so how or why would we be ready to do it now?" (Focus 
groupdiscussion, San Pedro de Curhauahra 2/12/02). Moreover, when 1 asked 
the FPS field officer if there are plans to provide such training at a later stage, 
he said that he was not sure (Femandez, Personal Interview, Desagauadero 
1/12/02). 
ln trying to understand why su ch training was sidelined, 1 further 
discovered that there were no NGOs subcontracted by any FPS project. 
According to the newly appointed Director of the FPS, the previous FISIFPS 
management (supported by the govemment in power at the time) viewed 
NGOs as leftist organizations to ostracize (Camacho, personal interview, La 
Paz 28/11/02). Furthermore, the Director explained that the previous 
management -which the FPS policies reflected at the time and was not yet 
reversed because of the recent appointment of the Director49- focused on 
tangible capital investments (like buildings) rather than on providing training 
and technical assistance to local communities, since the former is more useful 
for political propaganda and media coverage (Camacho, personal interview, 
La Paz 28/11/02). This stance was very similar to that of the Egyptian SFD in 
which, for political reasons, the number of projects was the main target of the 
Fund's management. Thus, in spite of criteria stipulating partnership with the 
NGO sector, the previous FISIFPS management had moved away from 
working ,'-Vith NGOs, the very institutions best equipped to provide such 
training programs. The FPS Director acknowledged that such collective 
training and organization are essential if these projects are to yield impact, but 
that "it will need time" before he could reverse the trend adopted by his 
49 At the time ofmy interview Camacho had been in office for less than six months. 
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predecessors and get NGOs to work with the Fund (Camacho, personal 
interview, La paz 28/11/02). 
This CUITent ambivalence towards NGOs and its impact on community 
organization and mobilization training programs, contradicts claims that the 
Fund is the quintessential model for participatory development and civil 
society-state synergy. Moreover, the change of direction away from NGOs 
and community training shows how pact democracy and the politicization of 
the Bolivian state apparatus have managed to infiltrate the Fund and inhibit the 
continuity and consistency of its policies for building meaningful participation 
and creating development synergy. In summary, while the design of FPS 
projects emphasizes participation, the conduct of its management and the 
complex nature of the relations between the Fund as a state institution and the 
communities and civil society actors with which it works, does not allow it to 
fully realize this goal. 
Accountability 
It is interesting to note that, unlike with issues of participation, there are 
no accountability mechanisms spelt out in the design and eligibility criteria of 
FPS projects. The only measure created by the FPS for the purpose of 
accountability stipulates that wh en a project is rejected, the departmental 
approval committee must explain the reasons for this decision as proof of 
transparency and openness towards the municipalities and their communities. 
Otherwise, no explanation or justification is required. In case of project 
rejection, the municipalities would then have the right to appeal the decision to 
the "Directorio Unico de Fondos" (DUF) (Fondo de Inversion Productiva y 
Social 2002). However, when 1 asked community members ifthey knew what 
the DUF was or where it was located, respondents were completely unaware 
ofthis administrative body (Focus group discussion, San Pedro de Curhauahra 
2/12/02; Focus group discussion, Desaguadero 1/12/02). Furthermore, even if 
the community members understood their right of appeal, the remoteness of 
many villages and communities in Bolivia makes traveling to the DUF in La 
paz in order to initiate the appeal process a far too costly and inconvenient 
option for the vast majority of citizens. For example, in the case of San Pedro, 
it would mean a seven hour trip for which there is no public transportation. 
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The explanation given by the FPS field workers for this void is that the FPS 
design relies on already established mechanisms of 'social control' - mainly 
by the Vigilance Committees - to guarantee accountability of the Fund 
(Femandez, Personal Interview, La paz 30/11/02; Inchausti, Personal 
Interview La paz 19/11/02). The need for appeal under such conditions of 
transparency would therefore be unnecessary. 
In reality, however, most Vigilance Committees do not have the 
capacity to ensure accountability, either because they lack the technical 
expertise or because they lack time and resources. This finding - which 1 
explained earlier in Chapter Three -- was confirmed by the community 
members 1 talked to, as weil as NOO workers and local officiais (Focus group 
discussion, San Pedro de Curhauahra 2/12/02; Focus group discussion, 
Desaguadero 1/12/02; Ayo, Personal Interview, La Paz 14/12/02; Barrios, 
Personal Interview, La Paz 26/11/02). One Bolivian social scientist with 
extensive field experience in local communities succinctly noted: 
The Comite Vigilancia does not have the capacity to guarantee 
that they can adequately supervise the work of the Funds ... they 
can hardly do their own work (Lasema, Phone Interview 
Cochabamba 12/1/03). 
The communities 1 visited went on to argue that the vigilance committee was 
ineffective: 
They might be good people but they don't know what to do or they 
don't have the time to do it. After aIl they are simple people like us 
(Focus group discussion, San Pedro de Curhauahra 2/12/02). 
Ind~ed, community members perceived the mayor as having more power and 
authority than the vc. As one ofthe interviewees in Desagaudero put it: 
The VC does not have actual power. It can only 'watch' for the 
mayor, but he is the one who proposes the projects and has aIl the 
contacts and decision-making power ... He can provide financing for 
his town or for the towns of the councilors (Anonymous, personal 
interview, Desaguadero 1/12/02). 
Thus, consensus among participants in the different focus group discussions 
was that the Mayor remained the only pers on who can address local 
community complaints (Focus group discussion, San Pedro de Curhauahra 
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2/12/02; Focus group discussion, Desaguadero 1/12/02). Not only does this 
limit the community's sense of power in affecting public policy and voicing 
their demands, but it also limits their chances for holding the FPS -- and the 
state in general - accountable. The extent of this limitation becomes ev en 
more palpable when one considers the fact that the Mayor of San Pedro lives 
in La Paz and has not been to the community since the time of local elections 
(Focus group discussion, San Pedro de Curhauahra 2/12/02; Anonymous 2, 
personal interview 2/12/02). When 1 asked how the community voiced 
discontent over an FPS project, a school teacher in San Pedro said: 
Vou can demand a session with the mayor to plead your case, and he 
will pretend to li sten, but in the end he never makes any move to 
resolve your grievance (Anonymous 2, personal interview, San Perdo 
de Curahauhra1l12/02). 
The Director of the FPS agreed that there were neither mechanisms for 
sufficient accountability nor for internai monitoring of quality and 
transparency. In order to fill this void, he explained, the FPS was embarking 
on a new initiative to establish an independent unit for monitoring and 
accountability to which both sub-contracted agencies (including NGOs and 
grassroots organizations) and individuals could bring their grievances. At the 
same time, the Director noted that the FPS was 
also looking at the possibility of improving transparency of 
management vis-à-vis civil society and the municipalities. So next 
year we are going to design a system of interaction between the FPS 
and the municipalities and civil society ... an element that is very 
important is that of communication (Camacho, personal interview, La 
paz 28/11/02). 
Thus, there are currently negotiations going on between the FPS and UDAPE 
(the largest non-governmental policy-formulation think tank) to design an 
impact evaluation system for FPS that would ensure feedback from, and 
accountability to, the community, civil· society and different funding 
institutions. However, this remains part of the CUITent director's personal 
vision for the Fund and might not occur if there is either a change in FPS 
management or a change of government, as has happened in the pasto 
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Just as in the Egyptian case, it appears that communities have no clear 
and accessible accountability mechanisms available to them with regard to the 
FPS. Moreover, the findings from the field seem to confirm my earlier 
conclusions regarding the ineffectiveness of local democratization measures 
such as the vigilance committee and social control mechanisms endorsed by 
the LDN. Although these measures are a good first step towards local 
democratization, in practice they are not yet providing local communities and 
the masses at large with effective channels for their grievances with the state. 
Hence, it is easy to see the reason why people still resort to street protests and 
demonstrations - the kind of which eventually led to the President's 
resignation in 2003 and 2005-- to voice their discontent and demand change. 
Embededdness 
As 1 pointed out earlier, one reason behind establishing funds, as 
parallel institutions to state bureaucracy is to have flexible and effective 
communication with local communities in a way that responds to their needs 
and helps transcend long lost trust between the citizens and state institutions. 
ln contrast to the Egyptian Fund, the FPS has a relatively decentralized 
communication system which, theoretically, should facilitate such 
embeddedness. The departmental offices are fully authorized to make 
decisions regarding the projects within their jurisdiction without having to 
refer back to La Paz, something which is not the case with the Egyptian SFD. 
The departmental offices are also responsible for project follow-up and 
supervision. However, with only nine departmental offices serving Bolivia's 
314 municipalities, decentralization has failed to fully facilitate the 
accessibility of FPS for different communities. For sorne municipalities, 
simply reaching the FPS departmental office, or receiving a visit from follow-
up staff, involves more than a one-day trip. 
However, in practice it seems that the FPS( or at least its field 
specialists) have a very clear view of their role: working with the contractors 
in project implementation (i.e. technical aspects). but not with the community 
to ensure their needs are met (i.e., political-social aspects). The local 
community members as weil as the local officiaIs 1 interviewed, indicated that 
there are unexplained delays in FPS responses to their requests and problems, 
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and that they never know when the 'engineer' (the term they use to refer to 
FPS personnel) might visit the site or, if he does, whether it will be possible 
for them to share their concerns (Focus group discussion, San Pedro de 
Curhauahra 2/12/02; Focus group discussion, Desaguadero 1/12/02; Tikkuna, 
Personal Interview, Desaguadero 1/12/02). Moreover, wh en 1 accompanied the 
FPS specialist on site visits, his main communication was with the contractors 
building the school and the health-post. When 1 asked if he held meetings 
with community members during his field visits, he said that it was not 
required of him and that he would only interact with beneficiaries if there was 
a problem between them and the contractor (Fernandez, Personal Interview, 
Desagauadero 1/12/02). Although the community members acknowledged 
that dealing with the FPS was still better than dealing with other state agencies 
since, as they put it, "at least they do not keep us going in circles between the 
different departments," they still did not have much faith in the FPS due to 
their lack of communication with FPS staff (Focus group discussion, San 
Pedro de Curhauahra 2/12/02). These delays, the unclear communication of 
project criteria, and lack of prompt problem-resolving mechanisms have meant 
that the FISIFPS "is not perceived as an institution that addresses in an 
opportune form the needs ofthe community. Less than 50% [of participants in 
a comprehensive survey] believe that it does at times"(Aquilar y Asociados 
1999: 87). Thus, it seems that communication problems are not specifie to the 
communities 1 studied, but rather endemic throughout FPS projects. 
This lack of interaction between the Fund and the communities means 
that the communities do not view the FPS as a social institution that can bridge 
the gap between them and the state, in spite of the FPS's claims. According to 
the FPS Director, "our mandate is bigger than just helping the state reduce 
poverty, we want to set a model for other state institutions on how to establish 
responsive relationships with marginalized communities" (Camacho, personal 
interview, La Paz 28/11/02). Yet, it seems that the FPS has not managed to 
perpetuate this vision among its field staff or local communities. Responding 
to a question regarding the nature of the FIS, 61 percent of the sample 
beneficiaries viewed it as a "financing" institution, having nothing to do with 
intra-community or state-community relations, and not even part of the social 
policy institutions. Only 13 percent disagreed with this view and had a 
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different perception of the FIS (Aquilar y Asociados 1999: 121), while 42 
percent indicated that the FIS personnel rarely or never visit the projects (Ibid, 
84). Again, this is consistent with the vision in the communities 1 visited. 
Thus, communication difficulties coupled with the FPS's use of outside 
contractors has effectively eliminated the possibiIity for embeddedness. The 
primary project relationship is currently between FPS personnel and 
contractors, not communities. It is interesting to note that even when the 
communities acknowledged positive aspects of FPS - for example, that it was 
easier to communicate with the FPS than with other govemment agencies --
beneficiaries still viewed the FPS as an exception to the rule and did not see 
any relationship between FPS successes and the betterment of the state 
apparatus in general. Thus, the Fund did not improve citizens' perceptions of 
the state as a whole and, in tum, did not contribute to any potential for synergy 
on the national level. 
Strengthening civil society and creating synergy 
Although earlier efforts by the ESF to engage citizens seemed to have 
had the potential to strengthen civil society actors and create synergy between 
the state, its citizenry and civil society, this potential was not realized by the 
ESF's successors, the FISIFPS. With regard to the strengthening of civil 
society, two factors are of particular relevance: (1) the lack of FISIFPS 
emphasis on community organization and (2) the Fund's politicization. The 
focus of the FIS and the FPS has been on "building things" -- schools, health 
posts, water and sanitation projects -- in spite of an FIS-contracted impact 
assessment that concluded: ''the FIS needs to promote efficiency through 
focus on follow-up on beneficiaries participation, impact-monitoring, 
performance evaluation and systematic capacity-building," that is, with 
"emphasis on aspects of 'social technology' and less emphasis on 
'construction"'(Aquilar y Asociados 1999: 137). This tendency to focus on 
physical construction, however, has continued within the FPS, reflecting a" 
prioritization of projects that can be built easily and rapidly, thus satisfying the 
demands of govemments for action and of donors for rapid disbursement of 
funds. FPS implemented most of the infrastructure projects without the 
integral components of communal training and institutional capacity building, 
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activities that require an investment of time and money over a far longer 
period. Thus, as Blanes correctly put it, the Funds "did not create networks or 
social density ... rather, they distributed scarce resources among the po or, in a 
very badly institutionalized, centralist and vertical manner"(Blanes 1999: 10). 
Even more criticaIly, the Funds have inhibited the potential for 
organization and mobilization and nurtured dependency at the community 
level by disbursing funds and creating a state presence in a manner which then 
encourages beneficiaries to 'wait' and 'depend' on upcoming state initiatives. 
Barring (1988), Grandon et al. (1987) and others assert that the response of the 
poor in Latin America to the increasing austerity measures of neoliberal 
policies allowed them to take charge of their own destinies, finding forms of 
organization that made them collectively stronger and self-reliant, and more 
likely to engage in collective action (Grandon and al 1987; Barring 1988). In 
contrast, FISIFPS, while mitigating the effects of austerity in a paternalistic 
fashion, has not allowed for such organizations to emerge from its projects, 
thereby putting a damper on the potential for collective action. Furthermore, 
the Fund also discourages community organization when it dismisses 
community input and feedback into its projects, Le. not allowing citizens to 
feel an importance for and influence of their participation. Thereby further 
entrenching the sense of powerIessness that these marginalized communities 
already has. 
Secondly, because of the impressive achievements of the FISIFPS' 
predecessor, the ESF, the huge amount of international funds donors made 
available to the FPS, and the high salaries it paid to its staff, it became part of 
Bolivia's already pervasive political patronage system. The Funds became a 
place where politicians wanted to place their entourage, and the regime used 
the inauguration of projects as a device to spread political propaganda (even 
though sorne projects were never actually finished). As Fernando Romero, the 
former head ofESF, explains: 
There is a lot of money coming into the Funds .. .It had to become 
politicized ... They now have televised parties for projects ... with the 
Mayor and other political officiaIs attending .. .It became a source of 
political merit (Romero, Personal Interview, La Paz 10/12/02). 
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Losing the political impartiality that characterized the ESF has affected 
the FISIFPS stance towards civil society, not to mention communities' trust in 
it and their willingness to work with Fund-sponsored projects. According to 
an earlier assessment ofproject beneficiaries' perception of the Fund: 
In case of govemment change, it [the Fund] is considered to be 
a company that utilizes the work it executes for publicity and 
political propaganda, forgetting the promises made from one 
administration to another"(Aquilar y Asociados 1999: 122). 
Also, as 1 mentioned earlier, a change in govemment led the FPS to be less 
inclined to work with NGOs. As Roberto Lasema, a prominent Bolivian 
social scientist and director of a local NGO and think-tank puts it: "the 
honeymoon between the NGOs and the funds was only short-
lived ... Gradually, it replaced the NGOs with the municipalities, as partners" 
(Lasema, Phone Interview, Cochabamba 12/1/03). Not only did this shift 
compromise the potential for strengthening civil society actors, including 
NGOs, but it also curtailed the potential for development synergy, since there 
are now no state/civil society partnerships within the FPS. 
Additionally, the potential for more generalized development synergy 
was further crippled by the lack of another prerequisite: coordination between 
the Fund and other state institutions. In an interview with the Deputy Minister 
responsible for educational reform -- one of the sectors in which the FPS 
should be helping to implement projects -- she confirmed that there were no 
direct links between her department and the FPS (Rojas, Personal Interveiw, 
La Paz 11/12/02). With the exception of establishing the eligibility criteria for 
projects - a one-time activity -- there was an absence both in FPS operation 
manuals and in FPS staff practice of any clear mechanisms for coordination 
between the Fund and the relevant ministries. This lack of communication 
between FISIFPS and other state institutions led the aforementioned review of 
FIS to strongly urge that "the FIS should identify and implement a better way 
to coordinate its work with the Ministries responsible for social policies" 
(Aquilar y Asociados 1999: 136). The vital, yet missing, interaction between 
the communities, the NGOs, the Fund, the municipalities and the social sector 
ministries, with the purpose of expanding and strengthening the bases of 
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participation and structuring communal development, has proved detrimental 
for the creation of synergy and the construction of citizenship. 
Conclusion 
When assessing FPS within the context of the complicated state-civil 
society relations in Bolivia, two sets of conclusions are evident. First, both the 
negative and positive features of FPS are a reflection of the macro-political 
econornic frarnework and not vice versa, as sorne observers and scholar tend 
to argue50• Positively, the legal and political framework provided by the LPP 
led to the FPS's theoretical emphasis on participation as part of its projects' 
requirements, something missing from the texts of Egypt's SFD. AIso, as part 
of the national decentralization and local democratization processes, attempts 
at local planning, even when lagging, were still perceived as important both by 
the FPS workers and the communities. Moreover, LDN's attempt at a 
transparent distribution of national resources has also helped to give the FPS a 
transparent mechanism for the distribution of projects, another element that 
was missing in the case of the Egyptian SFD. 
On the negative side, however, just as political pacts at the national 
level limited and defined the functions of democratic governance, so did they 
impact the Funds' attitude toward local level governance and participatory 
practices. The divided, clientelistic party politics that plagued Bolivia at the 
national level contaminated the different Funds, as did the weakness of the 
state institutions as independent and institutionalized players. As a prominent 
Bolivian social scientist told me: 
It is difficult to establish institutions without being 'captured' by 
political parties. Vou need a very strong State with a professional 
bureaucracy, with a very strong juridical back-up and aIl this does not 
exist in Bolivia (Gerbe, Personal Interview, La paz 26111/02). 
50 Here I am referring to daims - discussed earlier in this chapter -- that the Funds prompted 
the process of decentralization and local democratization of 1994-95 (Goodman, M. and S. 
Morley (1998). Social Investment Funds in Latin America: Past Performance and Future Role. 
Washington D.C., InterAmerican Development Bank. 
, Parker, A. and R. Serrano (2000). Promoting Good Local Governance through 
Social Funds and Decentralization. New York, The W orld Bank. 
, Medina, J. (2002). Personal Interview. La Paz. 
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This is evident in how the change in govemment at the national level resulted 
in drastic shifts in the policies of the Funds and created an overall lack of 
continuity of vision. As the CUITent Director of the FPS attested: "we could 
not keep the FISIFPS on the margins of politics" (Camacho, personal 
interview, La paz 28/11/02). Moreover, "traditional clientelism has continued 
because of the weakness of autonomous social organizations that are capable 
of demanding the right to a citizenship based on participation in the decision-
making process" (Garcia-Guadilla 2002: 104). Again this was evident in the 
communities' responses to the weakness of VC and the ineffectiveness of the 
POA process. The case of the FPS attests to the fact that there can be no 
administrative fix for political problems, as many technocrats, policy-makers 
and scholars would like us to believe. 
The second conclusion to be drawn from this case study is that Funds 
in Bolivia have exhausted their mission and their continuation remains a 
product of the tendency to seek easy solutions to the complicated problems 
that different regimes have been unable to resolve. The ESF worked weIl 
during its initial existence. Observers agreed that the Fund was able to 
provide a number of deprived communities with basic facilities, as weIl as to 
create a huge number of temporary employment opportunities that briefly 
eased the pain of structural adjustment reforms for a large segment of the 
population.51 It also helped initiate a positive reciprocal relationship between 
civil society, alienated communities and the state. However, these positive 
outcomes were reversed by subsequent funds, as shown above. AIso, the ESF 
existed at a time when there were neither as many municipalities nor a clear 
system for distribution of national resources. LPP and LDN later filled both of 
these voids, which has meant that the FPS and other Funds now act only as 
'cashiers': providing funds as designated by the LDN to projects that are 
formulated by the municipalities. As a consequence, the FPS no longer has a 
niche. With the exception of the FPS management and donor agency officiaIs, 
51 See Graham, C. (1997). Safety Nets. Politics and the Poor. Washington D.C., Brookings 
Institution. 
, Torres, 1. and M. Perez (2000). Conte ni do Social de Las Reformas Estructurales en 
Bolivia. Las Reformas Estructurales en Bolivia: Tomo II. La Paz, Fundaci6n Milenio: 232-
294. 
Medina, Personal interview 29/11/02. 
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local community members as weIl as govemment officiaIs and development 
consultants agreed that the Funds should be terminated and their resources 
channeled directly to the municipalities (Focus group discussion, San Pedro de 
Curhauahra 2/12/02; Focus group discussion, Desaguadero 1/12/02; Lasema, 
Phone Interview Cochabamba 12/1/03; Romero, Personal Interview, La paz 
10/12/02; Medina, Personal interview 29/11/02; Ayo, Personal Interview, La paz 
14/12/02; Barrios, Personal Interview 26/11102). 
However, due to the weak capabilities of the municipalities, and the 
unwillingness of the central govemment to tackle such a politically volatile 
and administratively complex issue, both the govemment and the donor 
agencies continue to support the FPS and other Funds. From my interviews 
with the officiaIs at the Inter-American Bank for Development and the World 
Bank - the two main supporters and funding agencies of the FPS -- it was 
clear that the Funds, as in the Egyptian case, represent an easy way for don or 
agencies to circumvent the notorious Bolivian national govemment. It was far 
easier to disburse, monitor and account for money -- the two overriding 
concerns of multilateral donors - when it was channeled through Funds as 
opposed to ministries or other government bodies (Godinez, Personal 
Interveiw, La Paz 22/11/02; Lena, Personal Interview, 11/12/02). However, 
unlike the Egyptian case where donors recognized the SFD's shortcomings, it 
seemed that donor agencies were happy with the Funds in Bolivia, mainly 
based on the previous track record of the ESF (Godinez, Personal Interveiw, 
La paz 22/11/02; Lena, Personal Interview, 11/12/02; Senior Economist, 
phone interview, Washington D.C. 10/2/03). Yet, it is interesting to note that 
in both cases there was continued donor support for the Funds, which poses 
the question: to what extent is don or support pre-determined and political 
rather than an informed decision based on the positive exemplary results of the 
Funds (something which the literature of the World Bank claims)? As for the 
Bolivian govemment, abolishing the Funds would necessitate capacity-
building at the local level, as weIl as a con crete partnership with NGOs and 
other actors in civil society, since the municipalities would not be able to 
handle the resources on their own. The regime, however, seems unwilling to 
undertake this step. Moreover, as the Funds -- and the high salaries they 
provide -- act as a haven for politically well-connected bureaucrats, the idea of 
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eliminating them promises to generate a lot of political resistance within elite 
circles, something that the fragile Bolivian regime is not equipped to handle. 
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Chapter Six 
Engineering Consent: The De-Politicization of the Political 
" ... That does not mean, however, that the neo-conservative analysis and the 
empirical arguments on which it claims to base its validity are 'true' in any objectively 
testable sense, or that they are 'right' according to substantive criteria of political legitimacy 
and social justice. [It is) ... simply highly effective and self-confirming as a political formula 
with which electoral majorities can be forme d, and with which existing large solidaristic 
communities of interest can be further disorganized. As a formula, it can only be challenged 
by a democratic left that moves beyond its traditional defensive positions and adopts new 
concepts, goals, and strategies whose outlines today remain largely uncertain"(Offe 1996: 
179). 
Drawn from case studies of Bolivia and Egypt, in this chapter my 
conclusions will focus on the three sphere model 1 described at the beginning 
of this thesis namely, state, civil society, and economy. 1 argue that 
neoliberalism severely limits the possibility of achieving development synergy 
and strengthening civil society. These limitations are structural one s, inherent 
to the neoliberal development model and, just as important, intrinsically 
grounded in specifie manifestations of economy, civil society and the state 
found in many developing countries. Such structures, 1 argue, do not allow 
new institutions like SFs to push forward such an ideal three-way relationship 
among the economy, state and civil society. Rather than strengthening civil 
society and creating development synergy, SFs are shown to be just an attempt 
to give neoliberal policies a human face and inhibit the potential for structural 
changes from below. 
ln the first section 1 concisely summarize my fieldwork findings in 
terms of the indicators discussed throughout the research. 1 then, specifically 
highlight how and why the two Funds have not and will not strengthen civil 
society, because of being ingrained in the neoliberal premises of technical 
obsession on the expense of structural change, and its funding decisions. 
Finally the two last sections focus on broader theoretical and research issues 
that emerged in the course of this research and as a result of it. 
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Deconstructing the Social Funds' My th 
ln both the Bolivian and the Egyptian cases, the Funds did not 
contribute meaningfully to strengthening civil society either at the community 
level or at the level of civil society as a whole. To recapitulate, the two Funds 
did not fare weIl in terms of community/civil society participation, 
accountability, and embededdness. The case studies show that SFs transfer 
differing degrees of responsibility to selected civil society actors at the 
implementation stage (for example, during service delivery), but do not 
engage diverse civil society actors in formulating Fund policy. Both Funds 
did not have clear mechanisms to guarantee accountability to the communities 
to which they catered, nor to the civil society organizations with which they 
worked. Finally, although the FPS personnel seemed to be in closer contact 
with the local community than with their Egyptian peers, this was largely an 
individual endeavor by sorne of its' staff. In both Funds, there were no 
institutionalized venues linking the Fund horizontally to community 
organizations nor did the Fund support civil society organizations in carrying 
out their major functions. Thus, on a more aggregate level, the Funds did not 
increase the ability of their target civil society partners to legitimize forms of 
resistance or protest, to push alternative discourse into the realm of public 
policy, or to pressure states with the threat of collective action or resistance, 
criteria 1 cite in Chapter One as essential to the creation of a strong civil 
society. 
Rather the functional differences between the two Funds, the primary 
factors shaping civil society in each case, even on the micro-Ievel 
(communities) in both countries were directly related to the differing macro-
economic and political environments of Bolivia and Egypt. These included 
the set of empowering legal reforms adopted by the Bolivian state (LPP & 
LDN), as weIl as distributional mechanisms facilitating the funding of 
community organizations at the local level. The Bolivian state's relative 
support for civil society can be contrasted with the many legislative 
constraints existing in the Egyptian context, most notably the lack of a 
pluralist dis course and the enactment of Emergency Law prohibiting collective 
organization. This seemed to be a logical outcome of the difference in regime 
type, Bolivia being democratic and Egypt authoritarian. Hence, each 
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country' s SF mirrored both the shortcomings and strengths of the political and 
economic systems in place. However, in both cases, the overall intention of 
the SF was to provide the political support necessary for the continuation of 
neoliberal policies, which in the end resulted in a crisis of state legitimacy that 
was largely independent of specifie govemments. Thus, while the technical 
aspects of social service delivery may be different in Egypt and Bolivia, the 
politicization of these programmes has been very similar. Within this 
overview of SFs and their relationship to structural conditions, two sets of 
conclusions stand out and serve to forcefully deconstruct the myth of Social 
Funds as instrumental in sewing the seeds of state-civil society synergy. The 
first set of conclusions relates to myths about Social Funds' supposedly 
innovative and economically efficient administration Le. 'technical' 
soundness. The second set involves misconceptions about various aspects of 
Funds' funding process. 
Social Fund 'Technical' Soundness and 'Structural' Impediments 
This study of SFs, has shown that the neoliberal preoccupation with 
their technical set up (especially, their emphasis on decentralization and 
detachment from national bureaucracies) is misplaced in the case of 
developing states where the problem is govemability more than govemance.52 
Under the neoliberal model, a bureaucracy that undertakes the efficient, 
consistent and professional "implementation" of technocratie policy goals is 
wrongly expected to overcome problems of the state in developing countries. 
Although this kind of bureaucracy is essential for positive developmental 
output, it cannot substitute for the political will of the state and its ideological 
inclinations. For example, the problems of the 'politicized state' as shown in 
Bolivia and the entrenched rent-seeking state elite in Egypt, are problems that 
have ramifications on social policy but are beyond technical changes. Rather 
as shown in Chapter Three, these are problems that are grounded in the 
historical structural evolution ofthe state in the two cases, and hence, can only 
be dealt with structuraIly. Thus, as Leftwich correctly asserts: 
52 Governability is used here to indicate the 'ability' and 'power' to govern, while governance 
is the 'quality' and 'effectiveness' of government actions. 
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[N]either sophisticated institutional innovation nor the best-
trained or best-motivated public service will be able to 
withstand the withering effects of corruption or resist the 
developmentally-enervating pulls of special or favored interests 
if the political and authority of the state do not sustain and 
protect them. (Leftwich 1994: 381) 
These 'developmentally-enervating' problems can only be overcome by 
changes in the state set-up and not only the bureaucracy of govemment. 
My case study of Social Funds attests to this. Although SFs were set 
outside the purportedly corrupt national bureaucracy, offered competitive 
salaries to attract high caliber professionals, and adopted a decentralized 
instifutional structure, both Funds were unable to escape politicization and 
corruption. Thus, the deep-rooted and complex problems of the state in Egypt 
and Bolivia is not simply related to the presence or absence of a decentralized 
and efficient bureaucracy, but also to issues of lack of legitimacy and absence 
of a c1ear developmental vision. While insulation from the particularistic 
demands of elite or privileged actors was not successful, the idea of 
technocratic policy-making has been far more successful in insulating the 
Funds from civil society actors, despite the rhetoric to the contrary. In both 
cases, although to a lesser degree in Bolivia, the SFs were not embedded 
within the communities in which they worked or within civil society at large, 
thereby belying the essence and requisites for synergy. 
The Bolivian and Egyptian SFs were based on the idea that social 
policy should be based on its retum on investment and its contribution to 
comprehensive economic growth through the building of human resources. 
This resonates with the apolitical tone advocated by neoliberal ideology, 
which stresses the ide a of the supremacy of economic imperatives above ail 
other goals. By advocating the market as the main locus of, and proposed 
mediator for, the resolution of societal conflicts, it undermines civil society's 
role as a vehicle through which citizens may promote their interests. For 
example in both the Bolivian and Egyptian Funds, the programs and projects 
were chosen not according to the priorities expressed by the community and 
civil society organizations, but rather on the assumption that these programs 
(micro-credit or infrastructure projects) had better economic viability. 
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Accordingly, through the Funds -and similar means-, civil society 
actors are pu shed into believing that it is not politics that decides social policy 
and determines the boundaries of inclusion, but rather efficient use of 
resources, as dictated by the market and 'objective' scientific findings about 
the optimal use of these resources. As part of the neoliberal paradigm, SFs 
also rescue the state from responsibility toward its citizens, by cutting back on 
universal social provision and substituting selective institutions like SFs. The 
different initiatives of the Funds were meant to take pressure off the state as 
the primary party responsible for the disadvantaged and, instead, emphasize 
the states role as an agent helping the disadvantaged better integrate into the 
market. The SFD's vocational training program for those who lost their jobs 
with privatization of the public sector and the FPS's provision of facilities 
using local funds, are cases in point. 
In this environment, civil society actors are dissuaded from organizing 
for political struggle and encouraged to find ways to work in accordance with 
market dynamics. For example, SF's emphasis on targeted assistance to help 
people participate in the market helps to generate political apathy (Oxhorn 
1998) and further erodes the potential for collective action, especially wh en 
such programs feed into individualistic survival strategies. Poor people drain 
their already limited financial resources seeking out formerly state-sponsored 
services from within the market. Citizens' energies are channeled away from 
'demanding' rights -- either through political struggle or engagement with 
civil society -- to seeking subsistence on individual basis (for example, instead 
of being active in a union, a worker seeks out an additional job). This was 
evident in the case of both Funds, where none of the project participants 1 met 
questioned the basic fact that they needed to struggle with a mediocre social 
safety net like the SFs in order to get basic services su ch as access to a clinie 
or garbage collection, which is part of their rights as citizens. Moreover, in 
both SFs there weren't any networks of project participants or training for 
community organizations that could facilitate organization within civil society. 
Thus, not only do neoliberal institutions such as SFs help perpetuate inequality 
by setting visible boundaries for inclusion and eroding the basis of equal 
citizenship rights, they also eat at the heart of the solidarity and collectivity on 
which civil society thrives. Hence, these programs superficially mitigate the 
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pain of economic adjustment without helping citizens organize of democratic 
struggle. Thus, as one author puts it, "the dynamic of policies of 
compensation, in general, and particularly that of the funds, do es not seem to 
lead to a process of citizenship-building based on popular participation" (Levy 
1997: 675). The fact that SFs do not contribute to su ch process suggests that 
in effect they are mechanisms for cooptation, not change. 
SFs are also held up as an antidote to problems such as poverty and 
unemployment, white often ignoring deep-rooted, structural inequalities. 
Following a "liberal" research tradition, such as that of Kuznets, many 
economists and social scientists have developed a linear understanding of 
inequality as involving temporary rewards to variable productivity. It is clear 
that in the cases of Egypt and Bolivia, social policy and poverty reduction 
institutions have been influenced by this economistic literature on poverty, 
which emphasize that the main policy solution to inequality is to effectively 
target resources toward the poor.53 As my interviews with employees in both 
Funds demonstrate, targeting resources is seen as the core issue in overcoming 
marginalization and poverty. Although targeting resources toward the po or is 
an important component of poverty alleviation, when considered in isolation 
from structural conditions it is not conducive to the full inclusion of the 
marginalized, since the structures that create poverty and power imbalance 
remain intact. 
Ultimately, for citizens to be able to formulate and pursue their 
interests - the main prerogative of civil society -- the state must alter many of 
these structural conditions and help to level the playing field. Social and 
political change on this scale cannot simply be addressed through selective 
targeting ofwelfare programs, even supposedly innovative ones like the Social 
Funds. 
53 See the review in Londono, J. (1997). Persistent Poverty and Excess Inequality: Latin 
America, 1970-1995. Washington D.C, Inter-American Development Bank. 
,InterAmerican Deve10pment Bank (1998). Facing Up to Inequality. Washington 
D.C., InterAmerican Development Bank. 
, nterAmerican Development Bank (1998). Facing Up to Inequality. Washington 
D.C., InterAmerican Development Bank. 
,Szekely, M. (1998). The Economics ofPoverty, Ineguality and Wealth 
Accumulation in Mexico. London, Macmillan. 
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Funding Choices 
In addition, to the misleading rhetoric about SFs technical abilities in 
addressing structural issues, SFs play a huge role in cooptation through its 
funding choices. Both the SFD and FPS provided support to NGOs as 
opposed to grassroots organizations. Thus, both Funds chose to support one 
faction of civil society at the expense of another more representative and 
internally democratic. To understand the implications ofthis choice, we need 
to note that NGOs are frequently identified as grassroots' organizations, yet 
both their functions and the class composition of their members differ 
significantly. Grassroots organizations are "membership organizations that 
permit their members collectively to represent economic and political 
interests" (Petras and Arrellano-Lopez 1994: 599), including cooperatives, 
unions, and professional organizations. NGOs, on the other hand, are non-
profit international or local organizations that promote social development 
either through provision of services or implementation of livelihood-
enhancement projects, dominated by middle-class professionals. Due to the 
difference in the class-base of the rank-and-file and leadership of NGOs 
versus grassroots' organizations, the earlier tend to focus less on issues of 
collective struggle for citizenship. Being membership-based institutions, 
grassroots' organizations have more potential to be representative of their 
constituencies than NGOs, which do not necessarily have a core-constituency 
to whom they are accountable. As the case study of SFD shown, the funded 
NGOs, were neither representative of, nor accountable to, the communities 
they worked with. Moreover, grassroots' organizations prioritize the strategic 
interests of their constituencies. Collective action and mobilization is at the 
core of their activities. In contrast, NGOs tend to focus more on service 
provision without giving due attention to issues of community organization. 
Funds, therefore, are specifically directed towards entities that can provide 
services and not towards ones that can increase civil society's ability - even 
on the community level -- to organize and rally for strategie interests. 
Additionally, the funding opportunities created by the SFs within 
certain pre-determined fields of activity (e.g. micro-credit in the case of Egypt, 
and infrastructure in the case ofBolivia) have led to the proliferation ofNGOs 
working in sectors which are not necessarily perceived by local communities 
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to be high priorities. In other words, SFs often lead NGOs to bypass the real 
needs of the community, as defined by its constituency, in order to chase SF-
determined funding opportunities. For example, there is no evidence that the 
micro-credit projects preferred by the SFD, or the infrastructure projects 
preferred by the FPS, are more beneficial to the Egyptian or Bolivian societies, 
than the vocational training or health awareness projects that community 
members prefer. 
Another outcome of these predetermined funding decisions is the 
erosion ofNGOs' diversity ofviews and activities. Currently in Egypt, there 
are almost no CDAs engaged in advocacyc and mobilization activities, while 
there are thousands undertaking micro-credit projects. Similarly in Bolivia, 
there are thousands working in social services delivery while the number 
working on human rights are progressively decreasing. And although those 
activities are to a great extent related to the availability of funding 
opportunities in general, SFs further exacerbate this asymmetry of 
development both because of their attractiveness to foreign donors and their 
ability to control exponentially more funds, but also because of their ability to 
link macro-Ievel, sector-based aid to local communities. As a consequence, 
not only is there a mushrooming of fund-chasing NGOs in La paz and Cairo 
(for example), but now we see similar processes being perpetuated even in 
smalliocai communities in Ismailia or Des Aguadero. 
ln addition, due to funding sources and procedures, SFs in Bolivia and 
Egypt are more dependent and accountable to don ors than to their elected 
bodies and civil societies. Not only does this weaken the possibility for 
democratization, but it also creates a lack of accountability to any stakeholder 
by playing off the different donors and national govemment agencies against 
each other, as in the Egyptian case. This problem is made worse by the fact 
that funding agencies seem to scrutinize the administrative requirements of 
SFs more than their govemance (for example, how representative and 
accountable they are to their constituencies). Moreover, 1 am not sure if the 
donor agencies have the will to push forward these kinds of reforms. It was 
clear from the changes in both Funds (as detailed in Chapters Four and Five), 
that both the national political elite and the Funds' bureaucrats were able to 
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manipulate international don ors and direct the Funds according to their own 
agenda. As one author put it: 
domestic political forces prevail over international technocratie 
linkages wh en it cornes to re-distributive social policy making. 
International alignments, although backed by prestige and 
money, simply lack the political clout to override vested 
societal groups (Hunter and Brown 2000: 131). 
For both states, the SF was often used as an attractive façade to get more 
international funding, while the dynamics behind spending the money 
remained the same, that is, dictated by political needs of the regime to curb 
dissent against failed economic restructuring, as in the case of Egypt, or to 
control the use of municipal funds and build political legitimacy in 
communities less penetrated by the state in Bolivia. 
Theoretical Reflections 
On the Neoliberal Model 
By virtue ofhow and why they were started, Social Funds are rooted in 
the neoliberal tradition and thus also reflect the structural deticiencies of the 
neoliberal model as a conceptual and technical framework for development. 
Conceptually, the neoliberal model is rooted in the 'western-Iiberal' origins of 
possessive individualism as initiated by Hobbes and followed by Hegel's 
dichotomous paradigm of private/public spheres, both of which gave impetus 
later to modernization theorists and neoclassical economists. As such the 
model is grounded in two main presuppositions: the primacy of human beings 
as homos economus, and the rivalry between the state and non-state agents. 
The tirst presumption, which affects the formulation of policies and 
institutions, stresses the idea of human beings as rational economic agents 
aiming at maximizing their gain in the market through the use of the political 
arena. It promotes an essentialist perception of 'citizens' as primarily 
individual economic subjects, marginalizing the socio-political context 
surrounding their existence and actions --an understanding that further 
weakens the standing ofthose citizens in their attempt to construct their rights. 
This explains the market-supremacy that SFs emphasize, choosing projects 
based on economic rewards and approaching citizens as clients. 
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As for the second presumption, based on the idea of rivalry between 
state and non-state actors, discourse and practice under the neoliberal model 
avoids strengthening the state in order to give supremacy to se/ected non-state 
players within the economy and civil society, but only provided that they are 
economically beneficial. The model therefore excludes different societal 
actors who are perceived as not contributing to economic growth (e.g. 
unskilled labor). Technically, the dynamics of neoliberal reform as carried out 
in most developing countries -- including Bolivia and Egypt -- are focused on 
eliminating opposition rather than strengthening support. Thus, the selected 
non-state actors to be strengthened under this model are the ones capable of 
inhibiting envisioned reform, which are invariably not the marginalized 
sectors. Although this is not the most beneficial arrangement for prospects of 
long-term reform, it is the politically "safest" strategy. "Seen in this light, the 
'politics of economic adjustment' reads merely as the 'politics of neutralizing 
the losers'" (Schamis 1999: 238). Social Funds have therefore continually 
targeted the politically vocal and not those most in need, so for example in the 
Egyptian case there has been a rise in the programs that target new graduates 
on the expense of those aimed at the poorest of the poor. Similarly in the 
Bolivian case, as mentioned in chapter Four, the projects of FPS and its 
predecessors were used for political propaganda purposes, despite their 
usefulness or lack thereof for overcoming economic problems. Aiso in both 
cases the Fund was used as a means for rewarding the outer-tier of regime 
elite, i.e. to continue buying there loyalty during times when the economic 
crisis can push for divisions within that elite. 
Neoliberalism also advocates a specifie understanding of political 
liberalism that champions the interests of the oligarchy. Based on Rawls and 
Dworkin, liberalism presumes two essential principles: 1) the state's "equal 
concern and respect" for ail citizen s, and 2) the state's role in guaranteeing 
"autonomy" of citizens to chose and pursue their life projects (Dworkin 1977; 
Rawls 1993; Rothstein 1998). However, the principle of equal concern and 
respect does not address the appropriate level of state intervention with regard 
to economic distribution and social policy coverage (Roth stein 1998). So the 
kind of social policy programs and institutions, their level of selectivity and 
their scope remain largely a matter of political choice and not an inherent 
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ideological given of liberalism. Under the neoliberal discourse, the two 
princip les --equal concern and autonomy- were taken to mean the neutrality of 
the state and that the socio-economic equity is an outcome, not a goal, of 
political and macro-economic policies. Thus, the design of SFs as the 
neoliberal invention for administering social policy attests to this parochial 
and biased understanding of liberalism. By choosing to focus the neoliberal 
views regarding social policy in an institution (SF) that does not champion 
comprehensive inclusion even of the most vulnerable --despite being called a 
social safety net- not to mention advocacy of social citizenship rights, the 
neoliberal model has been pushing forward social exclusion. 
On Civil Society 
When 1 started this research, 1 presumed that civil societies which have 
contributed to a transition from authoritarian to democratic rule tend to be 
"stronger" than those which did not. After the completion of my research, 1 
now believe that "strength" is not the right characterization. Rather, the focus 
should be on civil society's "potential." Based on my two case studies, 
although Bolivia did not represent an "ideal" of a strong civil society (with aIl 
its democratic aspects and its ability to induce change), it did, however, show 
signs of having much more potential of becoming one than in the Egyptian 
case. In Bolivia, civil society actors were capable of demanding citizenship 
rights through organizing marches, establishing forums and generating rights-
based discourse. This 'political' vibrancy and engagement were subsequently 
reflected in the Bolivian Fund, where demands for accountability on the part 
ofFPS, although still unmet, were much stronger than in the Egyptian case. In 
Egypt, on the other hand, civil society organizations were more passive and 
lacked a sense of social and political consciousness. And while the SFD was 
incapable of creating any form of organization that could serve as a vehicle for 
advocacy and change, its partner civil society organizations were not pushing 
it to do so. 
In spite of Bolivia's potential, however, funding decisions and state 
strategy directed civil society organizations toward service delivery rather than 
advocacy and mobilization, as was in the Egyptian case. This direction has 
proved detrimental in both countries to the construction of citizenship. On the 
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one hand, the state in hoth cases adopted selective social policy measures, 
creating a de facto situation of Iimited and selective citizenship rights. On the 
other hand, hoth citizens and civil society organizations shied away from the 
struggle for citizenship rights. 
Finally, from my fieldwork in Bolivia and Egypt, it is evident that the 
conception of development synergy hetween the state and civil society can in 
itself be exclusionary due to persisting power inequalities in those countries. 
ln both cases, there were partnerships between strong private actors and the 
state, which excluded more subordinate groups, sectors, and classes (such as 
women, other ethnic groups, the working classes, etc.). In both contexts, 
Gramsci's understanding of the hegemonic state that dominates and uses civil 
society within an oligarchic setting54 seemed to be the best explanation for 
civil society-state dynamics and concomitantly the use of SFs by those states. 
The State and the Regime 
Another issue that came out clearly from my research was how regime-
type al one is not enough to predict the ability of civil society to ensure 
inclusion. This is a rather important finding, since the study of 
democratization has been at the forefront in comparative politics for years 
now, in which the democratized countries are expected to he faring much 
better than their non-democratic peers. And although this might he true 
between ideal-types (a typical democracy and a typical authoritarian regime), 
it is not ail that true when we look at the different shades of democracy and 
authoritarianism that exist in the developing world currently. That is, a 
dichotomous framework, which sees democracy as antithetically opposed to 
authoritarianism is not necessarily appropriate to the analysis of developing 
countries. The cases illustrate that the state and civil society, under two-
different regime types, continue to share a number of similarities. In this 
regard, 1 find the distinction between a 'democratic regime' and a 'democratic 
state' enlightening (Przeworski, Manin et al. 1999). Although Bolivia has a 
democratic regime and Egypt an authoritarian one, my case studies have 
shown that civil society relations and both Bolivia's and Egypt's use of SFs 
54 The term is used here in a relaxed sense referring to a model tailored to the interests ofthe 
few but not necessarily the landed or extractive elite -which is the c1assic use of the term. 
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share many similarities because they both lack a 'democratic state.' The 
Bolivian case, for example, demonstrates Acufia and Smith's conception of 
"dualist democracies" where "state elites establish an alliance with a strategie 
minority of the opposition for the purpose of excluding the majority of the 
remaining social actors by disarticulating and neutralizing their capacity for 
collective action"(Acufia and Smith 1994). Likewise, the results ofthis dualist 
democracy can also be seen in the exclusionary character of the semi-
authoritarian state in Egypt. In both cases SFs have been overly politicized via 
similar clientalistic dynamics between communities and civil society 
organizations on the one hand, and via state institutions on the other. In both 
cases, the Fund came as "a poli tic al response to social conflict produced by 
economic crisis, in the absence of channels for citizen expression and 
participation, and in response to state failure to respond satisfactorily to social 
demands" (Garcia-Guadilla 2002: 98). Thus, with the recent waves of 
democratization, it seems that a variance in regime-type alone should not be 
the key factor in political analysis. Rather, the emphasis should be on a 
detailed analysis of specifie state-civil society interest intermediation pattern 
and its governing le gal, economic, and political structures. 
This finding also gives impetus to historical-structural analysis in 
comparative politics. That is because although the two cases are in two 
different regions of the world with completely different cultures and dominant 
world-views, they still share similar features by virtue of similar structural 
evolution. Similar economic and political factors have shaped state-civil 
society relations similarly. 
Future Directions for Research 
Based on these theoretical reflections, it seems that a future research 
agenda requires a paradigm shift in terms of how we understand civil society 
and its relationship to the state in developing countries. Our conception of 
civil society and its optimum relationship to the state must be dynamic and 
reflect the socio-economic context, and historical development of the 
environment in which it exists, rejecting both dogmas and ready-ma?e molds 
and models. Further research that examines the role of civil society on issues 
of inclusion and citizenship construction is needed. Such research needs to 
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factor in the limitations of civil society in developing countries, both under a 
democracy and lack thereof. As the two cases have shown civil society under 
two different regime types have exhibited sorne similar shortcomings and 
sorne different limitations. Yet, in both cases there was a lot to be aspired to 
in terms of citizenship construction and the role that civil society can, or may 
be cannot play in this regard. In this research 1 focused on this interconnection 
-between civil society and citizenship construction- within the realm of social 
policy. Further research is still needed to examine the different manifestations 
of this connection in different realms, including human rights, labor relations, 
and women rights. Combined, the findings and outcome of such research can 
provide us with a comprehensive understanding of the potentials and 
limitations of both civil society and the process of citizenship-building in 
developing countries, which are two of the most salient issues in the lives and 
study of these countries. 
Moreover, both case studies demonstrate that not only the state and the 
economy condition civil society, but so does the political society. Political 
parties and politicians influence civil society in different ways under different 
frameworks adopted by the state. In Egypt, this means that the weakness and 
lack ofmass-based opposition political parties further weakened civil society's 
ability to produce an alternative political discourse. While in Bolivia, even 
though the state adopted a more favorable legal and economic framework in 
support of civil society (through the LPP and the LDN) than its Egyptian peer, 
the patronage and factionalist conduct of political parties undermined the 
potential positive effect of this framework on civil society. We need further 
research on this critical dialectical relationship between political society and 
civil society in developing countries. However, as other research has shown, 
the presence of strong political parties carries the threat of politicization and 
factionalism of civil society (Oxhorn 1995; Hawthorn 2001). Thus, this 
dialectical relationship between the political society and 'civil society' needs 
to be further examined, especially under the context of pseudo-democracy 
prevalent in most of the developing world, where -as the case-studies have 
shown- the two spheres (political and civil societies) are not fully-developed, 
and features of clientelism and politicization are present equally in the newly-
democratized as weIl as the authoritarian contexts. 
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In general, there needs to be a return to the study of power structures 
underlining the different phenomenon that comparativists are interested in, be 
it civil society, citizenship, social policy or poverty. Moving away from 
minimalist technical preoccupations to re-emphasizing structural causation 
including division and use of resources and concentration or distribution of 
power. In other words, there is a need to reverse neoliberal/neoclassical 
technical reductionism and to re-politicize the political, interpreting socio-
political and socio-economic phenomenon for what they are; reflections of 
power distribution and power relations. 
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Appendix 1: Research Methodology and Techniques 
The research employed a predominantly qualitative methodology 
appropriate for in-depth analysis and understanding of the complexity of state-
society relations. 1 obtained relevant data through semi-structured interviews 
with key informant figures in the sites/communities under study (beneficiaries 
as weil as upper, middle and lower management employees of the SF, both at 
the site and in the central office). 1 conducted interviews with the non-
govemmental organizations acting as SF counterparts in each of the sites 
under study. In addition, 1 consulted secondary resources from the literature 
as weil as primary documents produced by the two SFs, the World Bank and 
the two govemments. Finally, 1 conducted field visits to the communities in 
which each of the two chosen regional offices has projects. 
1 chose the sample randomly, but first established certain criteria for 
choice in order to omit possible bias. 1 chose one regional office in each 
country, which covered rural and urban sites. In addition, the sites had to be 
away from the institutions' head-offices in Cairo and La paz where there is a 
higher probability for success -because of proximity to and supervision of the 
political authority. The"sample reflected the difference among the two case 
studies in the operational setting of the two institutions, in addition to the 
demographic, social, political and economic contexts of the two countries. 
That is, in the case of Egypt the SFD projects under the regional office were 
within the geographic boundaries of one govemarate, while in Bolivia the 
projects falling un der one departmental office extended into three 
municipalities.55 In both cases, however, the sample projects of each fund 
represented more than one percent of the population, i.e. an acceptable sample 
size. In each of the two cases, twenty-five interviews where conducted with 
NOO workers, management officers of the funds both at Headquarters and in 
the sites, and beneficiaries of the projects, as weil as with World Bank and 
other donor-agency representatives and intellectuals working on the issue of 
civil society in each ofthe two countries. 
55 The 314 Bolivian municipalities are covered by nine FPS offices corresponding to the 
number ofBolivian departments. While the SFD is represented by 23 -and 5 sub-offices-
offices covering 26 governerates. -
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In Bolivia, the two sites visited were Desaguadero and San Pedro de 
Curauhara. The projects in both sites were infrastructural; consisting of the 
building of a school in one site and a clinic in another. There was no 
contracting ofNGOs at the time, something which reflected a shi ft in direction 
that will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five. There were no local NGOs in 
either of the sites. Yet 1 did interviewa number ofNGO representatives who 
both have and have not worked with FIS (the predecessor of FPS) in the past. 
In Egypt, 1 focused on the Al-Ismailia field-office which had sub-contracted 
the active project to a semi-govemmental agency - the Productive Family 
Organization -- as 1 explain in Chapter Four. 1 also conducted interviews with 
the other 5 NGOs within the govemerate which had also received funding 
from the SFD at earlier stages. 
ln each of the project sites of the two countries, 1 conducted three focus 
group discussions and at least 10 semi-structured interviews with community 
members. In Bolivia, one of each of the focus group discussions included the 
members of the community supervisory committee -the community 
counterpart of the FPS. AlI groups included both men and women and was 
composed of 8 to 15 participants depending on the size of the community and 
the availability of participants. The discussions were focused on how the 
projects were chosen, what is the role played by the community and/or the 
committee (in case of Bolivia) and how the communication channels between 
the Fund and the community. 1 facilitated the discussions which were 
conducted either on the project-site or in the main square of the village/small-
towns. 
The community members participating in the semi-structured 
interviews were from among the participants of the focus group discussions, in 
order to further probe sorne of the issues they raised in the discussions as weil 
as other members of the community who were chosen randomly off the street 
in order to validate the claims made during the focus group discussions. The 
interview questions raised the same issues discussed in the focus group 
discussions, namely; community participation, SF accountability, and 
embeddedness. 
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